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Abstract.
In this thesis I study the implications of the speed of learning in an overlapping
generations model. The equilibrium can be altered, for example, by a change in the
level of government purchases and this can be financed in various ways. The purpose
is to examine the effects on a number of important economic variables including
welfare during the learning transition to the new steady state. Chapter 1 contains the
introduction. In chapter 2 there is a comparison between an economy in which all
agents are fast learners with an economy in which all agents are slow learners. Under
certain conditions it is shown that while welfare may initially be higher in an
economy with fast learners, this will not continue to be the case during the whole
learning transition. After some time, possibly quite early, welfare will be higher in an
economy populated by slow learners. This analysis is extended to a model with
externalities and coordination failures in chapter 3 and models with random
productivity and preference shocks are studied in chapter 4.
In chapter 5, I consider the consequences of agents having heterogeneous
expectations, i.e. slow and fast agents in the same economy. The analysis considers
two issues: (i) under what conditions is convergence of learning guaranteed when
there is heterogeneous learning and (ii) how does welfare compare for fast relative to
slow learners, when there is a mixture of the two types. The stability analysis extends
earlier results in the literature for the homogeneous case. The welfare comparison
gives a much more intuitive result. The welfare of the fast agents is higher than the
welfare of the slow agents during the entire learning transition. This does not depend
on whether one is looking at expansionary or contractionary monetary policy,
providing that the economy started in equilibrium. In an extension of this analysis, I
study the case where there are more than 2 classes of agents.
In chapter 6, the convergence with heterogeneous expectations when there
equilibrium 2-cycles are analysed and an equivalence result between stability in the
homogeneous case and the heterogeneous case is established. Chapter 7 provide
summary and conclusions.
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There has been an increased interest in the possibility of endogenous fluctuations in
dynamic macroeconomic models'. The rational expectations approach has been used
widely as the equilibrium concept in these models, and this procedure has been very
successful, but we are left with two questions. First, how can the rational
expectations solution be attained if the agents do not begin with rational expectations
and second, which rational expectations solution will the economy follow if there are
multiple rational expectational solutions. In order to answer these questions there has
been a widespread attention into the convergence of adaptive learning rules to the
rational expectations equilibrium, see Evans and Honkapohja (1995c) for a recent
overview of the literature. Lucas (1986) suggests that a plausible learning process
should converge to the rational expectations equilibrium where money has value,
furthermore Evans (1989) together with Evans and Honkapohja (1995a and 1995b)
suggests that in the case of multiple rational expectations equilibria, a simple
adaptive learning rule will track down locally unique rational expectations solutions.
An important distinction in the literature is made between linear models and
nonlinear models, where learning in linear models has been analysed by Bray (1982),
Bray and Savin (1986), Marcet and Sargent (1989a and 1989b), Evans and
Honkapohja (1994a) and others. Learning in nonlinear models has been considered
by Bullard (1994), Duffy (1994) Evans and Honkapohja (1993a,1994b, 1995a,b,c
and d), Grandmont (1985), Grandmont and Laroque (1986, 1991), Guesnerie and
Woodford (1991, 1992), Sargent (1992) and Woodford (1990).
In this thesis we will focus on learning in nonlinear models. A large part of the
literature has been concerned with finding a answer to the two questions mentioned
above, and simple adaptive learning rules has been suggested as a selection criteria to
pick out rational expectations equilibria. However there has recently been some
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See e.g. Grandmont (1985) and the recent survey by Guesnerie and Woodford (1992).
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criticism of this approach that a plausible learning rule should pick the relevant
locally unique solutions. Woodford (1990) shows that a learning process may
converge to a sunspot solution instead of the rational steady state, Evans and
Honkapohja (1994b) study the local stability of sunspots under learning as well.
Grandmont and Laroque (1991) is very critical of some of the assumptions needed
for many adaptive learning rules to converge to the rational expectations solution,
while Duffy (1994) shows local convergence of an adaptive learning rule to an
indeterminate steady state.
A common feature of a large number of these papers is that agents are assumed to use
the same learning rule, such that the agents are homogeneous in their learning. The
contribution of this thesis is investigate what happens in the economy, when the
agents have different learning rules, in the sense that some agents have afast learning
rule and others have a slow learning rule. The definition of fast and slow agents will
be defined more precisely below. Hence in this thesis we will introduce heterogeneity
of the agents learning rules, and analyse the effects on the evolution of the economy
during a learning transition towards a rational expectations equilibrium. This is done
for different cases within the context of a standard overlapping generations model.
We wish to look for a role for government policy in these models, and how the
stability conditions under learning is change when there is heterogeneity in the
model. Another aspect is the behaviour of welfare during the learning transition to
rational expectations solution, is it possible that agents with a poorer forecast can do
better in terms of welfare than agents with a better forecast. This would be interesting
when the government use a mixture fiscal and monetary policy to move the economy
between equilbria, in order to the see effect of learning,- especially if agents with
different forecast affect each other.
Heterogeneous beliefs has not been considered very often in the literature, although it
should be an obvious extension of the model to allow the agents to have different
beliefs. One reason might be that the models under consideration can be generalised
trivially to the case in which the expectation formation of each agent is different and
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it does not change the results, as mentioned in footnotes by Grandmont (1985), and
Grandmont and Laroque (1986). However Duffy (1994) gives the opposite reason for
letting all agents having the same learning rule, since the "analysis of the case where
agents have heterogeneous beliefs is especially difficult" as mentioned by Duffy.
In Bray and Savin (1986) there is an analysis of convergence of heterogeneous
expectations to the rational expectations solution by introducing different priors in
the context of the cobweb model, but the learning rules of different suppliers are
identical. Marcet and Sargent (1989b) analyse some situations of heterogeneity. In
Evans, Honkapohja and Sargent (1993), there is combination of "econometricians"
and perfect foresight agents, and this used to study the existence of 2-cycles and to
investigate whether the fraction of econometricians can affect the existence of a 2-
cycle. A recent paper by Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (1995) study convergence
in a overlapping generations model with money with heterogeneous agents.
We will concentrate on nonlinear models of the form
(1.1) xt = FK+1)
where F is some continuously differentiable function such that the actual value xt
depend on the forecast x°+1, see for example Grandmont and Laroque (1986) and
Woodford (1990). In this case we assume that the agents have point expectations, and
the model is purely deterministic, this is the simplest version which will be used in
chapter 2 and 3. We can easily extend the model to more general versions such as xt
= {F(xt+I)}e or xt = {F(xt+1)}e + vt, where vt is a random variable. These models can
all be included within the framework studied in Evans -and Honkapohja (1995a),
where we have the following model
(1.2) xt = H(G(xt+1 ,vt+1 )e,vt).
In this situation the actual value depend on the forecast of G(xt+1 ,vt+I) as well as the
random variable vt.
J
The nonlinear model given in (1.1) typically arise from a standard overlapping
generations model, which is deterministic. However in many cases the overlapping
generations model with some form of randomness included requires the more general
form (1.2). The random variable can, for example, be a productivity shock or a
preference shock, but many other specifications shocks are possible. In general the F-
function from (1.1) can be increasing, decreasing or hump-shaped depending on the
preferences of the underlying model. The different shapes of F can give other types
of rational expectations equilibria apart from steady states, for example, equilibrium
cycles and sunspot equilibria, together with more exotic equilibria, see Bullard
(1994)
The learning rule we will consider in this thesis is a simple adaptive learning rule of
the form
(1.3) x*+1 = x* + at(xt_1 - x°) for all t.
where eq is the speed of learning, this is sometimes called the gain parameter. This
learning rule is referred to as econometric learning or adaptive learning. The idea is
that agents use some perceived law of motion to calculate their forecasts of the
variables of interest, and use some standard statistical procedure to estimate it. The
forecast for the variables of interest are then calculated from the estimated law of
motion, this is referred to as reasonable learning schemes by Bray (1982). The
learning rule (1.3) has the merit of simplicity and there has been an extensive use of
it. When the agents use (1.3) they are not "fully rational" since the agents use a
model that are misspecified during the learning transition, in the sense they are
outside the rational expectations solution. As Woodford (1990) remarks "Indeed\ no
model that that seriously attempts to model behaviour under an assumption of total
ignorance about the equilibrium behaviour ofprices can avoid being unsatisfactory
in this respect." There has been some attempts to model "rational learning", but this
will not be considered in this thesis.
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There are some papers that discuss the role of the speed of learning, at. Guesnerie
and Woodford (1991), analyses the local stability of equilibrium k-cycles and how
the stability conditions depend on the size of a^ . Vives (1993) analyse, what factors
influence the speed of learning, and given that the learning process converge to a
rational expectations solution, Vives find a number for the rate of convergence. There
are other types of learning rules agents could use, some of these rules are similar to
(1.3) in the sense that agents are boundedly rational, see e.g. Woodford (1990) and
Sargent (1993) for a description of a gradient rule. Grandmont and Laroque (1986)
use a learning rule with finite memory which is time-invariant.
The learning rule (1.3) is formulated for agents who believe they are in steady state
and formulate a learning rule according to these beliefs. If the agents, for example,
believe the economy where in a k-cycle, or a sunspot equilibrium, they would
formulate a learning rule according to these beliefs. The question is whether the
steady state is locally stable under a variation in the learning rule, if the agents
believe the economy is in a more exotic equilibrium. In fact, the local stability results
are quite sensitive to variations in the variables used in the learning rule. Evans
(1989) suggests, that we should distinguish between weak stability and strong
stability, where weak stability of the rational expectations solution is defined as local
stability under the learning rule (1.3), while the rational expectations solution is
strongly stable if it is locally stable under an overparameterised learning rule. Weak
and strong stability of steady states and sunspots are considered in Woodford (1990),
and Evans and Honkapohja (1994b), while weak and strong stability of cycles is
considered in Evans and Honkapohja (1995a). In this thesis we will focus on the
learning rule (1.3) and therefore mainly consider weak stability.
The definition of fast and slow agents is related to the speed of learning given in the
learning rule (1.3). Let the fast agent's speed of learning be given by af for all t, and
let the slow agent's speed of learning be denoted by a® for all t, then the fast agents
have a higher speed of learning at each time t.
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(1.4) af > a' for all t.
Hence fast and slow are not meant as the fast agents learning more than the slow
agent, the fast agents are just closer to the actual value of the variables of interest.
Here both types of agents are boundedly rational and they do not "become" rational
during the learning transition. We will look at different ways of incorporating fast
and slow learners in the overlapping generations model. In the first part of the thesis
we will compare two economies, one economy with fast learners and one economy
with slow learners. There are no interaction between the two economies, but we can
show in some cases that the slow learners are better off in terms of welfare compared
to fast learners level of welfare during a part of the learning transition, but in other
cases fast learners is better off. A natural extension is to have a mixture of fast and
slow agents in the same model, this changes the F-function in (1.1) and makes the
model more complicated. This is studied in the last part of the thesis.
The thesis is organised as follows. In chapter 2, we outline the basic overlapping
generations model. There are no externalities, for example, increasing returns in the
production function, and the model is purely deterministic. The maximisation
problem for the agents give a reduced form like (1.1). An agent make a forecast of
the price in the following period, and it turns out that the agent might as well forecast
the labour supply according to (1.3). Hence the dynamic system can be described by
(1.1) and (1.3). In this very simple model there is a unique steady state, which is
globally stable under the learning rule (1.3), given certain assumptions on the
functions. We analyse the evolvement of labour supply, prices and welfare during the
movement to the steady state. We compare an economy with slow learners to an
economy with fast learners, and show that the welfare of a slow agent born at time t
is higher than the welfare of fast agent born at time t, when t is large and the initial
forecast is below the steady state. This result occurs although the fast agent is is
"closer" to the steady state. This learning effect depend partly on the fact that there is
no interaction between slow and fast agents. If the initial forecast is above the steady
state we have the opposite result when t is large. We introduce a government that use
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different types of policies to change the steady state. In this simple set-up there is no
role for government intervention, the different policies are purely distortionary and
are used to create "fluctuations", and we can use the welfare analysis above to
compare welfare between fast and slow learners.
In order to give a role for government policy, the model from chapter 2 is extended to
include increasing social returns, where we use a production function which exhibits
increasing social returns. The microfoundations for this function is developed in
Evans and Honkapohja (1995b). The increasing social returns give rise to multiple
equilibria with possible coordination failures. The government use a subsidy to the
price of production to push the economy from a low level of activity equilibrium to a
high level of activity equilibrium. The welfare comparison in this situation become
more clear-cut in some cases, since the fast learners can be better off during the
whole learning transition to the high level equilibrium. However there are still cases
in which the slow agents are better off when t is large, even when the steady state
welfare is rising, thus the learning effect is still existing in this model.
In addition to the learning effect there are two other effects present, there is the effect
of having increasing returns, which increase the steady state welfare when moving
from a low-activity steady state to a high activity steady state. Furthermore, if the
increase in the subsidy is too large, the welfare in the new high-activity steady state
can decrease compared to the welfare in the previous high-activity steady state, hence
there is an "optimal" steady state subsidy. We briefly discuss the problem of finding
an "optimal" path for the subsidy in end of chapter 3.
Chapter 4 introduce randomness in the model from chapter 2 and 3. First, a very
simple type of preference shock is incorporated in the model from chapter 2, similar
to Woodford (1990), this is done in order to investigate whether the welfare
comparison changes, since we might expect the welfare comparison to change with a
shock in the model. In this simple case the steady state does not depend on the
distribution of the shock, as it would in more general cases, for example, in the
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reduced form (1.2). In order to show local stability of the steady state under learning,
we assume that the speed of learning is decreasing over time :
at -> 0 when t -> oo
If at = a is constant for all t, a large shock early on might push the economy "away"
from steady state. The stability conditions for local stability corresponds to the
expectational stability conditions, see Evans and Honkapohja (1995a and 1995c).
We continue by incorporating increasing returns, together with a more "interesting"
shock to the model. There are many types of preference, monetary or productivity
shock we could incorporate, but here we use a productivity shock. In this case each
of the steady states from chapter will correspond to a "noisy" steady state. The
existence and stability of the noisy steady state depends on results from Evans and
Honkapohja (1995a). It is possible to obtain fluctuations between a low-level steady
state and a high-level steady state, without any government intervention or any other
structural changes, if the speed of learning a,. is constant, at = a for all t. The reason is
that for t large, the agents still produce a noisy forecast, while in the case of
decreasing speeds, the forecast becomes constant when t is large. If we compare an
economy with slow learners with an economy of fast learners, the welfare results
does not hold when t is large and the two groups of agents use a constant speed of
learning. This is due to the fact that both types of agents produce noisy forecast for
all t. The reason for having a constant speed of learning is to be able to track
structural changes, or changes in policy, much more rapidly than can be done with a
decreasing speed of learning.
In the previous chapters there was no interaction between"the two groups of agents,
this assumption is changed in chapter 5. In this chapter, we have a combination of
fast and slow learners in the overlapping generations model from chapter 2, or to be
precise we have a fraction p. fast learners and a fraction 1 - p slow learners. This
change the function F from (1.1), and instead we have the reduced form :
(1.5) xt = H(x^,x^,p)
8
where the actual value xt at time t depends on the fast learners expectations xtf;® and
the slow learners expectations x*;e,. The agents forecast the price instead of the
labour supply, since it is technically easier. In this situation we have two non-linear
difference equations, and the local stability of the steady state under learning depend
on the fraction of learners, p.. The welfare comparison in this case is simpler since
both groups of agents face the same actual price. Given a concavity assumption on H,
we can show that the fast agents are better off than the slow learners during the
learning transition to the steady state when both groups have the same initial forecast.
This is due to the fast agents being closer to the actual price. Hence the fast agent is
"less" misspecified than the slow agent. However, if the agents do not have the same
initial forecast, then we can show with the help of simulations that the slow learners
might be better off during a part of the learning transition to the steady state. In the
last section the model is extended to included n learners, but this does not change the
results.
In chapter 6 we study the local stability of cycles under learning in the model from
chapter 5. The increased number of difference equations makes the analysis
somewhat more complicated than models with one type of agents. Models with
homogeneous agents have been studied by for example by Grandmont and Laroque
(1986), Guesnerie and Woodford (1991), and Evans and Honkapohja (1995a). We
will look at the situation where we have decreasing speeds of learning, but there is no
shock in the model, it is purely deterministic. The stability analysis is done by
looking at a corresponding differential equation instead of the difference equation.
This is similar to Ljung (1977), however his difference equation is stochastic, thus
we reformulate his difference equation to our problem. We find a condition that
ensures local stability under learning. When we have heterogeneous agents, the
conditions for local stability of a 2-cycle under learning will actually depend on the
stability conditions for the homogeneous case. Chapter 7 contains the conclusions
and some remarks on how we might possibly extend the results from the previous
chapters.
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Chapter 2. Fast learners versus slow learners.
2.1. Introduction.
In this chapter we consider a standard overlapping generations model with money,
similar to a model in Evans and Honkapohja (1995b). The agents have an adaptive
learning rule, which they use to make their forecast of the relevant variable, for
example, the price or the labour supply. There is only one interior steady state in this
simple model, but the model may have other more exotic equilibria. We introduce a
government that uses different combinations of fiscal and monetary policy to change
the steady state.
The purpose is to analyse the welfare consequences during the movement to a steady
state, where the agents are using an adaptive learning rule to make a forecast of the
labour supply. We compare two separate economies, where the difference between
the economies are in the agents speed of learning. We define two types of learners,
fast learners and slow learners, where the fast learners have a high speed learning rule
and the slow learners have a low speed learning rule. Since both groups use an
adaptive learning rule, they are not "fully" rational, but the fast learner make a better
forecast compared to the slow learner as a result of higher speed in his learning rule.
We will investigate how the labour supply, the real interest rate and welfare evolve
during the learning transition to a steady state. We show that if the economy initially
is above (below) the steady state, then the labour supply decreases (increases) and
converges to the steady state. Given certain assumptions on the preferences the
steady state is globally. The welfare is increasing (decreasing) when the economy
initially is above (below) the steady state.
We make a welfare comparison between a slow learner and a fast learner, born at the
same time, during the entire learning transition to the steady state. We show that the
welfare of a slow agent is higher (lower) than the welfare of a fast agent initially and
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for some time on, if the economy initially is above (below) the steady state. When
the economy is "close" to the steady state the slow learner is worse (better) off than
the fast learner, if the economy initially is above (below) the steady state. In fact
simulations show that there are a single crossing point between the welfare sequence
of the slow learners and the welfare sequence of the fast learners.
In the last part of the chapter we study three types of policies, government spending
financed by seignorage, government spending financed by a lump-sum tax and a
production subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax. In all three cases the welfare
decreases, when we move from a steady state without any fiscal policy to a steady
state where we have introduced one of the three policies. The analysis made in the
previous sections covers the different cases, and since we are going to study
government intervention in chapter 3 and 4, we introduce the different policies in this
simple model in order to study the effects on labour, price and welfare, although
government intervention is purely distortionary in this model.
In the first case, where the government finances spending by seignorage, the steady
state is shifted downwards, and we can use the analysis where the economy initially
are above the steady state. Hence the slow learners are initially better off than the fast
learners, but eventually the fast learners become better off and remain better off for
the rest of the transition phase. The welfare result is reversed when the government is
using one of the other types of policy, because the steady state is shifted upward, and
initially the economy are below the steady state. Thus the fast learners are initially
better off, but the slow learners become and remain better off during the rest of the
transition phase. In all three cases the fast agents makes a better forecast, i.e. they are
"closer" to the steady state, but they need not have the highest level of welfare. There
is an learning "effect" in this simple model, and in more complicated models we
might expect a similar effect, when we study comparisons of different learning rules.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2, we describe the model and in
section 2.3 we look at stability of the steady state under learning. Section 2.4 and 2.5
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describes the evolution of the real interest rate and the welfare during the learning
transition. In section 2.6, we define the fast and slow learners and look at the welfare
comparison between the two economies. The effects of the various government
policies are analysed in section 2.7. Section 2.8 contains the conclusion and some
remarks on how to extend the results.
2.2. The overlapping generations model.
We consider a standard overlapping generations model with money, where an agent
is born at each time t and lives for two periods. The agent works when he is young
and consumes when he is old. There is one perishable good which is produced and
consumed. The welfare function for an agent born at time t is given by:
W = U(ct+1) - V(nt),
where ct+1 is consumption at time t + 1 and nt the labour supply at time t. U is the
utility function and V is the labour function. We implicit assume that W is separable
in c, n. In this situation the agent's problem is given by:
max W = U(ct+1) - V(nt)
ct+1nt,M,
subject to :
(2.1) ptyt = Mf ,
(2.2) P«+1ct+1 = M? .
Where p*+1 is the expected price at time t + 1, and the agents have point expectations.
yt is the output produced at time t, and since labour is the only output in the
production function, we have that yt = f(nt ) for all t. We have the standard
assumption on U, V and f.
Assumption 2.1. f is a C2-function for all n > 0 with f' > 0 and f" < 0, U is a C2-
function for all c > 0 with U' > 0 and U" < 0 and V is a C2-function for all n > 0 with
V' > 0 and V" > 0. Furthermore, U'(c) -» co when c -» 0 and V'(n) -» 0 when n —> <x>.
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There are no externalities in the production function, for example, increasing returns,
but in chapter 3 we will extend the model and incorporate increasing returns. The















The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied given assumption 2.1 on U, V
and f. In an equilibrium we have that the supply ofmoney is equal to the demand of
money:
(2.5) M* = M? for all t.
Let us assume that the money supply is constant M* = M for all t. If we combine the
households budget constraint (2.1) with (2.5), we have :
(2.6) Pt Yt = Pt-i y t-i for all t.
Since yt = f (nt) for all t, we have
P,-i _ f(nt)(2.7) for all t.
Pt f(n.-i)
(2.7) is the real interest rate at time t, or the real wage at time t.
Let us briefly look at the case where the agent has perfect foresight such that p^+] =
pt+1, hence pt/p°+1 = pt/pt+I and
(2.8) pt/pt+1 = f(ntH)/f(nt),
We can substitute (2.8) into the first order condition (2.4), and we have the offer
curve which describe the evolution of the labour supply over time :
(2.9) U'{f(nt+1)}f(nt+1) - V'(nt)f(nt)/f'(nt).
Since V" > 0 and f" < 0 the derivative of the right-hand side of (2.9) w.r.t. nt is
positive :
d( V'(n)f (n)/f'(n) )/dn =
(2.10) { (V"(n)f(n) + V'(n)f'(n))f'(n) - f "(n)Y'(n)f (n) }/(f'(n))2 > 0
In this case, (2.9) can be rearranged such that nt is a function of nt+1 :
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(2.11) nt = F(nt+1) for all t.
Since U, V and f are C2-functions, then F is a C1-function for all nt+1 > 0. F can be
increasing, decreasing or hump-shaped, and this depends on the preferences, see
figure 2.1a and 2.1b.
Figure 2.1a. F increasing. Figure 2.1b. F hump-shaped.
Intuitively, the shape of F depends on income- and substitution-effects. In figure 2.1a
the substitution-effect dominates the income-effect, and in figure 2.1b the income-
effect dominates the substitution-effect over the range where F is decreasing. The
steady state n is determined by U'(n) - V'(n) so that n is a fixpoint for F, n =
F(n) . Assumption 2.1 on U, V and f ensures the existence and uniqueness of an
interior rational steady state n > 0, see e.g. Woodford (1990). h is the well known
steady state were money has value. It is possible to show the existence of a sunspot
equilibrium in this model, see Woodford (1990). If furthermore U'(c)c —> 0 when c
—> 0, the autarchy steady state n = 0 also exists.
If F is hump-shaped it is possible that there exist cycles, an example of a 2-cycle is
shown in figure 2.1b, but the following assumption on U exclude the possibility of
cycles as shown by Grandmont (1985).
U" fx)x
Assumption 2.2. Grandmont (1985). A.(x) = < **
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Given assumption 2.2, U'(c)c is increasing in c because
<9( U'(c)c )/3c = U"(c)c + U'(c) > 0 if and only if
- (U"(c)c)/U'(c) < 1
If the utility function U satisfies assumption 2.2, then the F-function is increasing for
all n > 0. To see this, return to equation (2.9) and let the right-hand side of (2.9) be
denoted by the function H : V'(n Jf(nt )/f'(nt) = H(nt), then (2.9) is given by:
U'(f(nt+1 ))f(nt+1) = H(nt).
The function H is increasing as shown in (2.10), hence H have an inverse such that:
nt ~ H"'(U'(f(nt+1 ))f (nt+1)) = F(nt+1)
F is a C'-function due to assumption 2.1 and the derivative of F is given by
F'(nt+1) = {1/H'( U'(f(nt+1 ))f(nt+1))} { U"(f (nt+1 ))f'(nt+1 )f (nt+1)
+ U'(f(nt+1 ))f'(nt+I) } > 0
The derivative of F is positive, because H' > 0 and {U"(f (nt+1 ))f (nt+l) + U'(f (nt+1)) }
> 0 according to assumption 2.2.
2.3. The stability of the steady state under learning.
Let us now assume that the agent does not have perfect foresight. Thus the agent has
to make a forecast of the price. However, he could also make his expectations on the
output yt+1 according to pt /p°+1 = y*+1/yt or forecast on nt+I since y*+l = f(n'+1),
where n^+1 is the expected labour supply at time t + 1. The expected real interest rate
Pt/P'+, is given by:
(2.12) for all t.
P?+, f(*t)
Insert (2.12) in the first-order condition (2.4), and we have the temporary equilibrium
condition:
(2.13) U'(f(n;.,)) f«,) . V'(n,)|^4 for all t.f (nt)
This can be rearranged as (2.11), such that the actual labour supply nt depends on the
expected labour supply n®+1 :
(2.14) nt = F(n®+1) for all t.
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In this chapter the agent use the labour supply to forecast on and the forecast is made
according to the adaptive learning rule given by
(2.15) n°+1 = n° + at(nt_,-nte) = n? + at(F«) - n°)
00
where we assume that 0 < < 1 for all t, and ^ a, = oo.
t=2
The agent at time t takes account of the difference made by the agent at time t - 1:
nt_,-n*. As Evans and Honkapohja (1995b) state " The agents act as if the economy
was in a steady state with an unknown value, which they estimate from past data
using a weightedmean ofprevious values ns, s = 2,....,t —1 " :
nt+i = ^ nt_, + (1 - at )at_1 nt_2 + (1 - at )(1 - a^ )at_2 nt_3
It would be more natural to use the difference between the actual labour supply at
time t and expected labour supply at time t : nt-n®, but then we would have to
determine nt and n®+1 simultaneously since nt = F(n*+1). Another reason might be a
delay in the publication of the actual labour at time t, such that only information on
nt_! is available at time t.
The adaptive learning rule has the merit of simplicity and there has been a wide
interest in simple learning rules in the literature, see e.g. Bray (1982), Marcet and
Sargent (1989a), Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) and several papers by Evans and
Honkapohja. The agents are boundedly rational when they use this learning rule since
they are outside a rational expectations equilibrium, but in the end the economy
converges to the rational expectations equilibrium as shown below. Hence the
adaptive learning rule is "reasonable" as mentioned by Bray (1982). In the paper by
Bray and Savin (1986) the speed of convergence are studied. The convergence to a
rational expectations equilibrium may be fast under the learning scheme as shown in
Bray and Savin. Hence although agents are misspecified it is only for a short period
of time before they are in a rational expectations equilibrium. In the set-up presented
here simulations even fairly low values of ^ generates a fast convergence to the
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rational expectations equilibrium, when the rational expectations equilibrium is
stable under learning.
As mentioned above, the agent has a choice of which variable to use in his learning
rule for example, the agent could learn on:
(a) The first-order condition : x°+1 = {U'(f(nt+1 ))f(nt+1 )}e.
(b) The expected real interest rate : x®+1 = {pt/pt+1 }e.
(c) The labour supply : x°+1 = n°+1.
We could choose (a) and let the agent learn on this "variable", but this is not a very
obvious variable to learn on. It is worthwhile to look at (b), since it would be natural
to make a forecast of the expected real interest rate. There is not a one-to-one
correspondence between the speed of learning at in a learning rule, where the agent
forecast the real interest rate, and the speed of learning ^ from the learning rule
(2.15). This is due to (2.15) being non-linear.
In order to simplify the set-up and make simulations, we study the following example
where the utility function U and the labour function V are C.E.S.-functions and the
production function f is a Cobb-Douglas function.
Example 2.1. U and V are C.E.S.-functions andf is a Cobb-Douglas function.
Let U(c) = (1/(1 - a))cl_CT, V(n) =(l/(l+s))n1+e, and f(n) = Ana, where 0 < a < 1, s > 0,
0 < a < 1, and A > 0. The function F defined in (2.14), can be written as:
1 1-a
(2.16) nt =a^[A(nfy)a]^ = F(n°+1) for all t.
F is a strictly concave and smooth function with two fixpoints nt = 0 and nt = n > 0.
—
—
The interior fixpoint n is given by n = B1/(I P), where B = al+E[A]i+c > 0 and (3 =
a(l - ar / (1 + s)), such that 0 < P < 1. □




Figure 2.2. The F-function and the transitions paths during a learning process,
that begins either below or above the steady state.
Let us analyse what happens during the learning transition to the steady state n. If
the initial forecast n® is below the steady state n, then the expected labour supply
increases as shown in figure 2.2. If the initial forecast n® is above the steady state n,
then the expected labour supply decreases as shown in figure 2.2. Hence we split the
stability analysis into two parts, in the first case we are initially above 5 and in the
second case we are initially below the steady state n.
In the first case the initial forecast n® is above n :
n® > n, when time t = 0.
Then the actual labour supply at time t — 0 is also above n, since F is monotonically
increasing and
n0 = F(n®)>F(n)= n.
At time t = 1, the expected labour supply and actual labour supply is given by :
n®2 = n® + a,(n0-n®) < n®
since n0 = F( n®) < n®, and the actual labour supply at time t has decreased
ni = F( n2) < F( n®) = n0.
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When t > 1, the expected labour supply is given by :
nt+i = nt + at(nt_,-n®) = n® + a,( F«)-n® ) and
nt = F(nte+1) for all t > 0.
Since nte > nt_j = F(nte) and > 0, the expected labour supply are decreasing :
n®+1 < nte forallt>l.
Hence nte is a decreasing sequence bounded below by n. Since F is continuous and
monotone the actual labour supply nt is also decreasing and bounded below by the
steady state n.
In the second case we are initially below the steady state, n® < n, and the expected
labour supply, n®+1, is increasing and bounded above by the steady state n, as shown
by figure 2.2.
Let us return to the stability question of the steady state under learning. Since we
have a non-linear difference equation we are restricted to local stability, if we do not
have other assumptions on U, V and f than assumption 2.1. In this case the unique
interior steady state n is locally stable under learning, if
F'(n) < 1,
as shown in Azariadis (1993) or Evans and Honkapohja (1995a). However, if F is
monotonically increasing according to assumption 2.2, we can show that the steady
state n is globally stable under learning.
Proposition 2.1. Given assumption 2.1 - 2.2 and F'(vL) < 1, then the unique interior
steady state is globally stable :
n*+l —> h when t —> oo, for all initial values of n*.
Proof. From assumption 2.1 and 2.2, F is a continuous, monotonically increasing
function with n as the unique interior steady state and we have assumed that F'(n) <
1. IfF'(n) > 1, then the steady state would be unstable.
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Let ni > n then {n®+1 }J°=0 is a decreasing sequence bounded below by n, as shown
above and illustrated in figure 2.2. Since n®+1 is decreasing and bounded below by n,
n®+1 converge to n > n when t goes to infinity. Let us assume that n > n and show
that we obtain a contradiction.
Since F is continuous, then F(n®+1) -> F(n) when t goes to infinity. Let s = F(n) -
n . From the monotonicity of F we have F(n®) - n® < s < 0 for t sufficient large, and
n®+1 < n' + a, s for t sufficiently large, such that for all x > 1 :
Thus n®+1 —> n when t —> <x> . The argument for convergence when n, < n is
analogous. ■
Since F is a continuous function, nt converges towards n when t goes to infinity. We
can illustrate the paths for expected labour supply n*+1 and actual labour supply nt,
when the economy initially is above the steady state or initially is below the steady
state.
t+ T
nt+x £ < + e £ai .
i=t












Figure 2.3a. n^>h, Figure 2.3b. n® < n,
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2.4. The real interest rate during the learning transition.
Here we will again separate the analysis into two cases, either the economy is above
the steady state initially or the economy is below the steady state initially. The
expected real interest rate at time t is given by :
(2.17) for all t.
Pt+, f(nt)
The actual real interest rate at time t is given by :
(2.18) £!=! = JW .
P,
Let us study the paths of the expected and actual real interest rates when the economy
is either above or below the steady state initially. At the steady state the real interest
rate is equal to 1, pt/pt-i = 1-
In the first case, where the economy is initially above the steady state, n, > n, we
have that n0 < n* and p0/ p* = f(n®)/f(no) > 1. Since nt < n°+I for all t > 1 then f(nt)
< f(n®+1) for all t > 1, and from (2.17) the expected real interest rate is larger than 1 :
pt/p®+1>l for all t.
Since nt is a decreasing sequence in this case the actual real interest rate is less than 1
according to (2.18)
Pt/pt-n < 1 for all t.
In the second case where n° < n, thus n0 > n° and p0/ p® = f(n*)/f(n0) < 1. Since nt
> n°+I for all t > 1 then f(nt) > f(n*+1) for all t > 1, and
Pt/P^i < 1 for all t.
Since nt is a increasing sequence in this case, then
pt/pt+1 > 1 for all t.
In both cases, the expected and actual real interest rates converge to the steady state
level :
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pt/p°+1 -> 1 fort->oo,
pt/pt+1 -> 1 for t -> oo,
because f and F are continuous functions. In proposition 2.2, we will show that the
expected real interest rate p,/p°+1 decreases (increases) monotonically and the actual
real interest rate pt/pt+1 increases (decreases) monotonically, when we initially begin
above (below) the steady state.
Proposition 2.2. (a) If the economy initially is above the steady state, n] > h, then
the expected real interest rate is decreasing : pt / pet+x > pt+l / pel+2 .
IfU and V are as in example 2.1, then the actual real interest rate is increasing : pt
/pt+i <pt+I/pt+2.
(b) If the economy initially is below the steady state, n] < n, then the expected real
interest rate is increasing : p, / p'+x < pl+l / p"+2.
IfU and V are as in example 2.1, then the actual real interest rate is decreasing : p,
/pl+i >pl+1/pt+2.
Proof, (a) If we return to the first-order condition, then we can write the expected
real interest rate pt/p®+1 as a function of nt . Set p,/ p®+1 = rte+1 then the first-order
condition is given by:
U'(C,f(nt))C, = V'(nt)/f(nt) =>
nt = h(C,),
where the derivative of h w.r.t. rte+1 is positive since
5{U'( rte+1 f(nt)) rte+1 }/drte+1 - U"( rte+1 f(nt)) rte+1,+ U'( rte+1 f(nt)) > 0
according to assumption 2.2 and h'(rte+1) > 0. Since nt is decreasing when the
economy initially above the steady state, then rte+1 is decreasing as well.
Let us assume that U, V and f are as in example 2.1. We can write the actual interest
rate as a function of n®+1 :
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= t&Vi) , f(F(n;ti)) = f{F(n;„+a,(F(n;., )-<„))} =
p,„ f(n,) f(F(n;„)) f(F(n;„»
Since n^+1 > net+2 then pt/pt+i < pt+i /pt+2 if ^'(nt+i) < 0- Given the expressions for f and
F : f(n) = Ana and F(n) = Bnp, it is shown in the appendix to chapter 2 that 4'(nt+i) <
0. Hence the actual interest rate is increasing.
(b) Since h'(rte+1) > 0 and n°+1 is increasing then the expected real interest rate is
increasing. Furthermore ^'(nt+i) < 0 and n°+1 is increasing such that the actual real
interest rate is decreasing. ■
Proposition 2.3 is illustrated in the following figure.
Figure 2.4a. The expected and actual Figure 2.4b. The expected and actual
real interest rate, when n<>h. real interest rate, when nf < n.
The difference between the expected and actual real interest rates are due to the
agents using the learning rule such that they use a misspecified model. If the speed of
learning is high the convergence to the steady state value of the real interest rate is
high, and they will only use a "wrong" for a short number periods.
2.5. The welfare path during the learning transition.
The welfare for an agent born at time t is given by: U(ct+1)-V(nt). In a temporary
equilibrium we have nt from (2.14):
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nt = F(n*+I) for all t > 0.
The consumption ct+1 in an equilibrium depends on the actual output in period t + 1,
thus the actual consumption is given by:
Ct+I = f (nt+1) = f(F( n°+2))
= f(F{n*+1 + a^OO - <+1) }) for all t > 0.
This can be substituted into the private welfare function, and we can study how the
private welfare depends on the learning rule.
Proposition 2.3. Given assumption 2.1 and 2.2. If the economy initially is above the
steady state, the welfare in the steady state (h, c) is greater than the welfare for an
agent born at time t, where (n,, ct+I) denotes the agent's actual labour supply and
consumption in a temporary equilibrium:
(i) U(ct+I) - V(nt) < U(c) - V(h) , for all t > 0.
The private welfare sequence {U(cl+I) - V(nt )}"=0 is convergent:
(ii) U(ct+1) - V(nt) —> U(c) - V(h), when t —> oo.
Furthermore, if U, V andfare as in example 2.1 and assume that a, = a for all t, then
welfare is monotonically increasing :
(iii) U(ct+I) - V(nt) < U(ct+2) - V(nt+I).
If the economy initially is below the steady state, then the welfare in the steady state
(h, c) is less than the welfare for an agent born at time t, where (nt, ct+I) denotes
the agent's labour supply and consumption in a temporary equilibrium:
(iv) U(ct+I) - V(nt) > U(c) - V(h), for all t >0.
The welfare sequence {U(cl+]) - V(n, )}"=0 is convergent: -
(v) U(ct+I) - V(nt) —> U(c) - V(n ), when t —> oo.
Furthermore, if U, V andfare as in example 2.1 and assume that at = a for all t, then
welfare is monotonically decreasing :
(vi) U(ct+i) - V(nt) > U(ct+2) - V(nt+I).
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Proof, (i) Since nt > n for all t > 0, we have to prove :
V(nt)-V(n)> U(ct+1) - U( c).
From assumption 2.1, we have that V is strictly convex, hence
(2.19) V(nt) - V(n) > V'(n)(nt - n),
because nt > n for all t > 0. When nt = n we have from (2.9) that
V'(n) = U'(c )f'(n).
Thus the right-hand side of (2.19) is equal to
= U'(c)f'(n)(nt- n)
Since U is strictly concave and ct+1 > c for all t, we have:




Since nt > nt+1 > n and f is concave (2.20) is larger than
(2.21) > (U(ct+1) - U(c))
f(nt+1)-f(n),
^f'(n)(nt+1-n)A
v f(nt+1) - f(n)
Since f is concave and nt > h, then (2.21) is larger than
> U(ct+1) - U(c).
Hence the left-hand side of (2.19) is larger than U(ct+1 ) - U(c) and we the desired
result.
(ii) Since nt and ct+1 converges to n and c, and U and V are continuous functions,
we have :
U(ct+1) - V(nt) -» U(c) - V(n), when t —> co.
(Hi) We can write the private welfare as a function of the expected labour supply in
period t + 1:
U(ct+1) - V(nt) = U(f(nt+1)) - V(F(n®+1))
= U(f {FK+2)}) - V(F«+1))
= U(f( F[ n®+1 + a(F(n®+I) - n®+1) ])) - V(F«+1))
= a>«+1,a).
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If <B(n'+„a) < co(nte+2,a) then U(ct+1) - V(nt) < U(ct+2) - V(nt+1). Since n"+1 > n*+2, it
is sufficient to prove that co(. ,a) is a decreasing function for:
dco«+1,a) < Q
3<+1
With the expressions for U, V and f given in example 2.1 and the equilibrium
condition (2.9) we can determine 5co(n®+1,a) /3n°+1, and show that it is less than 0.
(2.22) 3(t><n^,a) =U,(ct+|)f'(nt+1)F'(n'+2) 6l|,(n'-"a) - V(n,)F(iC,)
dnt+1 5nt+1
where v|/(n®+1,a) = n®+1 + a(F(n®+1) - n°+1). Insert the equilibrium condition (2.9) into
(2.22) and we have:
(2.23) - V(n.) (("') ' f'(n,„)F(n;,;) -V(n,)F(nf„).f(nt+I) f (nt) 5nt+1
Insert the expressions for U, V, f and F given in example 2.1, then the calculations in
the appendix to chapter 2 show that (2.23) is negative, and 5co(n®+1,a)/ 5nte+1 is
negative.
(iv) and (v) This is proven similarly to the proof of (i) and (ii).
(vi) In the proof of (Hi) we showed that Sco(nte+1,a) / 5nte+1 < 0. Since n^+1 is
increasing then the welfare must be decreasing during the learning transition. ■
The welfare will thus be increasing (decreasing) if the economy initially are above
(below) the steady state during the learning transition.
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2.6. An economy of fast learners compared with an economy of slow learners.
We will now make a comparison between an economy of fast learners and an
economy of slow learners. We will show that the welfare of the fast learner is less
(larger) than the welfare of the slow learner initially, and when t is sufficiently large
the fast learners are better (worse) off than the slow learners, if n[,e = n,,e > n
(n['e = n['e < n). Let us define what we mean by fast and slow learners. Let " f "
denote the fast learner and " s " denote the slow learner.
Definition 2.1. Let a[ denote the weight in the learning rule (2.15) for one group of
agents, and let a' denote the weight in (2.15) for another group of agents such that a|
and a* satisfies the following condition :
af > a" for all t.
The group with af are called fast learners, while the group with a* are called slow
learners.
The difference between the two groups of learners is only in the speed of learning
and it is not possible to change the speed of learning within a group, such that af < ^
for some t. The terminology slow and fast learner is not meant as the fast agents are
learning more than the slow learners at each point in time, and suddenly end up with
perfect foresight. A fast learner have a quicker response in his learning rule compared
to the slow learner, but both types of agents are using the learning rule and do not
know the true value of the variable they forecast.
Example 2.2. The economy are initially above the steady state. Let U,V and f be the
C.E.S.-functions from example 2.1 with the following parameter values : A = 28, s =
0.2, a = 0.41 and a = 0.2. The speed of learning is given by a* = as = 0.2 for all t and
af = af = 0.5 for all t.
We compare the two separate economies, given the initial condition
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(2.24) n^e = nf'e > n.
The first economy consists of only slow learners, where all agents use a® = 0.2 in
their learning rule. We calculate the expected labour supply at time t + 1 denoted by
n';6! given the initial condition (2.24). From the expected labour supply we can
calculate the actual labour supply at time t, n", the consumption at time t + 1, cts+1,
and the private welfare U(c*+1) - V(n') during the movement to the steady state n.
The second economy is an economy with only fast learners. All agents use a[ = 0.5.
We make the same calculations for the fast learner given the initial condition (2.24) :
n[;ei, n[, cf+1 and U(cf+1) - V(ntf).
We can now compare the welfare between a fast learner born at time t and a slow
learner born at time t from each of these two economies. Since the steady state is
globally stable under learning, they converge to the steady state. Given the parameter
values, we can plot the private welfare over time for the slow and fast learners in a
figure.
Figure 2.5 about here.
Figure 2.5 is generated given the initial conditions : 30 = n*-e = n[ e > n « 1.39. □
Example 2.3. The economy are initially below the steady state. Let U,V and f be the
C.E.S.-functions as in example 2.1 with the following parameter values : A = 28, s =
0.2, a = 0.41, a = 0.2 and y = 0.2. The speed of learning is given by a® = as = 0.2 for
all t and af = af = 0.5 for all t.
We compare the two separate economies, given the initial condition
(2.25) n*'e = n['e < n.
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The welfare comparison between fast and slow learners are in figure 2.6 and as figure
2.6 shows, we have the opposite result to example 2.2.
Figure 2.6 about here
Figure 2.6 is generated with the initial conditions : 0.5 =ni'e = n['e < n » 1.39. □
Since figure 2.6 is just opposite of figure 2.5, we concentrate on figure 2.5. The fast
learner have initially a lower welfare than the slow learner, but at some time T the
fast learner overtakes the slow learner and have a higher welfare for all t > T. The
intuition behind this result is that the slow learners are compensated for being slow
during the initial periods of the transition phase, since the generation at time 0
benefits from the generation at time 1 being are slow. The crossing point between the
fast learner's and the slow learner's welfare depends on the parameter values, and it is
possible to choose the parameter values such that only the slow learner born at time 0
is better off compared to the fast learners.
The fast learners eventually become better off than the slow learners, because the fast
learners make a "better" forecast, i.e. they are closer to the steady state n :
I n[;e, - n I < I n^e, - n I for all t > 1.
Furthermore since welfare is increasing over time, future generations of fast learners
benefits from the previous generations being fast learners.
It seems that the single-crossing point property does not depend on specific
parameter values, since different parameter values give the same picture, although
the crossing point varies. However it was not possible to prove this single-crossing
property, since there are two effects on welfare that works in opposite directions. In
the proof of proposition 2.3, we showed that welfare depended negatively on
expected labour supply :
3co(ne,a)/Sne < 0 for all ne > 0,
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where ne denotes expected labour supply. Since the expected labour supply is
decreasing, the welfare is increasing. However the welfare depend negatively on the
speed of learning when n < ntf;® < n*;e,:
5co(ne,a)/oa < 0,
hence a low speed of learning have positive effect on welfare, when n < n[;e, < n*;e,.
In proposition 2.4 below, we show a weaker result that the slow learners are better
off initially, but there exists an integer x sufficiently large, such that the fast learners
are better of than the slow learners for all t > x. We need an extra assumption on the
weights atf and a* to prove proposition 2.4.
Assumption 2.3. a* = as for all t, atf = af for all t.
From definition 2.1 of atf and a', we have as < af.The following lemma is needed
for the proof of proposition 2.4.
Lemma 2.1. Let (x,)™0 and (y,)Zo denote two sequences given by:
xt+I = 9,x,+ s(xt) for all t >0,
yt+I = 02yt + e(yt) for all t > 0,
8 (x)where 0 < 97, 0 < 9, and s is a continuous function with s(0) = 0 and lim =
x->0 x
0. Furthermore, let us assume that both sequences are positive and converge to 0
when t goes to infinity :
xt> 0, yt> 0 for all t >0,
xt —> 0 when t—> oo
yt —>0 when t—> oo.
If 92< 9i, then there exists an integer r such that:
x, > y, for all t > x.
30
Remark. The reason for assuming that xt and yt converge to 0 when t goes to infinity
is to avoid the possibility of xt ( and yt ) are converging to the stable point x* =
s(x*)/(l-01) (and y* = s(y*)/(l—02) ). The function s could be the remainding term
from a Taylor-approximation. This is how we use lemma 2.1 in proposition 2.4 and
2.5, where we linearise a non-linear difference equation around the steady state.
The lemma tells us something of the speed of convergence between xt and yt when t
goes to infinity. Since yt has a lower 0, then it will converge faster toward 0
compared to xt when t goes to infinity, assuming both sequences converge to 0.
Proof of lemma 2.1. Look at the sequence defined by
since xt > 0 for all t and is given by:
Ua=( , this is well defined
yt+i _ Q2yt +s(yt) = e2y,








p(xt ,yt) is a well-defined continuous function since xt > 0 and yt > 0 for all t. When t
is going to infinity then xt —» 0 and yt —> 0, and p(xt ,yt) —> 1. Since 02 < 0] , there
exists an integer p such that:
Q
~~ fi(xt,yt) < r < 1, for all t> p.
W
When t is sufficiently large, we have :
Zi±L < rZi for ap t > m.
x. x.vt+i "t
From this inequality, we have :
ys ^ j.s-m ym
Since 0 < r < 1 : r
y
0 when s —» oo, such that — —> 0 when s —» oo, and there
x„
exist an integer x > m such that:
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— < 1 for all t > x => yt < xt for all t > x. ■
xt
Proposition 2.4 is a local result, and we assume that F'(n) < 1 in the following such
that n is locally stable.
Proposition 2.4. The economy is initially above the steady state.
Let (nfcf,, p')™=0 and (n{,c{+1,p{)™=0 denote the temporary equilibrium labour
supply, consumption and price for the slow and fast learners, respectively, Given
assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and2.2. If ne0f = nf > n then
(a) The slow learner born at time t = 0 is better off than the fast learner born at time
t = 0:
U(cs,) - V(nl)> U(c{)- V(
(b) There exists an integer r sufficiently large, such that the fast learners are better
offthan slow learnersfor all t > r:
U(cf,) - V(ns,) < U(c{+1) - V(n{) for all t > t.
Proof. The proof is divided into two parts. In part 1, we show that the slow learner is
better off at time t = 0. In part 2 we show there exist a x sufficiently large, such that
the fast learner is better off and stays better off for all t > x. Both parts are shown in
the appendix to chapter 2. ■
Figure 2.5 can be used as an illustration of the proposition 2.4. We have compared a
group of fast learners with a group of slow learners. The slow learners benefit from
everybody being slow initially, where the slow is better off than the fast. When the
agents converge towards the new steady state the fast learner becomes better off,
because his forecast is closer to the true optimum compared to the forecast of the
slow. Hence initially the slow learners benefit from their slow learning rule, because
they do not adjust their forecast as quickly as the fast learners, and the fast learner
make a better forecast such that they are better off in the end.
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If the economy is below the steady state as in example 2.3 then we can show the
opposite result to proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.5. The economy is initially below the steady state.
Let (nf10 and (n{,c{+l,p{)^0 denote the temporary equilibrium labour
supply, consumption and price for the slow and fast learners, respectively, Given
assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. If ne0f = nef < n then
(a) The fast learner born at time t = 0 is better off than the slow learner born at time
t = 0:
U(c-) - V(r,;><U(c{) - V().
(b) There exists an integer r sufficiently large, such that the slow learners are better
offthan fast learnersfor all t > t:
U(c;+I) - V(n;) > U(cf+l) - V(n{) for all t>r.
Proof. This is similar to the proof of proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.5 can be illustrated by figure 2.6 above. In this case the slow learners
welfare do not decrease as fast as the fast learners welfare, due to their slower
adjustment. The initial generation however of fast learners are better off because the
next generation of fast learners born at time are working harder than the generation of
slow learners born at time 1.
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2.7. Three different cases of government intervention.
We will look at three cases of government policies in this chapter in order to study
the welfare-effects of different speeds of learning. In the first first case the
government buys some of the good and finance the purchase by money-creation
according to:
(2.26) Mst = M*_, + ptgt , for all t.
M( is the money supply at time t and pt is price at time t, and gt is government
purchases at time t. In the second case, government spending gt is financed by a
lump-sum tax Tt and the money supply is held constant : M' = M for all t. The
budget constraint is given by:
(2.27) Tt ~ Ptgt > for all t.
We assume in both cases that the government buys a fraction yt of the production of
the good f(nt) at time t:
(2.28) gt - yt f(nt), where 0 < yt < 1.
In the third case we assume the government introduces a production subsidy st in
each period. This is financed by a lump-sum tax and money supply is held constant
M* = M for all t, such that the budget constraint is given by :
(2.29) Tt = st pt f(nt), for all t.
In all three cases, the model is purely deterministic, and there is no random shock in
the model. In chapter 4, we extend the model to include a shock either to the
preferences or as a productivity shock.
2.7.1. Government spending financed by money creation.
In the first case the government introduce spending "at time T, and this is
unanticipated by the agents. Let us assume that until time T > 0, there are no
government spending such that yt = 0 for all t < T - 1 and that the economy is in the
steady state where yt = 0 : nT_j = n. At time T, yt is increased and
Yt ~ Y > 0 for all t > T.
We assume that spending is constant. The equilibrium condition on the money
market is given by :
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M* = Mf for all t,
Since Mtd = pt yt for all t, the money market equilibrium condition combined with
(2.26) give the following condition:
pt yt ~ Pt-i y t-i+ ypt yt =>
(2.30) ^ - (1-y)-^- for all t > T.
P, f(nt-i)
Hence if agents have perfect foresight p°+1 = pt+I, the offer curve (2.9) is changed to
U'{(1 -y)f(nt+1 )}(1 -y)f(nt+1) = V'(nt)f(nt)/f'(nt) forallt>T.
Since V" > 0 and f" < 0, we write nt as a function of nt+t and y:
nt = F(nt+1 ,y)
IfU satisfies assumption 2.2, then the F is rotated downwards when y is increased as
shown in figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7. The rotation of F as a result of an increase in government spending.
The steady state is reduced to n. The reason behind the result is that the increase in
the money-supply in order to finance spending cause the real wage pt/pt+i to decrease.
A fall in the real wage lowers the return on work and saving, which leads to a fall in
the labour-supply, since the substitution-effect dominates the income-effect.
If the agents do not have perfect foresight but use the learning rule (2.15), the
temporary equilibrium condition (2.13) is given by nt = F(n°+1,y). We can use
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proposition 2.1 to show that the steady state n is stable under learning. The welfare
comparison made in section 2.6 can be used to describe this case. The initial
condition is
„ f ,e _ s.e — . £
n, = n, = n > n.
Given this initial condition we can use proposition 2.4, and the slow learners are
better off initially but when t is large and we are "close" to the new steady state the
fast is better off. If we compare the welfare between the two steady states, the steady
state welfare decrease after the government intervention, since the government takes
away consumption from the household. During the learning transition from the old
steady state to the new steady state the household are actually pushed below the new
level of steady state welfare. This is a result of the government taking away
consumption from the households, the households are hit by an inflation tax through
(2.30), and furthermore they are not solving the right optimisation problem when
they are using the learning rule. This welfare paths for the two economies are shown
in figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8 about here.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the situation where the economy initially are in the steady state
and remains there until t = 50, when t = 50 the government increase spending, y = 0.2
and the parameter values from example 2.1. This change the steady state, and the
agents converge to this new steady state. The last part of figure is not very clear, but
go back to figure 2.5, for an illustration when t > 50.
2.7,2. Government spending financed by a lump-sum tax.
We analyse the case where the government use a lump-sum tax and keep the money
supply constant M< = M . Let us assume the government increase spending at time T
yt = y > 0 for all t > T.




The equilibrium condition on the money market is given by
M= Mf
This combined with the new budget-constraint gives :
Pt f(nt) — Tt = M => (1-y)ptf(nt) = M =>
pt /pt+1 = f(nt+1 )/f(nt) for all t > T,
However at time T, then
Pt-i /Pt = (1 - y)f(nt )/f(nT-i) or
Pt-i /((I - Y)Pt) ~ f(nT)/f(nT_,)
The increased spending at time T works more like a subsidy to the price px.The offer
curve is changed to :
U'{(1 - Y)f(nt+1 )}f(nt+1) = V'(nt)f(nt)/f'(nt) for all t > T.
We can again write nt as a function of nt+t:
nt = F(nt+1 ,y)
Since U" < 0 then F is shifted upwards when y is increased as shown in figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9. The upward rotation in F as a result of an increase in government
spending.
In this case the real wage is increasing instead of decreasing as above, and the
household receive a higher return on work. Since substitution effect still dominates
the income effect the labour supply increase. The welfare comparison between the
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fast and slow learners are similar to proposition 2.5 where the economy initially is
below the steady state, since the initial condition are :
The fast learners are better off initially, but when t is large and the economy is close
to the new steady state the slow learners are better off. The steady state welfare
decreases although the labour supply increases. The government intervention is still
distortionary. However, the households can initially have a higher welfare than the
welfare at the steady state n, this is due to the goverment spending works more like a
subsidy to price for the old generation at time T, since the change was unanticipated
by the agents at time T. Hence the old generation at time T can benefit from the
introduction of government spending compared to the old steady state level U(c) -
V( n). The welfare for the two economies can be illustrated by the follwing figure.
This result is again generated where the economy is in a steady state for the first 50
periods and then spending is increased at time t = 50, with y = 0.2 and the parameter
values in example 2.1.
2.7.3. A subsidy to the price of output financed by a lump-sum tax.
As a last case, we look at a subsidy to the price on output. This is in many respects
similar to spending financed by a lump-sum tax. The government introduce a subsidy
to the price of production according to (2.29) at time T such that:
st = s > 0 for all t > T.
The subsidy is constant for all t > T. The households budget constraints is changed
to:
„ f ,e s,e — ^lit — 111 —- H ^ II .
Figure 2.10 about here.
st = 0 for all t < T.
time t +1 :
time t: Ptf(nt) - Tt = Mf.
(1 -st+i)Pt+.ct+i = Mf.
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The equilibrium condition on the money market is still M = Mtd, and combined with
the new budget-constraint, we have :
Pt f(nO -Tt = M => (1 - s)pt f(nt) = M =>
pt /pt+ \ = f(nt+, )/f(nt) for all t > T,
However at time T, then
Pt-i /Pt = (1 ~ s)f(nT )/f(nT_!) or
Pt-i /((I - s)pT) = f(nT)/f(nT_i)
The old generation at time T get a subsidy to the price they have to pay for the good,
but they do not have to pay the lump-sum tax, since this is paid by the young
generation at time T. The increase in the production subsidy change the offer curve :
(2.31) U'{f(nt+1 )}f(nt+1 )/(l - s) - V'(nt)f(nt)/f'(nt)
We can again write nt as a function of nt+t:
nt = F(nt+1 ,s)
The left-hand side of (2.31) is increased when s is increased. Thus F is shifted
upwards when s is increased as shown in figure 2.10.
Figure 2.11. The upward shift in F as a result of a production subsidy.
The temporary equilibrium condition is given by nt = F(n®+1 ,s), and the steady state
n is stable under learning. The welfare comparison between the fast and slow
learners are similar to proposition 2.5 where the economy initially is below the
steady state, since the initial condition are :
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f ,e „ s,e — . ~
n| — iij — n < n .
The fast learners are better off initially, but when t is large and the economy is close
to the new steady state the slow learners are better off. The steady state welfare
decreases although the labour supply increases. The government intervention is still
distortionary. However, the households can initially have a higher welfare than the
welfare at the steady state n, this is due to the subsidy to price for the old generation
at time T, since the change was unanticipated by the agents at time T. Since the
young generation at time T work harder in order to pay the lump-sum tax at time T,
the benefits the old generation because cT = f(nT), where nx > n and
U(cT) - V(nT_,) = U(f(nT)) - V(n) > U(f( n)) - V( n)
> U(c) - V(n)
The old generation at time T have a higher welfare than the steady state level U(c ) -
V(n). This shown by the peak at t = 50 in figure 2.12. However as t increases the
welfare decrease and converge to the new steady state level which is less than U( c)
- V(n). The welfare seqeunces are illustrated in figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12 about here.
The figure is generated with a subsidy s = 0.25 and the parametervalues from
example 2.1.
2.8. Conclusion.
In this chapter, we have studied the welfare consequences for two groups of agents,
fast learners and slow learners. We have compared the welfare between the two
groups at each time t, the welfare comparison depended on the initial conditions. If
the two groups initial were above the stable steady state, the slow learners were
initially better off than the fast learners, but for t sufficiently large the fast learners
were better off, and remained better off for the rest of the learning transition phase.
This result was reversed if the two groups initially were above the steady state.
40
We introduced different government policies in the model. However, in all three
cases the different policies decreased the steady state welfare. If there were multiple
equilibria with possible coordination failures, the government can use fiscal policy to
move the economy from a low level employment steady state to a high employment
steady state. This will be studied in chapter 3 and we will analyse the welfare
comparison between the fast learners and slow learners hold, when you move from a
low employment steady state to a high employment steady state. We could also
introduce a stochastic chock in the production function, this is done in chapter 4, but
we would have to make the speed of learning decreasing over time, otherwise the
steady state might not be stable under learning. Since the results seem to depend on
the learning rule, we should try to analyse cases, where we have different learning
rules.
In this model, there is no interaction between the two types of agents, but it would be
obvious to change the model such that we have two or more types of agents in the
same model. This is done in chapter 5. In chapter 6 we analyse the stability of cycles
under learning.
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Appendix to chapter 2.
Proofofproposition 2.2(a). The actual interest rate is decreasing.
4'(n°+1) is given by :
4'(0 =
f' (F«+2 ))FK+2XI - a, + atF «+1)) f(F(n°+,)) - f' (F«+1 )F' (n'+1) f(F«+2))
f(F«+1))2
Hence if
f'(F(n®+2))P«+2)(l-at +atF'«+1)) f(F«+1)) - f (F(n?+1) F«+1) f(F«+2)) < 0
then §'(n°+1) < 0. Since f(n) = Ana and F(n) = Bnp then
f (F«+2 ))F «+2 )(1 - at + a,F «+1)) fl(F(nJ+I)) - f (F«+1 )F'(n®+1) f(F«+2))
= aA{(B nj,2T'}pB(1 - a.fPBn^1 - 1) )A(Bn;w|i)a
-aA{(Bn^)°-1}pB(n;,,)|wA(Bnt,!|,r
= aApBA(Br'(B)a{ (n;,2)|ia-1(n;,1)Pa( 1 -a.tfBn^"1 - 1))
-(nl,r-'(nur }
= aApBA(B)a-'(B)a (n;.2 )«*-<(n;„)'a{(nj.2 "' ( 1 - at(pBn;.l|1-, - 1))
}
= aAPBA(B)°~1 (B)a (n:,: f'-'«, {'"(<.2)"' T
{ n*+l( 1 - at(PBn°+li3"1 - 1)) - n®+2 }
- aApBA(B)"-'(Bf (nj.2 f"'
{ nr„-at(PBn;,1p-n;,1)-[n;,1-at(Bii^1p-n;,1)] }




The right-hand side of (2.21) is equal to the following expression when we use the











LPB(n;,!)H(l ta(pB(n;„)H - 1)) -PB0C,)*
t+1
Rfne V
p r';p PB(n°+2)p_1 (1 + a(PB(n®+1 )p_! - 1)) -PB«+I)p-'B(nt+2)p
= V'(nt)P B(n°+1)
e n.P-1 n t+i
n
(1 +a(pB(n®tl)p"! - 1)) -1
t+2




Since P < 1 the last term is negative, and Sco (n®+1 ,a) / <9n°+1 is negative.
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Proofofproposition 2.4. The steady state is initally above the steady state.
Part 1. Initially the labour supply of the slow learner and the fast learner is equal :
n„ = njj, since the expected labour supply at time 1 is the same, n,-e = nf'e. At time
1, the actual labour supply of the slow learner is higher than the actual labour supply
of the fast learner : n, > nf, because n^ > n^'6. Since c, = f(n,) and c( = f(n[) we
have:
U(cn-VK)>U(c[)-V(n0f).
Part 2. Let us write U(ct+1) - V(nt) as a function of n®+1 and a :
U(c;+1)-V(n;) = <o(nts;e„as)
U(ctf+1)-V(ntf) = co(nf;e,,af)
Since the function oo(.,a) is a C2-function for all ne > 0 according to assumption 2.1
with a non-vanishing partial derivative of co w.r.t. n at n, co^rLa) ^ 0, there exists
according to the inverse function theorem a unique C1 -function <j> such that:
x = (j)(co(x,a)), for all x € N,
where N is a neighbourhood around n.
Let us look at the slow learners first, given the sequence (n^e, )J°=0, determined by
(2.25) n';e, = <e + as (F( n^) - n;-e) for all t > 1,
and n,5;® > n for all t > 0 and 0 < < 1. Given the expected labour supply sequence,
we can construct a welfare-sequence (co(n^, ,as))(l0 = (co'+1)"=0.
We have assumed that the steady state is locally stable under learning, thus n';e,
n for t -» oo, for all n';e, € Qb where is a neighbourhood around n. Since co
(.,as) is a continuous function, then co'+1 -> co(n,as) = co when n';e, -> n. From the
inverse function theorem, we can choose a neighbourhood Q2 around the steady state
(n, cb) such that:
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n*'e = (j)(co(n'-e ,as)) = <j)(co^) for all (n;'e,co*) e Q2,
This can be inserted into (2.25) and we have a connection between ®(+1 and co':
(2.26) <|)(co*+1) = <t>(a>* )+ as(F(cj)(cots))-<()(co^)).
Since <j) is unique, it has an inverse function, and (2.26) can be written as:
(2.27) <> = cjT1 [ <j>(cOt) + as(F(<t>(co')) - (j>(©t)) ] = ®(co*,as).
It is easy to show that co is a fixpoint for <!>(., as): O(co , as) = co .
Let us now make a first-order Taylor expansion of <t>(., as) around co* :
®(co*,as) = ®(©,as) + O£0'(©,as)(co^ - co) + s(|co^ - co |) =>
(2.28) co - co^+1 = Ora'(co,as)(co - co;) + s(|co^ - co |),
where s(|co* - co |)/|co* - ® | converges to 0, when co* converges to co, and
O(0'(co,as) is given by:
dco dn
When n = h , we have :
a,) - (<t>-')'(H) [ f(5>) + a,( F'OKOJf(co) - f(co)) ]
= T~rf(S)[l + a,(F'(«ffl:»-l)] = [l+a,(F'(n)-l)],
<t> (CO)
and (2.28) can be written as follows:
® - ®t+i = [ 1 + as(F'(n)-l)]( co - co*) + s(|co; - co|)
= 0S(CO - CO*) + s( |C0* - CO I)
where 1 + as(F'(n) - 1) = 0s and 0 < 0s < 1, since F(n) < 1.
The above arguments can be repeated for the fast learners, thus given the sequence
(ntf+i)r=o> determined by
nf;® = n[,e + af(F(nf-e)- nf-e) for all t> 1,
where n['e > n for all t > 1 and 0 < af < 1. Hence we can construct the welfare-
sequence (co(nf;eI,af))"=0= (cotf+I)"0, and (ntf^,cof+1) -> (n,co) for t -> oo, because
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n is locally stable under learning. We can use the inverse function theorem again and
there exists a neighbourhood W2 around (n,co), where nf,e = <j>(cof) for all
(n['e, co f) € W2 . Similar to (2.27) we have the non-linear difference equation:
(2.29) cof+I=0(cof,af).
We can linearise this non-linear difference equation around co :
(co - cof+1) = 9f ( co - co[ ) + s(co - cof )
where 9f = (1 + af (F'(n) - 1) so that 9 < 9f <1, and s(co - oof )/( © — cof ) —» 9
when cof -> co . We have 9f < 9s, because as < af and F'(n) < 1.
Let yt = (co - oof) and xt = (co - cof). Then according to lemma 2.1 there exists an
integer x such that:
(do — cof )<(co — cof ) forallt>x =>
(2.39) cof > cof forallt>x.
From part 1 the slow learner is initially better off at time T, but as part 2 shows the




Figure 2.5 The fast learners welfare (straight line)
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Figure 2.6 The fast learners welfare (straight line)
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Figure 2.9. The fast learners welfare (straight line)











Figure 2.10. The fast learners welfare (straight line)










Figure 2.12. The fast learners welfare (straight line)
and the slow learners welfare (dotted line).
Chapter 3. Increasing social returns and different speeds of learning.
3.1. Introduction.
There has recently been a growing attention into increasing social returns to some
factors of production in the analysis of growth and fluctuations in dynamic
macroeconomic models, see for example Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Increasing
returns arise, for example, from learning by doing or search and matching depending
on aggregate activity. A different but related approach depends on demand spillovers
or imperfect competition, see e.g. Ng (1980), Kiyotaki (1988) and Pagano (1990). A
common property of these models are the possibility of multiple equilibria and
associated coordination problems, see for example Cooper and John (1988), and
Howitt and McAfee (1992).
The possibility of multiple equilibria can be worrying since many of the predictions
of the model depend on the choice of a specific member from the set of equilibria.
One way of limiting the set of possible rational expectations equilibria is to
incorporate learning behaviour in the agents' expectations. In this chapter we analyse
the interaction between simple adaptive learning rules and multiple equilibria in a
nonlinear model with coordination failures. We will especially study welfare aspects
when the government is able to move the economy from a low level equilibrium to a
high level equilibrium.
The rationale for government intervention, when there are externalities, would be to
move the economy from a low level activity steady state to a high level activity
steady state. It is possible to show that the welfare in the different steady states can
be ranked such that a low level of activity implies a lower welfare than a high
activity steady state. This has been done by Evans and Honkapohja (1995b). Instead
of using a policy change to shift between low and high level steady states, we could
introduce an exogenous shock in the production function, this is done by Evans and
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Honkapohja (1993b). In this chapter we will not introduce the production shock, but
focus on different policy changes in a deterministic setting.
We will study the effect of different learning rules, or to be precise, we introduce two
types of learners, slow learners and fast learners. The slow learners have a low speed
of learning and the fast learners have a high speed of learning. This does not mean
that the fast learners learn more about the state of the economy, it simply refers to the
weight he use in his forecast and indicate that it is higher than that of the slow
learner. Hence the fast learner is making a better forecast than the slow learner. We
will compare the labour supply, real interest rate and the welfare between an
economy with fast learners and an economy with slow learners, when we move from
a low level steady state to a high level steady state. The movement is due to the
government introducing a production subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax, this
policy will steer the agents towards the high level equilibrium if the subsidy is large
enough. It is possible to show that a fast learner is better off in terms of welfare than
a slow learner during the movement to the steady state. However, as shown by
various simulations this need not be so. If the production subsidy is too high the slow
agents overtake the fast agents when the economy is close to the steady state and are
better off than the fast agents.
These results are due to three different effects. There is a positive production
externality when we increase the production subsidy as a result of the increasing
social returns. There is a dynamic learning "effect" from different speeds of learning.
However there is also an "inefficient" subsidy effect caused by a very large
production subsidy. We will investigate whether the fast learners will be better off
compared to slow learners during the entire learning transition, when the agents
move towards a high level employment steady state. This assumes that the
production subsidy is less than the optimal production subsidy and the speed of
learning is not too high. Furthermore we will briefly look at an optimal path for the
productions subsidy.
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In the literature there has only been few studies into the magnitude of the speed of
learning whereby agents learn. Bray and Savin (1986) study the speed of
convergence with the help of computer simulations, and with a high speed of
learning the agents converges to rational expectations equilibrium. Thus although the
agents use a misspecified model when they use the learning scheme they are only
misspecified for a short while. In Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) the stability of k-
cycles is analysed and it is shown that the stability condition depends on the speed of
learning in a rather complicated way. In Vives (1993) there is a study of the factors
that influence the speed of learning and the rate of convergence to a rational
expectations equilibria.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2 we describe the model with
increasing returns and in section 3.3 we explain the learning rule. The change in
government policy is studied in section 3.4 and in section 3.5 we use this analysis to
compare the labour supply and real interest rates between a fast learner and slow
learner born at the same time. In section 3.6 we look at the welfare comparison
between the two groups and investigate if there is an optimal path for the subsidy.
Section 3.7 contains the conclusions.
3.2. The model.
We analyse a standard overlapping generations model with money, but with
increasing social returns in the production function instead of linear production
function. The government's policy is a subsidy on the price of output/consumption
financed by a lump-sum tax, we could also study government spending financed by a
lump-sum tax or by seignorage. The representative agent born at time t maximises
welfare W = U(ct+1) - V(nt), where ct+1 is consumption at time t + 1 and nt is labour
supply at time t. The budget constraints for the agent are as follows
ptyt-Tt=Mtd and (1 - st)p°+1ct+1 = Md,
where Mf is the money demand at time t, pt is the price of output at time t, p®+1 is
the expected price at time t + 1, yt is the quantity of output produced when the labour
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supply is nt, st is the subsidy rate and Tt is the tax at time t. The government's budget
constraint is given by st pt yt = Tt such that there is a balanced budget. There is a
constant money supply M* = M for all t.
The production function is given by yt = f(nt ,Nt ), where Nt is the aggregate
employment given by Nt = Knt, and K is the number of agents in each generation.
The term Nt represents the externality. This type of production function is developed
in Evans and Honkapohja (1995b) and is given by
* XT
f(nt ,Nt) - A(nt )a{max (I*, ' }P = (nt)a\|/(Nt),
1 + bkN
t
where A>0, b>0, I*>0, 0<a<l,(3>l and X > 0. The function f can be
illustrated as follows.
Figure 3.1. The production function, f.
This particular form for the production function f arise as follows. The individual
agents output is assumed to depend on "ideas", hence we think of labour effort as
mental effort rather than physical effort and output is thought of as some type of
service based on the ideas. The complementary ideas received from other agents
exert a positive externality on productivity, when they are above some threshold, I*.
The number of ideas each agent create is equal the his or her labour supply nt, this
also includes additional labour effort. All the ideas are public information and the
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total number is Nt = Knt. The ideas are sent at a uniform rate throughout the whole
period and agents have a fixed endowment of time to listen to and absorb
complimentary ideas. This could be the whole period or some part of the period. Let
A. be the proportion of "matching" ideas then (A,Nt)_1 is the amount of time used
before a "suitable" idea arrives. However there is a cost of time when the agent
absorb a suitable idea, this is assumed to be fixed and equal to the constant b. The
total cost of time is equal to b + (A-Nj)"1 and with the endowment of one unit of time
available, the total number ofmatching ideas the agent have access to is:
1
= A.Nt
b + (A.N,)"1 1 + bA.N,
When the number of complementary ideas received from other agents are above
some threshold I* there is a positive externality. The effect generates increasing
returns over a range at the aggregate level, however since there is a fixed time cost
when absorbing a suitable idea, the range of increasing social returns are bounded.
The consumer treats Nt as given in production decisions and with 0 < a < 1 there is
diminishing marginal return to the individual labour supply nt. The production
function f(nt ,Nt) is non-decreasing in Nt.
The first-order condition for the maximisation problem is given by:
(3.1) uMn-N.);T.]jL_ ' f,'(n„N,)^V(n,)^ (1 St+l)Pt+l ' Pt + 1 (1 St + 1 )
The equilibrium conditions are
Money market. = Mts =M for all t.
Goods market. ct = yt = f (n t,Nt) for all t.
If the agents had perfect foresight, i.e. p'+, = pt+1 , we have from the budget
constraints and equilibrium conditions that M/pt = (1 - st )f (nt ,Nt) in each period,
and
pt/pt+1 = (1 - st+1 )f(nt+I ,Nt+1 )/(l - st)f(nt,Nt)
If this is inserted in the first-order condition (3.1), we can derive the offer curve
describing the evolution of n t over time :
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(3.2) U'(f(n,„ ,Kn,„ ))f(n,.l,Kn„l)= V'(n,)(l s,)f(n Kn,)
f] (nt,Knt)
We can find a particular expression for (3.2) given the functions in the following
example such that we can simulate the model.
Example. A constant subsidy and C.E.S.-functions. Let U(c) = (c1 -<7l - <r), 0 < cr <
1 and V(n) = (n1 + S/1 + s), s > 0 and st = s e [0,1 [ for all t, then the expression for
F(n,s) is as follows :
nt = F(n t+1 ,s) - [a / (1 - s)]I^[(nt+1 )a • v|/(Knt+1)] '+<=
where \]/(Kn t+1) = A(max \ I*,—— 1 )p .[ l + bA,Knt+1 J
This function is S-shaped as long as 0 < a < 1, see figure 3.2. Since the range of
increasing returns are bounded the F-function eventually become concave. If ex > 1
then F is downward sloping, see Evans and Honkapohja (1995b).
Figure 3.2. n t = F(nt+1 ,s). 1
The figure shows three interior steady states and the autarky steady state, where n =
0. Whether there are 3 interior steady states or less depends on the specific parameter
values in the example , there could also be one interior steady state or two interior
1
The parameters values are A = 1, b = 0.2, I* = 2, K = 200, a = 0.2, P = 4.8, s = 0.2, X = 0.01 and a =
0.41.
57
steady states. There are a continuum of perfect foresight equilibrium paths. If F is as
in figure 1, then for any n0 € (nL , % ) u (% , nH ) there is a equilibrium path
converging to ny and for any n0 e (0 , nL) there is a path converging to the autarky
steady state.
3.3. The learning rule.
Let us now consider the case where the system is not in a perfect foresight
equilibrium, and we want to study the evolution of the system when agents are
attempting to learn the law of motion, this is done as follows. The agents at time t
make a forecast of the price at time t + 1, p*+1, furthermore the agents observe pt and
yt in a temporary equilibrium. An agent can thus use M = pt+1 yt+1 or equivalently pt
/ p^+1 = y®+1 /yt to forecast on the output y®+1, or using the production function y^+l =
f(n°+1 ,i|/(Kn,tl)) the agent can forecast on the labour supply, n°+1, instead of
forecasting on the price in the next period, p^+1. Here we let the agents forecast the
labour supply and the temporary equilibrium condition given by
TT^.e v _ e wes _ e „ e ^ _ V? (n. )C1 ~ s. ) f(nt , Khn. )U (f (nt+1 ,Knt+l ))f (nt+1 ,K nt+1) — —— .
f, (nt,Knt)
This can be rearranged such that
(3.3) nt = FK+1).
The agents form expectations of the labour supply according to the learning rule
(3.4) nte+1 = n* + at(nt_, - <) = < + at(F(<)- n*)
where 0 < at < 1 and t = 2,3,.... We assume that at satisfy
Z<X> a, = oo.t=2 1
This learning rule is also known as econometric learning. The idea behind (3.3) is
that the agents devise a formula for the perceived law of motion and use some
standard statistical procedure to estimate it. The forecast of the labour supply is
calculated from the estimated law of motion. The learning rule is ad hoc but so are
most learning rules. However there has been a strong interest in simple learning
schemes like this in the literature, see for example Lucas (1985), Marcet and Sargent
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(1989) and Woodford (1990), and this learning rule has the merit of simplicity and
can be justified by agents' beliefs being "bounded rational" but "reasonable" as
mentioned by Guesnerie and Woodford (1991). The agents are boundedly rational in
the sense that the model they use is misspecified when they use the learning rule, the
reason is that they are outside a rational expectations equilibrium, but in the end the
economy converge to a rational steady state.
The learning algorithm can be viewed as an agent acting as if the economy was in a
steady state with an unknown value, this value is estimated from past observations
using a weighted mean of previous values ns, s = 2,3, t - 1 :
nt+i = atnt_! + (1 - at)at_1 nt_2 + (1 - a^l - at_1 )at_2nt_3 + ...
In order to make the model simple we assume that at = a for all t and 0 < a < 1. This
constant a is the speed of learning . The speed of learning indicates how much is
weight is placed on the difference between the actual labour supply nt_[ at time t - 1
and the expectations n® made at time t - 1. It would be obvious to use nt instead of
nt_j in the learning algorithm, but we use nt-1 to avoid a simultaneous determination
of nt and nte+1. Furthermore there might be a delay in announcement of labour supply
at time t, such that only nt_, is avaible at time t. However it is possible to use nt at the
expense of simplicity.
It might seem strange to learn about the labour supply instead of the price p^+1 or the
real interest rate (pt /pt+1 )e , however in this set-up it is the simplest to do. If the
agents learn on the price or the real interest rate it does not alter the results, but there
is not a one-to-one correspondence between learning on the labour supply and, for
example, learning on the real interest rate. Hence there does not exist a weight a
when learning on labour supply that corresponds to a weight a when learning on the
real interest rate.
The choice of an adaptive learning rule is not crucial, we could also use a related
learning rule formulated in Woodford (1990):
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n®+1 = n® +at(U'(rtf(<,K<))rtf«,K<)-V'(nn)
where rt = pt_j /p®. This is sometimes referred to as a gradient rule, see also Sargent
(1993). With this algorithm we have the effect on the marginal utility from last
periods forecast n®, at the steady state nH : U'(f (nH,K nH))f (nH,K nH) - V'(nH) = 0.
When n® > nH the impact on the marginal utility is negative such that agents adjust
their expectations downwards and if n® < nH the impact on the marginal utility is
positive such that agents adjust their expectations upwards. This learning rule
describes how agents accumulate knowledge about their optimal response to the
labour supply.
The stability analysis of the different steady states under learning is developed in
Evans and Honkapohja (1995b). It is shown in the case where F are monotonically
increasing (0 < a < 1):
• If there are three interior steady states as in figure 3.2, then nL and nH are stable
under learning, while % is unstable.
• If there is only one interior steady state (nL or nH), it is stable under learning.
• If there are two interior steady states (ny and nH) then nH is stable under learning
and ny is unstable.
Throughout this chapter, it is assumed that the agents are bounded rational, so the
agents treat the economy as if it were in a steady state, the value of which they
estimate using the learning rule.
Example continued. Given U and V, the function F(.) is .
nt= F«,) - [a / (1 - s)]T[Wtl)" •V(KiC.)p .
When 0 < a < 1 F is S-shaped as in figure 2.
The temporary equilibrium condition (3.3) and the learning algorithm (3.4) provide
us with a description of the evolution of the economy over time and the convergence
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to a steady state depends upon the initial beliefs. Since the two steady states nH and
nL are the only interior stable steady states, we will focus our analysis on these.
3.4. A change in the production subsidy.
Let us consider the situation, where the government changes the production subsidy s
s t = 0 for 0 < t < T - 1.
s t = s > 0 for t > T.
When s = 0, it is assumed that the economy has reached the low level steady state
net+] = nt = nL for t = T - 1 and F is as in figure 3.2. The government's objective is to
push the economy to the high employment level nH by the use of a production
subsidy s. This is financed by a lump-sum tax Tt such that the government's budget is
balanced: Tt = sptf (n^. The production subsidy s will push the F-curve upwards,
because the subsidy makes consumption tomorrow cheaper and since the
substitution-effect dominate the income-effect, the household substitute between
expensive goods today and cheap goods tomorrow. This can be seen from the F-
function in the example that an in increase s, rotates F upwards, see figure 3.3. If the
increase in the subsidy s is too small, then nL still exists and increases together with
nH . The change in s has to be large enough for nL to disappear and nH to be the
unique interior steady state, see figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3. The effect on the F-function of an increase in the subsidy s.
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The dynamics are given by the learning rule and the F-function:
n°+1 = nts +at(nt_! - nte) for all t.
nt = F(n®+1) for all t.
What are the effects on the labour supply, real interest rate and private welfare of a
change in government policy. It is easy to show that
• The expected labour supply n'+1 and actual labour supply nt is increasing and
converges to the steady state nH , where s > 0. In the proof for convergence, we
use Y"° a. = oo.Z-it=2 '
• The real interest rate pt/pt+l > 1 for all t > T + 1, and converges to the steady state
level which is equal to 1.
However pt/pt+i need not be monotone decreasing, because st+1 = st and nt+1 > nt for
all t > T and the real interest rate is given by :
Pt
_ (1 ~ st+i )f(nt+1 ,Kn t+i ) = fCtt t+1 > KEs±i2 > I
Pt+i (l-st)f(nt,Knt) f(nt,Knt)
When nt and nt+1 is in the range where f has increasing returns the difference between
nt and nt+1 can be "large" such that the difference between f(nt ,Knt) and f(nt+1 ,Knt+I )
is too "large". As t goes towards infinity the difference between nt and nt+I decreases
because nt converges to nH. When nt is "close" to nH, both F and f becomes concave
and the difference between f(nt ,Knt) and f(nt+] ,Knt+1 ) becomes "small", because nt
converges to nH.
Hence the real interest rate might be increasing in the beginning as a result of the
increasing returns, but when t is large it has to decrease and converge to the steady
state level. If we use the functions from the example we can show this by
simulations, see figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 about here
2
We use the parameter values from figure 3.2, see footnote 1, with s = 0.25 and a, = 0.5 for all t.
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There is an effect from the production externality on the real interest rate, the
sequence of the real interest rate, (pt/pt+i )t, is asymptotically decreasing.
3.5. The comparison between fast and slow learners.
Let us assume we have two separate economies, one with fast learners and one with
slow learners. The speed of learning for the fast learners is given by the sequence
(atf)t, where " f" denotes the fast learners, and likewise for the slow learners, (a')t,
where " s " denotes the slow learners. We assume
aj = ats < a[ = af for all t.
With this assumption the fast learners make better forecasts than the slow learners as
shown in below proposition 3.1, however both types of learners are bounded rational
for all t and they are stuck with their learning rule and their respective speed of
learning. The assumption that the speed of learning is constant is not crucial, but is
made to ease notation. There is no interaction between the two economies as
mentioned earlier. Each economy is fully characterised by the labour supply n[, the
real interest rate pj / p{+1 and consumption cj+1 where i = s,f. We compare the
expected labour supply between a fast learner and a slow learner born at time t, this is
done in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Assume there is a one-time increase in the production subsidy at
time T, and let (nff), denote the fast learners' expected labour supply and let (nf,)t
denote the slow learners expected labour supply, then
fe _s,e
nT+l ~ nT+l
nff > nff for all t >T + 1.
Proof. Since n£®j and n^f, are determined by n^'e and n^e, respectively, and n^,e =
n^e = nL then n^®, = n^®, and n^ = n^.. The rest of the proof is done by induction.
0 f
S . Since a^, < aT+I then
63
— f,e „ f,e i f / f f,e \ ^ „ s,e , s / „ s „ s,e \ s,e
T+2 T+l T+l ( T T+l ) T+l aT+l (nT nT+l ) nT+2 *
T°. Assume nj;® > n*;®, and show ntf;e2 > n*;®2 :
n«f;e2 = af;® + atf+I(ntf - ntf;®,) = (l - a(+1)nf;e, + a[+1 n[
> (1 - atf+1)n*;®, + af+1 nts = n*;®, + atf+I(nts - n|;®,)
\ ^ s,e I _ s / „ s _ s,e \ ^ s,e
t+i a,+I(n, nt+]) t+2 '
where the first inequality is due to nf;® > n*;® and the second at < af• ■
The fast learners have according to proposition 3.1, a better forecast than the slow
learners when we change the production subsidy. The fast learners respond more
rapidly to a change in the subsidy. It is easy to see from proposition 3.1 that the
actual labour supply for a fast learner born at time t > T is greater than the actual
labour supply of a slow learner :
ntf > n* for all t > T.
At time t = T, n^ = n^. > nL because n^'®, = n^®, = nL . Hence there is an immediate
increase in the actual labour supply at time T, but the effect from different speeds in
the learning rule does not have an impact on the expected labour supply before time
T + 1. The agents does not update their beliefs before time T + 1. The increase in the
expected labour supply is due to the monotonicity of the F-function. The agents keep
working harder each period, and converge to the new steady state with high activity.
Let r/+1 = p| / ptf+l denote the fast learner's real interest rate and let rts+] = pts / p'+1
denote the slow learner's real interest rate, then we have the following proposition,
where we compare the real interest rates.
Proposition 3.2. Assume there is a one-time increase in the subsidy, then
r^ t> t~sT+l 'T+l '
and there exists an integer r such that
rLi < r,+i f°r al11 * T-
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Proof. See appendix. ■
Initially the fast learners have a higher real interest rate, but when t is large the slow
overtakes the fast learners such that they have a higher real interest rate. This is due
to the difference in the speed of learning and the fact that the two economies do not
interact, if you are a slow learner then the generation before you were slow and the
generations to come will be slow.
It is possible to compare the welfare at the different steady state levels for a given
subsidy :
• IfnH n|^ then the we 1 fare at n^, U(npj ^ — V(n^ is higher than the welfare at nj^,
U(nL ) - V(nL ), for given subsidy s > 0.
For a proof of this, see Evans and Honkapohja (1995b). When the subsidy s is
changed the steady states are changed and we cannot make the same comparison
between a steady state where s = S] with a steady state where s = s2 and s, * s2.
However the low activity level nL , where s = 0, is "locally" pareto optimal. If we
have a small increase in s which does not remove nL, but simply increases to nL > nL
, then the welfare U(cL) - V(nL) is less than U(cL ) - V(nL ). This is due to the
inactivity of the production externality at this level. If the government introduces a
small subsidy s when the economy are at nL , then although nL increase, the welfare
will decrease in the new steady state, the reason is that we have not reached the range
of increasing returns. The change in the production subsidy has a purely distortionary
effect.
If there is a fixed subsidy s, the welfare is increased when n is increased due to the
ranking of the steady states. From this positive externality, the welfare at nH when s =
0, is less than the welfare at nH where s > 0, because an increase in the subsidy will
activate the production externality. Hence a small increase in the subsidy when the
economy initially are at nH will raise the welfare in the new steady state. However the
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government cannot raise s arbitrarily high. If the increase in s is too high then the
level of welfare at nH with s "high" can even be lower than the welfare at nH with s =
0. There is an optimal production subsidy s*, where welfare is maximal, and s* is
determined as a solution to the following maximisation problem
max U(f (n, Kn)) - V(n)
n
The first-order condition for this problem is:
(3.5) U'(f (n,Kn))( f, (n,Kn) + f2 (n,Kn)d{i|/(Kn)}/3n ) - V'(n) = 0
where f] is the partial derivative f with respect to the first argument and f2 is partial
derivative of f w.r.t. the second argument. If we insert the expression of the offer
curve (3.1), we have
U'(f (n,Kn))( ft (n,Kn) + f2 (n,Kn)5{vj/(Kn)}/5n )
- U'(f (n,Kn))f! (n,Kn)/(l - s*) = 0 =>
(3.6) s* = f2 (n,Kn)^ { f, (n,Kn) + f2(n,Kn)y1on on
where n = nH .
Let us assume that F is as in figure 3.2 with s = s*. If the economy is at nL and the
government wishes to bring the economy to nH , it has to increase s such that s > s*
and shortly later it must decrease the subsidy s to s = s*. The increase in s reduces the
steady state welfare compared with the steady state welfare at nH where s = s*, and if
the increase in s is too high the welfare might even be lower than at nL . There are
several problems with this increase, for example, for how long is it necessary for the
government to have s > s* and what is the optimal path for the subsidies when the
agents use an adaptive learning rule. The government wants to minimise the time
where s > s*, but the agents need to get above nH where s = s*, before the
government decreases s again. If the government reduces s to s* before the level of
labour supply is above nH (s = s*), then they converge back to the old level nL. This
will among other things depend on the speed in the learning rule, if agents have a low
speed learning rule it might take them some time before they are above nH.
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3.6. The welfare comparison between the two economies.
In this section we will compare the welfare between an economy with slow learners
and an economy with fast learners. Let (n|;e, )t denote the fast learners labour supply
and let (n^e, )t denote the slow learners labour supply. Given these two sequences we
can calculate the labour supply, the price and the consumption for both economies,
remember there is no interaction between the economy with fast agents and the
economy with slow agents. We wish to compare the welfare after a change in the
production subsidy at time T, between a slow learner born at time t, U( c*+I) - V( n*),
and a fast learner born at time t, U( c[+1) - V( ntf) for all t > T.
At time T, the old generation of fast learners has the same welfare as the old
generation of slow learners, however there is an increase in the welfare compared to
the old generation at time T - 1:
U(4) - V( 4_,) = U(c' ) - V(n*) > U(cT_,) - V( nT_2) = U(cL) - V(nL).
The increase in welfare is due to the young generation at time T is working harder,
nx > nj_, for i = s,f. This is a result of the production subsidy having an immediate
effect on the F-function, see figure 3.3. However the forecast at time T nx®,, i = s,f,
is not affected because it depends on the forecast at time T -1, n^e, and the labour
supply at time T — 1, nx_,, and the change was unanticipated by the agents. Hence
there is a one-period delay in revising the forecast after the change in the production
subsidy. The old generation at time T benefits from the increase in the actual labour
supply nx because the consumption cx = f (nx ,Knx).
Furthermore there is a decrease in the price the old generation pays for the
consumption good at time T due to the production subsidy s :
Pt—i /(I — s)px — f (nx ,Knx )/f (nx_j ,Knx_]) ^ 1
Pt-i > (1 ~ s)Pt •




since = n^. and CT+1 > Ct+I . Here the effect of higher speed of learning benefits
the fast learner, because the effect of different speeds of learning make the young
generation of fast learners at time T + 1 work harder than the young generations of
slow learners at time T + 1 : 4+1> n^.+1, while at time T , nlj- = n^.
When we compare the two economies at time T + 1 it is helpful to use simulations. In
the simulations we use the functions from the example and parameter values in
footnote 1. The simulations indicate that there are two different cases :
• The fast learners are better off than the slow learners for all t > T, see figure 3.5
and figure 3.6.
• The fast learners are better off than the slow learners initially while the slow
learners are better off when the economy is close to the steady state, see figure
3.7.
Figure 3.5 about here.
We use the parameter values from figure 3.2 and set s = 0.25 and af = 0.5, = 0.2.
Here we have chosen a subsidy large enough to remove the low level steady state.
The difference in the speed of learning could be made smaller without changing the
results, but this obviously depends on the parameter values we have chosen in the
example. The two welfare-sequences, given by {U(c*+I) - V(n*)}t and (U(ctf+1) -
V(n[)}t are monotone and converge to the steady state level U(cH) - V(nH) and the
fast agents are always better of than the slow agents for all t.
Figure 3.5 shows the positive effect on the welfare from the increasing social returns,
and both types of agents benefits from this effect. If the production function were
strictly concave, the steady state welfare would decrease, although the steady state
value of n increases, this is due to the distortionary effect from the increase in s.
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Here we have an increase in the welfare when the economy is pushed from nL to nH ,
given a change in the subsidy s is large enough to eliminate nL.
• There is a static positive externality effect from an increase in the subsidy s < s*,
when the production function exhibits increasing social returns.
There is also a dynamic effect from the difference in the learning rules, as can be
seen from figure 3.5, the fast learner born at time t have a higher welfare compared to
a slow learner born at time t:
U(cf+1)- V( nf) > U( ) -V«) for all t.
This is a result of the increase in the level of steady state welfare together with the
fast learner making a better forecast than the slow learner. The welfare is increasing
due to the increasing social returns, and the welfare sequences for the two economies
are monotonically increasing. Since the fast learners are "closer" to the steady state :
I n[;e, - nH I < I n';e, - nH I for all t > T
they have higher welfare compared to the slow agents who do not adjust their
forecast as fast.
If the production function is strictly concave, the fast learner is better off initially, but
when t is large the slow learner overtakes the fast learner. This is a result of the
difference in the speed of learning : The fast learner changes his forecast more
rapidly than the slow learner, but because of the decrease in the steady state level of
welfare, the fast learner converge to the steady state " before " the slow learner.
Hence even though the fast agent make a better forecast, he is worse off when t is
large, given a strictly concave production function, because the steady state welfare
was decreasing and the fast was closer to the steady state. This is also possible if
there is increasing social returns in the production function as will be shown below in
figure 3.7.
In the following experiment, shown in figure 3.6 below, we have increased the
subsidy to s =0.6 but left the remaining parameters unchanged from figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.6 about here.
As can be seen from figure 3.6, the fast learner is still better off than the slow learner
for all t > T + 1, but the welfare sequence for the group of fast learners, {U( cf+1) -
V(n[)}t, is no longer monotone as in figure 3.6. This is due to the increase in s
compared to figure 3.5, such that the range over which we have increasing returns
has increased. This can lead to a large difference between nf and n[+], and since the
consumption cf+) = f(ntf+1 ,Kn[+1), it is possible that the welfare U(cf+1) - V(nf) can
be above the steady state level U(cH ) - V(nH ). However as t goes to infinity the
welfare converges to the steady state level, because the steady state is stable under
learning rule. Hence at some time t the welfare of the fast learners must begin to
decrease and converge to the steady state level, the fast learners are better compared
to the slow learners during the learning transition. Furthermore there is also an effect
from the speed of learning, since the slow learners still have a monotone increasing
welfare sequence, {U(c'+1) - V(n;)}t, but an increase in will make the welfare
sequence non-monotonic, if the increase is large enough. Hence the combination of a
"large" subsidy s and a "high" speed of learning can cause the welfare sequence to be
non-monotonic as shown in figure 3.6. In figure 3.6 and in figure 3.5 there is a
"welfare effect" for the old generation at t = 50, they get the subsidy to price, but do
not have to pay the tax at time t = 50.
It is possible that the welfare for both types of learners is decreasing in the first
periods after the change in the subsidy. This is due to the "local" pareto-optimality of
nL , when the labour supply has not reached the range of increasing returns. This is
also possible even if the subsidy is large enough to eliminate nL, as can be shown by
simulations. The "slower" the agents are, the longer it takes them to move to the
range where the production function exhibits increasing returns.
In figure 3.7 we have increased the subsidy to s = 0.8 and this above the optimal
subsidy s* ~ 0.62, but the remaining parameters are as in figure 3.5 and 3.6.
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Figure 3.7 about here.
Here the subsidy is higher than the optimal subsidy, the steady state level of welfare
at nH , where s = 0.8 is lower compared to the steady state welfare at nH , where s =
0.6 see figure 3.6. Hence there is an "inefficiency" effect from a very large increase
in the subsidy. As in figure 3.6, the welfare sequence is non-monotonic but now it is
for both groups of learners, and even if is "very small" the welfare sequence
remains non-monotonic. There is again a "welfare effect" at t = 50, the old generation
at t = 50 benefits from the subsidy and do not pay the tax.
As figure 3.7 shows, when t is sufficiently large the slow learner has a higher welfare
than the fast learner, even though the fast learner is making a better forecast than the
slow learner as shown in proposition 3.1. This might seem counterintuitive that
somebody with a better forecast could do worse than somebody with a "worse"
forecast, but remember there is no interaction between the two economies.
Furthermore if the generation before was slow (or fast) learners, the generations to
come will also be slow (or fast) and it takes the slow learners longer time to converge
to the steady state compared to the fast learners as shown in proposition 1. Since the
welfare for both groups is above the steady state level from some time t, the slow
learners will eventually overtake the fast learners when t is large, while initially the
fast learners are better off than the slow learners. Hence there are two externalities
working together here:
• There is a static inefficiency effect from s > s*, even though the change in s
increases the labour supply, the welfare in the steady state with s > s* decreases
compared to the welfare in the steady state where s = s*.
• There is a dynamic learning effect from af > 3s» and although nt increases, the
welfare sequence is not monotonically increasing. When t is above some integer x,
the welfare begins to decrease and converges to the steady state level. Since the
slow learners do not converge as rapid as the fast learners, they eventually
overtake the fast learners when t is sufficiently large.
We can now show the following local result.
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Proposition 3.3. Assume the subsidy is increasedfrom s = 0 to s > 0.
(i) If the welfare of the fast and slow learners, U(c'l+I) - V(n\), for i = s,f, is below
the steady state level ofwelfare U(cH) - V(nH) for all t, then there exists an integer
tsuch that
U(csl+I) - V(n]) < U(c{+1) - V(n{) for allt>r.
(ii) If there exists an integer m such that the welfare of the fast and slow learners,
U(c'l+I) - V(n't), for i = s,f, is above the steady state level ofwelfare U(cH) - V(nH)
for all t> m, then there exists an integer r > m such that
U(cl,) - V(n\) > U(c{+1)~ V(n{) for all t > r.
Proof. See appendix. ■
In order to determine if we are in case (i) or in case (ii), we have to find the condition
for U( ctf+1) - V( nf) < U(cH) - V(nH) for all t, and this depends upon the size of the
subsidy s and the speed of learning a. If we are in case (ii), we have to find the
criterion for U( c*+1) - V( nts) > U(cH ) - V(nH ) for t sufficiently large, this will also
depend on the size of s as well as the speed of learning.
The second statement in proposition 3.3 illustrates the possibility of slow learners
being better off than fast learners. The simulations and the above analysis suggests a
more general proposition. After a one-time increase in the subsidy s, but where the
subsidy is less than the optimal subsidy, s < s*, if furthermore the slow learners
speed of learning is less than some constant, as < kj , then the welfare of the slow
agents is below the steady state welfare:
U( c*+I) - V( n?) < U(cH) - V(nH) for all t
The combination of a "low" subsidy and a "low" speed of learning makes the welfare
sequence monotonically increasing and bounded above by the steady state welfare
during the learning transition. The fast agents' welfare sequence might also be
monotonically increasing and bounded above, then we should be able to prove by
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induction that the fast learners are better off than the slow learners, since the fast
agent is "closer" to the steady state as in figure 3.5. In the case where the agents
welfare sequence increases above the steady state at some point x because af > k,
then
U(cH) - V(nH ) < U( cf+1) - V( nf) for all t > x,
and the fast learner is still better off compared to the slow learners, see figure 3.6. In
both situations we can use the first part of proposition3.3.
In the last case where the slow agents are better off than the fast agents when t is
large as in figure 3.7, then a high subsidy, s > s*, or a high speed learning for the
slow learners, > k2 , makes the welfare-sequences non-monotone at some point and
the welfare increase above the steady state level:
U(cH) - V(nH) < U(c;+1) - V(n;) for i = s,f.
In this case we can use the second part of proposition 3.3. Hence the following
conjecture should cover all three situations.
Conjecture. Assume there is an increase in s from s = 0 to s > 0.
(i) Ifs < s* and as < k{, where k, is some constant, then the fast learners are always
better off than the slow learners :
U(csl+I) - V(n]) < U(c{+I)~ V(n{) for all t.
(ii) If s > s* or as> k2 , where k2 is some constant, then the slow learners overtake
the fast learners and there exists an integer r such that:
U(c5t+I) - V(n]) > U(c{+I) - V(n{) for all t > r.
The problem with a conjecture as the above, is that if we assume that U and V are
C.E.S.-functions as in the example, the constants k, and k2 may depend on the speed
of learning and subsidy as well as the other parameters, furthermore the welfare
function is not concave over a range of values for n°+l. Hence it is not as
straightforward to show the conjecture, as one might expect, even in the case were
we assume that U and V are C.E.S. functions.
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With this in mind let us study the policy problem where the government wants to
increase the subsidy in order to steer the economy away from the low level activity
steady state to the high level steady state. Instead of comparing the welfare of a fast
learner with the welfare of a slow learner at each point in time, we will compare the
total welfare, i.e. the sum of all the agents' individual welfare during the learning
transition, for different government policies, in order to find the optimal path for the
subsidy st over time.
We assume that the economy is at the point A in figure 8 below, at the low level of
activity steady state with s = 0. The government would like to move the economy to
B, where s = s*, the optimal subsidy, and the steady state welfare is maximal. In
order to push the economy from A to B the subsidy is raised to S], this rotates the F-
function upwards as we have seen previously, since the substitution-effect dominates
the income-effect. The government will thereafter reduce the subsidy to s2 = s* after
some time as shown in figure 3.8. This pushes the F-function downwards with the
steady state at B.
Figure 3.8. The effect on F with an initial increase in the subsidy from s to Sj and
a subsequent decrease to s2 - s*.
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Since there is no discounting in the model, we can evaluate the policy by the finite
sum of each generations welfare:
O'7) L1tUW«) " VW) for i = s,f.
Where N is a large but finite integer and T is the time of the first change in the
subsidy. If we let N go to infinity the sum will become infinite, because it is a
sequence of positive numbers that converges to U(cH ) - V(nH ) > 0. One way to
overcome this problem would be to discount future generations welfare by a
discount-factor, for example, the real interest rate rt+1. Another possibility is to look
at the infinite sum but take the difference the welfare during the learning transition ad
the steady state:
0-8> 2T.t{ (u(c«)- vW» - (U(c„)-V(nH))}
Since nj converge to the steady state level it should be possible to prove that (3.8)
was well-defined, but it depends on whether it is possible to find a function g(nt)
such that
V(n;))-(U(cK)-V(nH))} < 2LTg(n,)«».
However in order to keep the set-up simple let us for the moment merely look at the
finite sum. Since there are lots of policies that end up at B where s = s*, we have to
find the optimal path for the subsidy, this could, for example, be :
• Policy a. An increase in s to s* at time T : st = s* for all t > T.
• Policy b. An increase in s to Sj > s* for t > T until some time x, where s is reduced
to s2 = s* :
st = S[ for T < t < x - 1
st = s2 = s* for t > x.
We do not want too many changes in the subsidy, because then the agents would take
these changes into account when they make their forecast. Until now the agents take
st as given in every period and they expect next periods subsidy to be equal to the
previous period's subsidy and we keep this assumption for simplicity. We have only
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studied unanticipated changes in the production subsidy, but it would be a natural
extension to incorporate expectations about the governments policy as well.
If we look at policy a, the welfare increases due to the positive production
externality. If the agents speed of learning is to high then it may rise above the steady
state level but has to decrease since the learning rule takes them to the steady state
nH.
With the policy b, the increase in s to Sj leads to a higher steady state level of
employment but a lower steady state welfare compared to the steady state labour
supply and welfare when s = s*, this is due to s being increased above the optimal
level s*. The government has to decide for how long it wishes to have st = st . It is
necessary to have S! for at least as many periods as it takes n® to move above a
possible low activity steady state nL where s = s*. Otherwise the economy will
simply converge to this new low level activity steady state, where the welfare is
lower than welfare in the old low level activity steady state, because of the local
pareto-optimality of nL with s = 0. A way to ensure that the government would not
run into this type of problem would be to have st = s, until nte is above the steady
state nH where s = s*, i.e. that we would have a large x in policy b. However a large t
could reduce the welfare during the learning transition, but a large subsidy combined
with high speed of learning will increase the labour supply "very fast" such that it is
above the steady state nH where s = s* within few periods after the initial change.
Hence we have to consider the possible loss of welfare due to a large t, against a
quick response due to a high speed of learning and a large subsidy. When s is
decreased to s*, this will lead to a decrease in nt but an increase in the welfare,
because the subsidy is at its optimal level.3
The question is now, which of the two types of policies gives the highest welfare
during the learning transition, and does the optimal path of subsidies depend on a, the
3
The analysis where s is decreased is similar to the previous, where s is increased.
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speed of learning. The policy we are looking for must give a higher welfare during
the transition from A to C and from C to B rather than staying at A, but how big
should S] be and how fast can we reduce it to s2 . It is easy to show the following
result:
• A policy with a one-time change in s from s = 0 to s > 0, but s < s*, where the
increase is large enough to eliminate nL will always give a higher welfare than
stayingatA: Z,N.tu(cLi) " VW) > Z,1tU(c-.) " VK)
for N sufficiently large and i = s,f.
When the government increase the subsidy, nt will eventually reach the range where
there is increasing returns and where it converges to a high level steady state with
higher welfare than the welfare in the old low level steady state nL . Thus the
government just need to choose N sufficiently large. Hence if s is increased to s* at
time T, this policy will give a higher welfare for the group as a whole rather than
staying at A, where s = 0 and n - nL .The government would thus be induced to
introduce the subsidy in this case, however it might not be a trivial task to calculate
s* as can be seen from the expression in (3.6), because f is not concave thus the
maximisation problem is non-concave. The problem become even worse if the
economy is at nL with s = s*, then an increase in s reduces the steady state level of
welfare at nH as discussed earlier. We need to evaluate :
(a) The policy where st = s* for t > T :
!>«=!.■)-v<n|).
(b) The policy where st = S] for T < t < Nj and st = s2 for t > N) + 1 :
Z><0 - V(n|) + - V(ni).
Which of these policies give the highest welfare will depend on the size of the
subsidy and the size of the speed of learning and again it might not as straightforward
to show which policy give the highest welfare, since functions are not concave for all
values of the expected labour supply.
3.7. Conclusion.
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In this chapter we have studied the effects on increasing social returns in a standard
model with overlapping generations, where the agents forecast on the labour supply.
This lead to multiple equilibria with different levels of activity. The learning
behaviour could be used in the model narrow down set of "reasonable" equilibria
where the outcome depended on the initial conditions. The purpose was to study the
effect of changes in government policy on two different groups of learners, where
each group was determined by their speed of learning. The group with the higher
speed of learning made better forecast than the group with a low speed of learning in
the sense that the fast learners converged more rapidly to the new equilibrium
compared to the slow learners.
In most cases this leads to a higher welfare for the fast learner compared to the slow
learner because of the positive production externality and higher speed of learning.
However it was possible that the slow learners were better off when the economy is
close to the steady state, see proposition 3.3. This was due to the dynamic learning
externality together with a "large" subsidy s such that the welfare was increased
above its steady state level. Hence it might not always be favourable to make "better"
forecasts.
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Appendix to chapter 3.
Proof ofproposition 3.2. The real interest rate rt+1 = pt /pt+1 can be written as a
function of the expected labour supply n°+l :
r _ P, f(n„i,Kn,„) _ f(F(n^2),KP(n?+z)) _
p,„ f(n,,Kn,) f(F«,),KF(iC,))
2
because nte+2 = nte+l + a(F(nte+1) - nte+1). <)>(.) is a C -function. Hence for the fast and
slow learner, we have :
rt+i = <Knt+i) and r,s+1 ^(n").
Since ntf;° —> nH when t —» oo and n';e, —> nH when t -» oo, then the real interest rates
converge as well : rtf+I —> 1 and rts+1 —> 1 when t —> oo, remember that F and f
eventually become concave and remains concave for all n above a certain value,
especially both F and f become concave for n in a neighbourhood around nH. Let rH =
1 denote the steady state real interest rate. Since <j) is a C -function with <t>'(nH) * 0,
there exists a neighbourhood Q around (nH ,rH ) such that
K+\ = M>( rt+i) for all (n[;e,, rtf+1) e Q
according to the inverse function theorem. If this is inserted in the learning rule we
have
M>( rt+2) = V( rt+i) + af ( F(v|/( rtf+,)) - y( rtf+I) )
Since \\i is unique, it has an inverse function and
r,f+2 = { T( r/+1) + af( F0( rtf+1)) - y( rtf+1)) } = ¥( rtf+1).
It is easy to show that rH is a fixpoint for VF(.):
^(rH) = M>~' { M>(rH) + ^( F(\|/(rH)) - v(rH)) } = V~' { V(rH) } = rH ,
because vp(rH) = nH and F(nH) = nH . Let us now make a first-order Taylor expansion
of around rH :
¥( rtf) = ^(rH) + T"(rH)( rtf - rH) + s( rtf - rH) or
(A. 1) ¥( rtf) - T(rH) = T'(rH)( rtf - rH) + s( rtf - rH)
where T"(rH) is given by :
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^'(rH) = ^ K)) W (rH) + af(F' 0(rHW 0"H) - V (rH))^(nH )
,) , (V (rH) + af (F' 0(rHW (rH) - ¥' (rH))V(rH)
= l+af(F'(v|/(rH))-l) = ef,
where 0 < 9 f < 1, because 0 < F'(v|/(rH )) < 1. This is inserted in (A. 1):
xF(rtf)-vF(rH) = 9f(rtf -rH) + s(rtf -rH) or
(A-3) rtf+1 - rH = 0 f (rtf - rH) + e( rtf - rH),
since rtf+1 = VF( rtf) and vF(rH) = rH. This can be done for the slow learner as well and
(A.4) rts+1 - rH = 0s(rts -rH) + e(rts -rH)
where 9 s = 1 + aj (F '(¥(%)) ~ 1) ® sK T Since 0 < F '(v|/(rH)) < 1 and aj < af,
then 0 f < 9 s. We can now use the lemma 2.1 from chapter 2 with x t = (rts - rH) and
yt = (rtf - rH ), and there exists an integer x such that
(rts ~ rH) > (rtf ~ rH) for all t > x =>
rts > rtf for all t > x. ■
Proof ofProposition 3.3. This is similar to the proof of proposition 3.2 so we will
just briefly skecth the proof. The welfare U(ct+I ) - V(nt) can as the real interest rate
be written as a function of the forecast n^+1:
cot+1=U(ct+1)-V(nt) = ^(n^).
This can be done for both the fast and the slow learner :
©f+1 =^(n[;j) and ©ts+1 =^(n*;e,).
Since nf;e, —> nH when t -» co and n';e, —> nH when t -> co, the welfare converge as
well:
<o[+1 ->U(cH)-V(nH) = ©H and
© ts+1 -» U(cH) - V(nH) = ©H when t co.
Since § is a C -function with a non-vanishing derivative <;'(nH) * 0, then we can use
the inverse function theorem again and there exist a unique C1-function C such that:
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n,f;ei = £(© Li) and n*;e, =^(cots+l)
for all (nf;e, ,co[+1) e Q and for all (n*;® ,cots+1) € Q, where Q is a neighbourhood
around (nH,coH).
Let us now look at the first case where coH > co [+l for all t and coH > co ts+I for all t. As
in the proof of proposition 3.2, we can construct two sequences similar to (A.3) and
(A.4) but for the welfare co[+1 and co*+1 instead of the real interest rate. This is done
with the help of the inverse function theorem and by linearising around the steady
state coH as done above :
roH-®[+1 =0f(coH-co[) + s(coH-cotf) and
®h- ®t+i =es(©H- ®,s) + s(©H- <)•
where 0 f and 0 s is as above, hence 0 f < 0 s and according to the lemma there exist
an integer x such that
ooH - co f+1 < coH - co *+1 for all t > x =>
©f+i > ®ts+i forallt>x.
The second part of the proposition is similar, but now there exists an integer m such
that
co j+1 > coH for all t > m , and
co [+1 > coH for all t > m,
We construct the following sequences again
co[+i -ooH = 0f(cotf -coH) + s(cotf -coH) and
© t+l - »H = 9 s O t - tOH) + e(G> [ - C0H).
where 0 f and 0 s is as above and 0 f < 0 s .We can now use lemma 2.1 from chapter 2
such that there there exist an integer x and
co f+1 — coH < co (+| — gdh for all t > x =>
co [+1 < co ts+1 for all t > x. ■
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The real interest rate
Figure 3.4. The effect on the real interest rate,
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Figure 3.5 The fast learners welfare (straight line)
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Figure 3.6 The fast learners welfare (straight line)
and the slow learners welfare (dotted line)
Welfare
Figure 3.7 The fast learners welfare (straight line)
and the slow learners welfare (dotted line)
Chapter 4. The OLG - model with intrinsic noise.
4.1. Introduction.
The study of learning in nonlinear models has largely focused on models without
intrinsic noise, however the literature on learning in linear models have emphasised a
stochastic framework, thus it would be obvious to extend the deterministic nonlinear
model from chapter 2 and 3 to a stochastic nonlinear model in order to allow, for
example, for a random shock in the production function or a random shock in the
welfare function, i.e. a preference shock. These types of shocks are often referred to
intrinsic noise.
If there are no random variables in the model decribed chapter 2 and 3 the economy
converge to a steady state, as shown in chapter 2 and 3, and the steady states are
stable under learning. When we introduce a shock in the model, the stability
conditions will depend on the distribution of shock, since the model is nonlinear, and
the steady state will depend on the distribution the shock in most cases. It is possible
to obtain fluctuations around the steady state if we introduce a random variable. In
some simple cases, the steady state does not depend upon the shock. We will briefly
analyse the model from chapter 2 with a simple preference shock. The reason for
analysing the model from chapter 2 with the preference shock is to investigate,
whether the welfare comparison between an economy from chapter 2 with fast
learners and an economy with slow learners still holds.
In chapter 3 there were multiple steady states, and we used a subsidy financed by a
lump-sum tax to generate fluctuations and shift the economy between steady states.
However, we do not need a shift in government policy to generate fluctuations, as
long as we have large productivity shocks and a constant speed of learning. Here we
will introduce government spending financed by either by a lump-sum tax in addition
to the productivity shock. In the previous chapter the agents used a constant speed of
learning, however in order to be certain that the steady states are locally stable under
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learning, we need a decreasing speed of learning. Otherwise a large shock early
might push the economy away from the steady state. The main purpose is to analyse
the welfare consequences of different speeds of learning as in chapter 3, and see ifwe
get similar results as in chapter 3.
The chapter is organised as follows, in section 4.2 we study the basic model from
chapter 2 with a simple preference shock and investigate whether the welfare analysis
still hold in this case. In section 4.3, we look at an adaptive learning rule and the
conditions for stability of a steady state under learning when we have multiple
equilibria and a productivity shock. In section 4.4, we analyse different form of
government policies, while in section 4.5 we look at stability issues, when agents use
a decreasing speed of learning or a constant speed of learning. In section 4.6, we
compare the welfare between two groups of learners when the two groups either have
a decreasing speed of learning or a constant speed of learning, and section 4.7
contains the conclusions.
4.2. The basic model with a preference shock.
In our basic overlapping generations model the agents live for two periods, where
they work when they are young and consume when they are old. An agent born at
time t maximise the expected welfare Et { U(ct+1) - (V(nt) - stnt)} at time t, where
ct+1 is consumption at time t + 1, nt is labour supply at time t, and et is an i.i.d.
random variable with bounded support, mean 0 and variance a > 0. Et is the
expectations held at time t. We make the following assumptions on U, V.
Assumption 4.1. U is a strictly concave C -function with U' > 0 and U" < 0, V is a
strictly convex C2-function with V' > 0 and V" > 0.
Assumption 4.2. U'(c) -> oo for c -> 0 and V'(n) —» co for n co.
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Assumption 4.2 ensures that the desired labour supply, hence the desired real
balances will be positive no matter what the expected real interest rate are. The
budget constraints for the households are given by :
ptyt=M? and pt+I ct+1 = M?.
where pt is the price of time t, pt+1 is the price at time t + 1, yt is the output produced
at time t and Mf is the money demand at time t, which is carried forward to time t +
1. The real interest rate is given by pt/pt+i . The production function f is a concave
C2-function f(nt) with f' > 0 and f" < 0.
The introduction of a preference shock follow Woodford (1990), and is a simple way
to introduce noise in the model. In this case, the rational expectations equilibria does
not depend on the preference shock, it will only be the learning rule that depend on
st. There are many other types of preference, technology and monetary shocks, and
this give rise to more complicated situations as we shall see below.
Let us return to the households maximisation problem. The first-order condition is
given by:
/ s \
P,(4.i) Et U' -^-yt -^-f'(nt) + st




In the basic model the money supply is often assumed to be constant, such that the
equilibrium condition on the money market is Mf = M for all t and
(M/pt+i )/(M/pt) = yt+1 /yt => pt+i /pt = yt+i /yt •
Since yt = f(nt) the real interest rate pt+1 /pt is given by
Pt+, /Pt= f(nt+i)/ f (nt)
Hence the first-order condition (4.1) implies
(4.2) E, { U'(f(n„, ))f(nl+l) + s,} = V'(n,)
f (nt)
Et denote the agent's expectations at time t, and in a rational expectations equilibrium
the agent's expectations are equal to the true conditional distribution at time t and Et
(st) = 0, such that (4.2) is given by
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(4.3) E, { U'(f(nm ))f(nt+!) } = V'(n,),
f (nt)
thus a rational expectations equilibrium is a stochastic process given by {nt }t that
satisfies (4.3), or equivalently (4.2), since Et (st ) = 0 in a rational expectations
equilibrium. Since V is a C2-function with V" > 0 and f is a C2-function with f" < 0,
the derivative of the right-hand side of (4.2) is positive for all n > 0 :
—1-{(V"(n)f(n) + V'(n)f'(n))f'(n)-f"(n)f'(n)V'(n)} > 0,
f (n)
and the right-hand side of (4.2) has an inverse function, and we can rearrange (4.2) so
the labour supply at time t, nt, depends on the labour supply at time t + 1, nt+1 :
(4.4) nt = H{ Et(U'(f(nt+1 ))f(nt+I)) + st) } = F(nt+1, st)
where H is the inverse of (f(n)/f'(n))V'(n).
The process given by nt = n > 0 for all t, where n is a solution to U'(n) = (1/f
'(n))V'(n) is the well-known steady state where money has value. Assumption 4.1
and 4.2 ensures the existence and uniqueness of n > 0, see Woodford (1990). If
lim U'(c)c = 0, then nt = 0 for all t is also a solution, and this is the autarchy steady
C—>co
state where money does not have any value. The nonstochastic version of (4.4) can
have different types of rational expectations equilibria, for example, periodic
equilibria, and sunspot solutions. Azariadis (1981), shows that there also exists
stationary rational expectations equilibria where prices and labour supply are
stochastic without any form of random shocks in the model. Azariadis (1981) and
Woodford (1990) look extensively at sunspot equilibria in this model1 and find
conditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria.
We wish to consider when the monetary steady state is locally stable under learning.
The agents use the adaptive learning rule from chapter 2 and chapter 3 :
(4.5) n®+1 - n® +at(nt_, - n®) for all t,
1
A sunspot equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium where purely extrinsic uncertainty
affect the equilibrium prices, labour supply and consumption.
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where 0 < ^ < 1 and 2 at = oo. In order to obtain local stability, we need the
following assumption on the speed of learning ^ .
Assumption 4.3. a,. = a(l/t) for all t, where 0 < a < 1.
Actually we just need certain conditions on the rate of ^ —> 0 when t —> oo, but
assumption 4.4 satisfies these conditions, see Evans and Honkapohja (1995a). Hence
we have a decreasing speed of learning, this is sometimes called a decreasing gain
parameter. If was constant, it is possible that a large shock early might push the
economy away from the steady state.
The local stability of the monetary steady state under learning is described in
Woodford and Evans and Honkapohja (1995a). We have to distinguish between
weak and strong stability as described below, because the stability conditions are
sensitive to a variation in the perceptions which agents are assumed to hold. If the
agents use additional variables in their forecasting rule, for example, if they believe
that the economy is in a k-cycle or a sunspot equilibrium this can alter the stability
conditions. Woodford shows that if agents include an additional variable in their
forecasting rule, the monetary steady state might be unstable, while it is stable if this
additional variable is omitted. Evans and Honkapohja (1995a) gives an example of a
steady state that is weakly stable but not strongly stable.
Let us use the approach from Evans and Honkapohja (1995a), where the local
stability of a steady state under a learning rule like (4.5) is.analysed, and it is shown
that local stability under learning is determined by expectational stability conditions.
The expectational stability or E-stability conditions are developed as follows. The
agents forecast at time t the labour supply at time t + 1, where the forecast is given by
n®+1 according to (4.5). We can combine this with (4.4) and n°+1 is given by
nt+i = nt +at(F(n',st_1)- n°)
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Given this perceived value of the labour supply the actual value of the labour supply
is given by (4.4) according to
nt= F(nt+i,ev¬
idence we have a mapping T: R —> R from the perceived value to the actual value
given by
T(n) = F(n,s),
where s is a random variable with the same distribution as st. The steady state n is a
fixed point of T and the definition of E-stability is based on the differential equation
(4.6) dn/dx = T(n(x)) - n(x),
where x is notional time. A fixed point n of T is E-stable if (4.6) is locally stable at
n. If n is not E-stable then it is E-unstable. However E-stability is defined relative
to the perceptions the agents hold, and this leads to a definition of weak E-stability
and strong E-stability as mentioned above. The steady state is weakly E-stable if it is
stable under the learning algorithm (4.5), and strongly E-stable if it is stable under an
overparameterized learning rule, for example, if there was an extra lag in (4.5) or the
agents believed the economy could be in a cycle, and formulated a learning rule
according to these beliefs.
The necessary and sufficient condition for weak and strong E-stability of the steady
state n is given in proposition 3.1 in Evans and Honkapohja (1995a).
• n is weakly E-stable if and only if F'( n ,s) < 1.
• n is strongly E-stable if and only if | F'( n ,s) | < 1.
Under appropriate conditions stated in Evans and Honkapohja (1995a), the local
convergence of n® to the steady state n is governed by the stability of (4.6), i.e. the
E-stability conditions. Proposition 5.2 from Evans and Honkapohja (1995a) gives a
condition for local stability under learning, ifwe have "small" shocks.
• If the initial point njj is sufficiently close to h and n is weakly E-stable, then
n° —» n with probability 1.
A similar result hold for strong E-stability. The reason for having "small" shocks is
to avoid a projection facility described in Evans and Honkapohja (1995a). Let us
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assume there are no limits on the size of the shocks. If we have a large shock early
on, it might push the learning process away from a neighbourhood around the steady
state. Thus the learning rule does not converge with probability 1. In order to avoid
this possibility, Evans and Honkapohja introduce a projection facility to keep the
learning algorithm in a neighbourhood of n, when shock does not have a small
support. This projection facility is also used in Marcet and Sargent (1989b).
Grandmont and Laroque (1991) give a critical review of the projection facility.
We have focused on local stability of the steady state, the reason for this is that there
are not many results on global stability of the steady state under learning. There is a
global convergence result in Evans and Honkapohja (1995d), but we have to find a
Lyapounov function in order to use the result.
With these stability results in mind, let us turn to the welfare comparison between an
economy with fast learners and an economy with slow learners, where the fast agents
speed of learning is given by af = af (1/t) for all t and the slow is given by a' -
(1/t) and 1 > af > a*. > 0. We consider two situations, one where both groups start
above the steady state and one where both groups start below the steady state. These
case corresponds to the situations analysed in section 2.6 of chapter 2. As in chapter
2, we use the following example.
Example 4.1. Let U(c) = (1/(1 -a))c', V(n) - (1/(1 + s))n' +e and f(n) = Ana where 0
< cr < 1, s > 0, A>0 and 0 < a < 1.
Let us assume that n[,e = nf'e = n, is above n, and let {ntf;e, }t denote the fast
learners sequence of expected labour supply and {n", }t denote the slow learners
sequence of expected labour supply. We calculate the actual labour supply and
consumption for the two groups, where {nf,cf+1}t denote the fast learners labour
supply and consumption and {nf,cf+1}t are the slow learners labour supply and
consumption. This is used to calculate the welfare for the two groups and make a
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comparison between the level of welfare of a fast learner born at time t and the
welfare of a slow learner born at time t as in chapter 2. We have the following figure
for the welfare during the learning transition to the monetary steady state n.
Figure 4.1 about here. 2
The initial condition is n® =10 and n = 1.3907. We have the same picture as figure
2.5 in chapter 2, the slow learners are better off initially compared to the fast
learners, but the economy is close to the steady state the fast learners overtake the
slow learners.
Let us assume that nj'6 = n^ = njj is less than n, so that we start below the steady
state. In this case the welfare analysis reverse the result from before, the fast learners
are better off initially, but the slow learners are better off when the economy is close
to the steady state, as figure 4.2a show.
Figure 4.2a about here.
The parameter values are the same as in figure 4.1, but af = 0.9 and as = 0.5 with the
initial condition n^ = 0.5. However we can have a different figure if we change af
and aj to af = 0.99 and as = 0.2. These parameters give the following figure.
Figure 4.2b about here.
Here the slow learner is better off when 3 < t < 6, but for t < 2 and t > 7 the fast
learners are better off. In this case there are two crossing points and the welfare
results from chapter 2 is not valid in this case. A reason for the two crossing points
might be the low value of = 0.2 such that the speed of learning a;1 = as (1/t) = 0.2/t
2
We use the following parameter values: a = 0.2, A = 28, a = 0.41, and s = 0.2, with af= 0.5, as = 0.2
and et is uniform distributed over the interval [ -0.1, 0.1 ]
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is low and convergence will be slow. The slow learners does produce very good
forecasts compared to fast learners, and the slow learners welfare actually fall below
the steady state level in figure 4.2b. This is not clearly shown in the figure, but this
due to the scaling.
If we choose the parameters careful, we can get two crossing points. It is also
possible to find parameter values, where the fast learners are better off during the
entire learning transition, and we cannot use the welfare results from chapter 2 in this
case.
4.3. Increasing social returns and different forms for intrinsic noise.
Let us now use the production function from chapter 3 in order to investigate whether
the welfare comparison from chapter 3 still holds if we introduce a random variable.
The welfare analysis from chapter 3 might be used, if we use a productivity shock
since we have increasing returns in the production function. The production function
is given by :
(4.7) f(nt,Knt) = A(nt)a{max(I*, kKnt(l + bkKnt)~l }p.
Furthermore, let us incorporate a random shock in the model in more complicated
way than above, this might be a preference shock or a productivity shock. We
consider a productivity shock vt, where vt is observed at time t before the agent has
decided on labour supply etc. This is incorporated as follows :
(4.8) yt = f(nt,Knt)vt
where vt is a positive i.i.d. shock with bounded support, mean E(vt) = 1, and variance
var(vt) = ct2.
Instead of a productivity shock we could introduce a preference shock st, as before
but in a more general form :
U(ct+1)-V(nt) + 8tln(nt),
where et is an i.i.d. stochastic variable with bounded support, mean 0 and variance a2
> 0. In this case the steady state depends on the distribution of the preference shock.
There are of course many other types of preference, technology and monetary shocks
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we could introduce in the model, but in the following we will focus the attention on a
productivity shock like (4.8), where vt is given by :
vt= 1 + v(0.5 -ut),
and ut is i.i.d. uniform over the unit interval with v = 0.20.
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where ^ is the partial derivative of f w.r.t its first argument. In the basic model the
money supply was constant, such that the equilibrium condition on the money market
is Mf = M for all t and
(M/Pt+i )/(M/pt) = yt+1 /yt or pt+1 /pt - yt+1 /yt.
Since yt = f(nt ,Knt)vt, the real interest rate pt+I /pt is given by
Pt+i /pt = f(nt+i ,Knt+1 )vt+1 /f(nt ,Knt)vt
In a rational expectations equilibrium the agent's expectations about the distribution
of pt+1 /pt will be equal to the true conditional distribution for f(nt+1,Knt+1)vt+1 /f(nt
,Knt)vt, and the first-order condition (4.9) becomes
E, { U'(f(nt+1 ,Kn„,)vt«) >f(n„i ,Knw )vw - f(n"^°')' V(n,)f,(nt,Knt)
This is the temporary equilibrium condition, and can be written in the reduced form
where the labour supply at time t, nt depends on the labour supply at time t + 1, nt+1:
(4.10) nt = H{ EtG(nt+1 ,vt+1) }
with G(nt+1 ,vt+1) = Et {U'(f(nt+1 ,Knt+1 )vt+1 )}f(nt+1 ,Knt+1 )vt+1. In this case the
reduced form does not depend on vt. Ifwe used yt = f(nt ,Knt) + vt then nt would also
depend on vt, and the reduced form is given by
(4.11) nt = H{ Et G(nt+1 ,vt+1), vt}
A steady state in the stochastic case is defined as follows.
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Definition 4.1. a rational expectations equilibrium steady state is a solution nt =
n (V[) where
n (vj = H(EW (G( n (w),w),vt).
Ew denotes the expectation over the random variable w, and where w has the same
distribution as the i.i.d. shocks vt . In definition 4.1, the steady state depends on the
random shock vt, but a steady state for the reduced form in (4.10) does not depend on
vt. In this case the rational expectations equilibrium steady state is defined as
n = H(EW (G( n ,w)).
4.4. The government policy.
We will again study government spending under different forms of financing. The
government buys a constant proportion of output, 0 < y < 1 at each time t, such that
(4.12) gt = yf(nt,Knt),
where gt is government spending at time t. We assume that the government spending
gt is distributed back to the household through a non-decreasing function Z included
in the welfare function, U(ct+1 ) - V(nt) + Z(gt+1). The purchase gt is either financed
entirely by a lump-sum tax with the money supply M kept constant or financed
entirely by money creation, it could also be a mixture of both. Hence the
government's budget constraint is either :
(4.13) Tt = ptgt or
(4.14) = m;_, +ptgt
where Tt is the lump-sum tax at time t and Mts is the money supply at time t.
If we begin with spending financed by a lump-sum tax, the households pay the tax Tt
at time t and the household's budget constraint at time t is changed to ptyt - Tt = Mf.
Since the money supply is constant and inserting (4.12) and (4.13) into the
households budget-constraint, we have (1 - y)ptyt = M, and
M/pt+1
= f(nt+, ,Knt+,)vt+1 ^
M/p, f(nt,Knt)vt
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(4.15) P. _ f(nt+I,Knt+1)v t+i for all t.
p,+i f(nt ,Knt)vt
where pt/pt+i is the real interest rate at time t + 1. The first-order condition for the









where Et is the expectations held at time t and f, is the partial derivative w.r.t. first
argument nt. Ifwe substitute (4.12) and (4.13) into (4.16), we have :
r
(4.17) U' P. (l-y)f(nt,Knt)vt
V Vpt+1
Insert (4.15) into (4.17) such that:
U' {(1 - y)f(nt+1, Knt+1 )vt+1} •








t (U' (C1 — Y)f(n«+i > K^t+i )vt+i) f(nt+i> KHt+i )vt+i) = 77^^Hv'(nt)-f,(nt,Knt)




Since V'(nt) is a C'-function with V" > 0, we can write nt as a function of nt+1, vt+1,
and y in the reduced form :
(4.18) nt = H(Et (G(nt+1 ,vt+1, y)))
where G(nt+1 ,vt+1, y) = (U'((l-y)f(nt+1 ,Knt+1 )vt+I >f(nt+1 ,Knt+1 )vt+1). This is similar
to the reduced form (4.10) apart from y.
Example 4.2. We use the functions from example 4.1 but with the production
function given in (4.7), to find an explicit expression for H(Et(G(n,v,y)) :
G(nt+1 ,vt+1 ,y) = (1 - y)~CT{A(nt+1 )a{max(I*, XKnt+1(l + b7,Knt+ {)_1 }p vt+1}'
i













where 0 < a < 1, A > 0, (3 > 1, A. > 0, y > 0, I* > 0, b>0, and K > 0.
Let us briefly study the various cases when we have multiple equilibria and possible
coordination failures. This is simpler to understand in a non-stochastic set-up as in
chapter 3, hence yt = f(nt, Knt) and if the agents have perfect foresight then nt is a
function of nt+1 :
nt = H(G(nt+1, y)) = F(nt+1, y).
We are still analysing the situation where we assume that the substitution-effect
dominates the income-effect, such that F is upward sloping as shown in figure 4.3.
For different values of y there can be 0,1,2, and 3 interior steady states, denoted nL ,
% and nH. In figure 4.3 we have illustrated F for different values of y and there can
be 1,2, and 3 interior steady states depending on the size of y. This is also the case
when we have a productivity shock.
nL %
Figure 4.3. The F-function for different values of y.
J
We use the following parameter values : a = 0.9, A = 0.0805, P = 1.007 1, k = 0.5, I* = 19.5, K
40, a = 0.1, b = 0.025 and s = 0.25.
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The interior steady states correspond to "noisy" steady states given by
nt = n j and yt - f( n i5 Kn j)vt, for i = l,u,h ,
if the size of the shock is "small", i.e. the support of vt is "small", as shown in Evans
and Honkapohja (1995a). The steady state does not depend on the shock vt in this
particular case. We can rank the steady states for given y as we did in chapter 3, such
that the welfare at nL is less than the welfare at n(J, and this is less than welfare at nH,
if the utility from government spending Z(gt+1) is zero or sufficiently low. At the
low-level equilibria nL or % agents work less hard than at nH , because all the other
agents work less hard. If agents could coordinate their effort to a high level nH they
would better off in terms ofwelfare.
There is a role for government policy as in chapter 3. If we initially have three
interior steady states, nL, nUs and nH and the economy is stuck in the low-level steady
state nL , the government could increase the proportion y to shift the economy to a
high level steady state. This increase would rotate the F-function upwards, such that
there is only one interior steady state, nH , if the increase in y is large enough. The
households supply more labour since the real interest rate pt/pt+i is above 1, but
decreases and converges to 1, hence the households get a high price today for its
output. Since the price tomorrow is less than today, they work harder in order to
substitute between expensive goods today and cheap goods tomorrow, because we
have assumed that the substitution effect dominates the income-effect.
If the government instead use seignorage to finance spending according to
M' = Mts_, +ptgt,
then the F-function rotates downwards when y is increased and "y low" would be
switched to "y high" in figure 4.3. If there are three interior steady states as in figure
4.1, and the economy are initially at nL, the increase in y financed by an increase in
the money supply, would lead to a lower labour supply in the steady state. The
increase in money supply leads to higher inflation, because the real interest rate pt
/pt+1 is less than 1 and increasing. The rise in inflation give a lower return on the
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work effort, and since we have assumed that the substitution-effect dominates the
income-effect, the labour supply decreases for higher levels of y. This situation is
analysed extensively in Evans and Honkapohja (1993).
The changes in y can be seen as fluctuations caused by productivity shocks if the
agents have poor information about changes in y, and the data on y are infrequent. It
is thus possible for the government to change y more often without the agents
incorporating changes in y into their expectations. The case with the production
subsidy, which we studied in chapter 2 and in chapter 3 will not be considered here,
since it is similar to government spending financed by a lump-sum tax.
4.5. The learning rule.
It might seem strange to use a pure rational expectations approach when there is a
possibility ofmultiple rational expectations equilibria, because the approach does not
give us a selection criteria for which of the equilibria we should choose. Here we are
back to the conjecture by Lucas (1986), that a reasonable learning rule should pick
out the relevant equilibrium. Thus in order to overcome this problem with multiple
equilibria, we use a learning rule to formulate a forecast of the economic variables of
importance and replace the rational expectations assumptions with an adaptive
learning rule. Hence the reduced form (4.18) is written as follows:
(4.20) nt = H(G(nt+1,vt+1,y)e)
where the superscript e denote the expectations of G(nt+1 ,vt+1 , y) at time t. The
expectations of G(nt+1 ,vt+1, y) is based on the learning rule, and the actual evolution
of the economy depends on the sequence of stochastic shocks (vt )t as well as the
learning rule and the initial conditions. The issue of interest, is the convergence of
the learning algorithm to a rational steady state, but this is not as straightforward as
we might expect, since the agents change their forecasts when the dynamic model
evolves over time and the evolution of the model depends on the forecasting rule the
agents use as well as the sequence of shocks.
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The adaptive learning rule is as before, but the expectations are formulated for
G(nt+1,vt+1, y):
(4.21) 0t+i = 9t + at(G(nt-i,vt_i,Y)-0t) for all t,
where 0t = G(nt+1 ,vt+1, y)e for all t. We assume that 0 < a, < 1 with at = oo, and
at satisfies assumption 4.3, such that we have a decreasing speed of learning.
In the situation with three rational steady states nL , % , and nH in the deterministic
case, nL and nH where stable under the learning rule (4.21) as shown in chapter 3.
This can be generalised to stochastic case, thus nL and nH are stable under learning
(4.21) in the stochastic case. The argument is based on E-stability conditions
developed in Evans and Honkapohja (1995a).
At time t the agent make a forecast of G(nt+1 ,vt+1, y). Let 9t+1 = G(nt+1 ,vt+1, y)e be
the forecast obtained from the perceived law ofmotion, then the actual law ofmotion
is given by nt = H(9t+i). The corresponding parameters of the actual law of motion
induced by the perceived law ofmotion is thus given by E (G(nt ,vt ,y)). Hence we
have a mapping T : R —»• R from the perceived law of motion to the actual law of
motion given by
T(9) = Ev(G(H(9),v,y))
A steady state 9* is just a fixed point of T. The local stability of a steady state under
learning is equivalent to conditions for E-stability, this is defined as follows.
Definition 4.2. A fixed point 9* of the mapping T is E-stable (expectational stable) if
the differential equation given by
dO/dx = T(0(x)) - 0(x)
is locally stable at 9*.
However as mentioned earlier, the definition of E-stability depends on the
perceptions which agents are assumed to hold. This leads to a distinction between
weak E-stability and strong E-stability. The steady state is weakly E-stable if it is
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locally stable under the learning algorithm used above, while it is strongly E-stable if
the steady state is locally stable under learning even if the agents overparametrize
their learning rule, i.e. it depends on irrelevant variables. Hence if the agents believed
in other solutions than the steady states, and formulated a learning rule according to
these perceptions, then the steady state is strongly E-stable if it locally stable under
this new learning rule.
Let us assume that vt is a random shock with a small enough support, i.e. a > 0 is
sufficiently "small", such that we can use propositions 5.1 and 5.2 from Evans and
Honkapohja (1995a) to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for weak and
strong E-stability of the noisy steady states. If nL , % , and nH denote the three
interior steady states from the deterministic case, then there exists "noisy" rational
steady states denoted by nL, hy, and nH according to proposition 5.1, where each
these is located in a neighbourhood around the respective deterministic steady state :
V5 > 0, there exists an a* such that V0 < a <a* there exists a noisy steady state
h; (a), for i = l,u,h , where |n - h; (a)| < 5 for i = l,u,h.
Furthermore h( (a), for i = l,u.h , is weakly E-stable , respectively strongly E-stable,
for all a sufficiently small if and only if ^ for i = l,u,h , is weakly E-stable,
respectively strongly E-stable.
From proposition 5.2, we have for all a > 0 sufficiently small and for all initial points
90 sufficient close to n,, that the learning rule (4.21) converge with probability 1 to
the noisy steady state ni5 if the deterministic steady state nj is weakly stable. A
similar result can be shown for strong E-stability. We have from chapter 3 that only
nL and nH are weakly E-stable, thus only nL and nH are locally stable under
learning. Hence the stability under learning from the deterministic case in chapter 3
can be extended to stochastic case.
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The convergence to either nL or nH depends on the initial conditions and the
distribution of shocks vt , such that the nonlinear stochastic model exhibits path
dependence. If the random shock has a "large" support the noisy steady state is only
weakly E-stable and not necessarily strongly E-stable, as shown in an example in
Evans and Honkapohja (1995a). Hence if the agents overparameterize their learning
rule such that it depends on "irrelevant" variables, for example an extra lag in the
learning rule (4.21), nt_2 - 9^_,, then the stochastic steady state is only weakly E-
stable but not strongly E-stable under this alternative learning rule.
In the learning rule (4.21) we assumed that the speed of learning a,. was decreasing,
let us briefly look at the case where the speed of learning at is constant, at = a. This is
analysed in greater detail in Evans and Honkapohja (1993). A decreasing speed of
learning is appropriate, if the agents believe that they are in an economy where the
variable being forecasted, 9t = G(nt+1 ,vt+1 , y)e, has a constant mean over time. This
would be reasonable if the agents assume that the structure of the economy never
changes, but such an assumption does not seem realistic in practice. If the agents
believe that the structure of the economy may be subject to changes, the agents could
use a constant speed of learning, and the learning rule will adapt more rapidly to
changes in the economy. However a constant speed of learning produce more noisy
forecasts, but changes can be adjusted more swiftly.
Evans and Honkapohja (1993) analyse this and show that a constant speed of
learning is clearly in better in than a decreasing speed of learning when the spending
parameter yt varies systematically over time. Given a set of parameter-values they
can find a constant "equilibrium" speed of learning or an "equilibrium" learning rule,
in the sense that the choice of a minimises the mean square forecast error for each
agent, given that all the other agents use the speed of learning a. Not surprisingly the
"equilibrium" speed of learning depends upon the policy parameter.
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The introduction of productivity shocks can lead to shifts between high and low
activity levels, even there is no shift in the policy or any structural changes, when the
agents use a constant speed of learning, because their forecast still generate some
randomness in the limit through G(nt_j , vt-1 , y). If the economy starts close to a
low level equilibrium nL, then a large shock in the right direction could lead to large
revision in the forecast 9t+1 and move the economy to the high level steady state as
shown in figure 4.4 below.
figure 4.4 about here. 4
The system seems to be alternating between the high level steady state and the low
level steady state according to the figure, hence a sequence of large shocks can
apparently induce a self-fulfilling overreaction such that the economy is moving
between two stable steady states.
Evans and Honkapohja discuss why the agents should believe in a constant speed of
learning if the situation is as in figure 4.4, basically there are two reasons. First, the
agents may be aware of the possibility of structural changes or policy shifts, and thus
use a constant speed of learning. The other reason is that the constant speed of
learning may be an "equilibrium" speed of learning, but one problem might be that a
depend on the chosen parameter values and there is no proof of existence of such an
equilibrium.
The economy can converge to a stable steady state when there are multiple steady
states as shown below.
figure 4.5 about here.
4
The parameter values are: a = 0.9, A = 0.0805, P = 1.007 1, A. = 0.5, I* = 19.5, K = 40, ct = 0.1, b =
0.025 and s = 0.25. The speed of learning is a = 0.15 and the steady states are nH = 2.2 and nL = 1.8, y
= 0.
5
We use the following parameter values : a = 0.2, A = 1, P = 4.8 1, X = 0.01, I* = 2, K = 200, a =
0.41, b = 0.2 and e = 0.2. The speed of learning a = 0.8 and nH = 6.3.
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Figure 4.5 illustrates the "noisy" steady state quite well. It might be interesting to
investigate whether the results from chapter 3 still holds when we use the constant
speed of learning. We can compare the two situations, a decreasing speed of learning
and a constant speed of learning, as noted above the constant speed of learning give a
more rapid adjustment but also more noisy forecast. If the economy converge to a
stable steady state, we might not be able to distinguish between fast and slow
learners, since the agents produce a noisy forecast in the limit.
4.6. The welfare comparison between an economy with fast learners and an
economy with slow learners.
We will analyse the case where the economy are in a low-level equilibrium nL with y
= 0, then the government increase spending from y = 0 to y > 0 such that the increase
is large enough to remove nL and % . The welfare comparison is similar to chapter 2
and 3, we have two groups characterised by the speed of learning such that the fast
agents are given by af = af (1/t) for all t and the slow agents are given by a® = (1/t)
for all t, with af > as . In figure 4.6 we have the welfare comparison, where y is
increased at time t = 50 from 0 to 0.25 with the parameter values from footnote 5, but
the speed of learning af = 0.99 and = 0.8. We choose the high values in order to
speed up convergence.
Figure 4.6 about here.
At time t — 50 the old generation benefits from government spending, since it works
more like a subsidy and the old generation does not have to pay the tax at t = 50.
However the government takes away some of the consumption so the overall effect
on welfare for the old generation at t = 50 is uncertain. Apart from this, figure 4.6
give same picture as in figure 3.5 from chapter 3, when we move the economy from a
low level steady state to high level steady state. The fast learners are better off during
the entire learning transition. The results from proposition 3.3 in chapter 3 might be
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used here, due to the increasing returns in the production function which shifts the
welfare upwards and the decreasing speed of learning tend to smooth the "curves" in
figure 4.6 when t is large, but this has to be investigated properly.
We can compare this situation to the case, where the two groups of agents have a
constant speed of learning. In this case the agents use a constant speed of learning,
given by af and respectively. The welfare comparison between fast and slow agents
in this situation looks as follows, given the parameters from footnote 5 and set
spending y equal to 0.5 for all t.
Figure 4.7 about here.6
As can be seen from figure 4.7, we cannot distinguish between the two groups when
the economy is close to the steady state, since both groups produce a noisy forecast
such that the welfare fluctuates around the steady state level, hence the welfare
results from chapter 3 does not hold in this case.
We are left with two different results, if we use either decreasing speeds of learning,
or constant speeds of learning. The reason for using the decreasing speed of learning
was to be sure that the steady state was locally stable under learning. However, when
we use decreasing speeds both groups of agents become very slow when t is large,
and the difference between fast and slow learners might become negligible when t is
large. The other approach is to use constant speeds as in chapter 2 and 3, but the
economy might fluctuate between a low level steady state and a high level steady
state even if there is no changes in policy and no structural changes, as shown in
figure 4.4. However, the response from the agents to a change, for example, in
government spending is much more rapid than with a constant speed of learning, than
a decreasing speed of learning, but the welfare comparison is not valid when t is
large.
6
y = 0.5 and % = 0.8, as = 0.3.
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4.7. Conclusion.
In this chapter we have studied the overlapping generations model from the previous
chapters with intrinsic noise added to the model. This made the model somewhat
more complicated, stability issues became more difficult to investigate and we could
study only local stability of the steady state under learning. In order to obtain local
stability it was necessary to a decreasing speed of learning. It was possible to
generate fluctuations without policy changes or other structural changes if the agents
used a constant speed of learning.
The welfare comparison between fast and slow learners are not similar to the results
in chapter 2, when the agents use a decreasing speed of learning as shown by figure
4.2b. If the agents use a constant speed of learning, it was not possible to distinguish
between fast and slow. This is due to the agents producing noisy forecast even in the
limit. Hence we have to choose whether to use a constant speed of learning or a
decreasing speed of learning. A reason for choosing the constant gain parameter was
that it might an equilibrium learning rule, in the sense that it minimised the mean
square forecast error, when all agents use the same speed of learning a. We could try
to establish the existence of an equilibrium learning rule, and find other criteria for
the equilibrium learning rule, based on the welfare function for example. We could
also allow for a variance in a, but this is left for further investigation.
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Figure 4.1 The welfare paths for the slow learners
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Figure 4.2b. The welfare paths for the slow learners
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Figure 4.6. The welfare paths for the slow learners
(thick line) and the fast learners (thin line).
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Figure 4.7. The welfare paths for the slow learners
(dotted line) and the fast learners (straight line).
5.1. Introduction.
In macroeconomic models where the economic variables depend on agents forecast
of future variables, it is usually assumed that agents have rational expectations.
However, if the agents do not have rational expectations initially, how can they
obtain rational expectations. One way to solve this problem has been to introduce an
adaptive learning rule in the model, and study the stability of the rational
expectations equilibrium under learning, see for example Bray (1982), Lucas (1986),
Guesnerie and Woodford (1991), and Evans and Honkapohja (1995b). It has been
standard to assume that all agents have the same learning rule such that there are
homogeneous agents. There are a few papers where heterogeneous agents are
incorporated in the model, Bray and Savin (1986) studies the cobweb model where
the agents have different initial priors but all agents have the same learning rule,
Marcet and Sargent (1989) analyse recursive least squares learning in model with
hidden state variables, and use the model from Townsend (1983) as an example.
Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (1995) look at heterogeneous learning rules and
experimentation in an overlapping generations model with a continuum of agents.
Frydman (1982) and several papers in Frydman and Phelps (1983) also considers the
problem with heterogeneous agents, where the agents have to know the average
opinion of prices. In the model presented here an agent does not need to know the
average opinion of expected prices. The agent only needs information about the
temporary equilibrium price.
We analyze a standard version of the overlapping generations model that have more
than one type of agents, for convenience we initially study a model with two types of
agents, but this can be easily extended to m types of agents. At time t the agents are
forecasting the price at t + 1 according to an adaptive learning rule, we only study
adaptive learning or "irrational" learning in this paper. The difference between the
agents is in the speed of learning. One type of agents have a high speed of learning.
These are called fast learners and a fast learner are born into families of fast learners,
we assume there is a fraction fj. fast learners at time t where /j e [0,1]. The other type
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agents have a low speed of learning and are called slow learners, and a slow learner
are born into families of slow learners. There is a fraction of 1 - /d slow learners at
time t. The agents cannot change their type during the learning transition.
First, we study the stability of a stationary rational expectations equilibrium under
heterogeneous learning. There is no uncertainty in this model and the stationary
rational expectations equilibrium is the steady state. The conditions for local stability
of rational expectations equilibrium under learning depend on the fraction of
learners. Furthermore, there is a correspondence between the local stability
conditions in the homogenous case and the stability conditions in the heterogeneous
case. We should note that in the limit the two types of agents are identical, since they
are at the steady state. Given an extra assumption on the equilibrium mapping, we
can show global stability of the steady state under learning.
Second, we compare the welfare between a fast agent and a slow agent born at time t
during the learning transition to the rational expectations equilibrium. It is shown that
the fast learners are better off than the slow learners for t sufficiently large. The
intuition behind this result is that the fast learners are making a "better" forecast than
the slow learners for t sufficiently large. Since the fast learners have a higher speed of
learning they have a higher speed of convergence, and when t is sufficiently large
they are closer to the actual price, because the actual price depends on the forecast of
the agents. Thus the fast agents are "closer" to solving the true optimisation problem
when t is sufficiently large. However, it is possible that the slow agents are better off
during the early periods of the learning transition, but eventually the fast agents
overtake the slow agents and become better off, this is illustrated by numeric
examples. In this set-up the fast agent is ignorant of the slow agent, and does not take
into account that the other agent is using a learning rule as well.
We also the effect of a one-time increase in the money supply. The result is not
surprising, the rational expectations equilibrium price increases and the agents update
their forecast accordingly. We can use the welfare analysis from above to compare
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welfare between types. An extension of the model to m different types of learners is
discussed in the last section of the paper. The results from the 2-type case are still
valid with the natural extension of assumptions. The chapter is organised as follows,
section 5.2 outline the modeTand in section 5.3 we look at the local and global
stability of a steady state. In Section 5.4 the welfare comparison is made. The effect
of a change in money supply is analysed in section 5.5, and in section 5.6 we extend
the model to m different types of learners. Section 5.7 contains the conclusions.
5.2. The model.
The model is a version of the standard overlapping generations model, where the
agents live for two periods and there is one good there is produced and consumed.
An agent work at time t and consume at time t + 1. The production function q is
assumed to be linear q(n) = n, and one unit of output y yields one unit of the
consumption good c, y = c. We can then use the same notation pt for wages and
prices. There is a constant supply ofmoney, M> 0. The agent born at time t demands
money at time t and use the money to buy consumption at time t +1. The welfare
function W is assumed to be separable in labour supply at time t, nt, and consumption
at time t + 1, c,+1, W = U(c,+i) - V(nt), where U is the utility function and V the
labour function. U is a strictly concave and increasing C2 -function for all c > 0 and V
is a strictly convex and increasing C2-function for all n > 0. There is no uncertainty
and the agents have point expectations about future price.
There are m different agents, and we that a fraction of yy agents born at time t are of
type / where yy e [0,1] for all i and , yy = 1. Type /-agents are born into families
of type /-agents and the /-th agent solve the following maximisation problem
max U(c'l+l) - V(n\)
subject to: (5.1)
ptn[= and c[+x - M\.
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where M\ is the money demand at time t, p, is the price at time t and p]'[x is the z'-th
agent's forecast of the price at time t + 1. This forecast is made at time t. The first-
order condition is given by
= v'(n') (5-2)
Pi+1 Pi+i
for i = 1 Given the assumptions on U and V the second-order condition for a
maximum is satisfied. (5.2) is rearranged such that the labour supply n] is a function
ofpt/pet'+x the expected real interest rate, this also represents the expected real wage
«; = qTri («>vp,+\j
for i = 1 where ^ is a C' -function ofp,/p,+, according to the assumptions on
U and V.
Assumption 5.1. £is an increasing function inpt/p°'h for i = 1
According to assumption 5.1, an increase in the expected real interest rate (or
expected real wage) pt/p]''+x gives an increase in the labour supply n\. In this case the
substitution-effect dominates the income-effect, because an increase in the expected
real wage cause the agents to substitute leisure for labour, thus increasing labour
supply. If xU'(x) is increasing in x, then £ satisfies assumption 5.1, because an
increase inp,/p°lx implies an increase (p,/p"+x)U'((p,/ pZi)n',) ■> the left-hand side
of the first order condition (2). Since V" > 0 the right hand-side must increase as well
and the labour supply must increase as well. The condition that xll'(x) is increasing
can be expressed as
. xU" (x) ,A(x)= < 1.
U'(x)
a(x) is the well-known Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. If A(x) < 1 then
cycles of period k > 2 cannot exist as shown in Grandmont (1985).
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The money supply M is constant for all t, and we have the following definition of a
temporary equilibrium.
Definition 5.1. A temporary equilibrium is a (m + l)-tuple (p,, {n\}"l=x) such that n\
is a solution to (5.1) for all t and the money supply is equal to the money demand
M =
f jui M't for all t. (5.4)




Insert (5.3) into (5.5), we can express the actual price pt as a function of the expected
prices :
M -t-i/H





Since t; is a c'-function with > 0, the implicit function theorem can be used to
express pt as a function of p]'[x, i = 1 :
Pl = H(p^,..,P::i) for all t. (5.7)
and H is C'-function in p'lx, i = 1 according to the implicit function theorem.
However the implicit function theorem only defines the function H locally, thus we
make the following regularity assumption on H.
Assumption 5.2. His a well-defined C'-function for all p^x > 0 and i = 1
Given this assumption and assumption 5.1 on the function we can study the
monotonicity ofH.
Lemma 1. Given assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, then the partial derivative ofHw.r.t. p][x
is positive
Hi (Pe,t\>- Pe,'"\ )>® fori = 1, ,m.
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Proof. See appendix. ■
The function His increasing in the expected prices such that an increase in ,leads
to an increase in pt. For example, an increase in p'^ results in a decrease of the
expected real wage, p, / pe, '+x. The substitution effect dominates the income effect
agent i's labour supply, n\, decrease and there is a decrease in aggregate labour
supply nt. This leads to an increase in p,, because n, = M/pt . A perfect foresight
equilibrium is a sequence {pt}t that satisfies the following condition :
p, = H(pt+X ,...,pl+l) for all t.
A steady state is a p where p =H(pp). Let us briefly study the case where all
agents have perfect foresight, since this gives a condition for the existence of an
interior steady state. If all agents have perfect foresight p]'[x = pt+, for all i, then the
agents are identical. (5.4) is reduced to M = Mt and if we combine ptnt = M with the
first order condition (5.2) we have
U'(—)— = —V'(-) (5.8)
P,+1 Pl+1 P, P,
Since the right-hand side of (5.8) is monotone in p,, we can write p, is a function of
Pt+i ■
Pt = F(Pt+\) (5-9)
The function H is reduced to the function F when agents have perfect foresight. F is
C'-function for all pt+l > 0. The perfect foresight equilibrium {pt}t satisfies (5.9). The
steady state p satisfies p = F(p), i.e. an n where U'(n) = V'(n), since all agents
have the same welfare function. Ifwe furthermore assume that U'(c) —> co when c —>
0 and V'(n) oo when n —> oo then there exists a unique interior steady state p > 0.
If cU'(c) —> 0 when c —> 0, then the autarky steady state p = 0 also exists. There are
a continuum of perfect foresight paths in this economy and the steady state p > 0 is
unstable under perfect foresight, let {pt}t be a perfect foresight path with p0 > p,
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then pt goes to infinity for t going to infinity. Ifp0 <P, then pt goes to 0 as t -» oo. In
the next section we study learning and the stability of p under learning.
5.3. The conditions for local and global stability of the steady state under
learning.
The learning behaviour we introduce is adaptive learning. In formulating a forecast
of the price at time t + 1, /?*;',, the z'-th agent is using the forecast at time t - 1 ,p'-',
the actual price at time t — 1, pt_x. We use p,_x instead of p, in order to avoid
simultaneity between pe;'+x and p, as explained below. There is a choice whether the
agents should learn about the real interest rate or the price. One reason for learning
on the real interest rate is that we can allow for the government to change the money
supply over time. If the money supply increases, the price increases as shown in
section 5 below, and the expected prices just increase over time. We have to look at
the real interest rate instead to get convergence to a steady state. However, to keep
things simple the agents learn about price and for convenience we set m = 2. The
difference between the two types is in the speed of learning. A fraction of p agents
born at time t use a high speed learning rule into and a fraction of 1 - p agents use a
low speed learning rule, where p e [0,1] . The high speed agents update pt+x
according to the learning rule
P,ix = Peif + a{ (p,_x - p*J) (5.10)
where p]{x is the forecast made at time t of the price at time t + 1. The slow speed
agents update pt+l according to the learning rule
p::x = pY + as,(p,_x - pY) (5.11)
where p]'lx is the forecast made at time t of the price at time t +1. The difference
between the two types of agents are in the speed of learning a\ , i = s,f and we
assume
0 < a, < a{ <1 for all t.
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]T a't = oo for i = s,f.
1=1
Since there is no uncertainty in the model it is not necessary to assume that a] -> 0
when t goes to infinity. The high speed agents are denoted by "/" and are called fast
learners, while the slow speed agents are denoted by " 5 " and are called slow
learners. The terms slow and fast merely describes the difference in the speed of
learning, the fast learners do not become perfect foresight agents suddenly as a result
of a higher speed of learning. There has been a wide interest in the literature in the
learning rules (10) and (11), see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (1995b) for a recent
overview of adaptive learning rules in dynamic macroeconomic models. The learning
rules (10) and (11) are simple although they are ad hoc. If the steady state is stable
under learning, the rate of convergence is fast if the speed of learning is high, thus
the agents are only misspecified for a short number of periods. Hence the learning
rule is "reasonable" as noted by Bray (1982). In the following we use constant speeds
of learning, a\ = at, i = s,f and as < aj. A constant speed of learning is sometimes
called a constant gain parameter, and we place a high weight on current observations.
A decreasing speed of learning place a low weight on current observations when t is
large, while earlier observations have a higher weight. The choice of a constant speed
of learning does not change the results below and is used to simplify the notation.
However if there is uncertainty in the model, for example a technology shock or a
preference shock, then a constant speed of learning produces a noisy forecast even in
the limit. In this case the economy can fluctuate around the steady state depending on
the size of shock. We assume that /j. is exogenous, an agent is either born as a slow or
a fast learner and cannot change the speed of learning. A possible extension could be
to make /a endogenous, for example it could depend on the welfare the agents
receive. If the welfare of slow learner compared to the welfare of a fast learner is
decreasing the proportion of slow learners would decrease, and we can study
evolutionary aspects in this model.
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If we insert the temporary equilibrium condition p, = H(p**x) into the learning
rules (5.10) and (5.11), we have the non-linear dynamic system :
PUi ' PY+ "/(H(P;J,pY) - )
(5.12)
PY, = PY + "i(.H(PY.PY) - PY )
If the actual price pt was used instead ofp,_x then we would have to determine p, and
pet'l\ simultaneously, thus for convenience we use p,_x . We could use pt if we are
only concerned by local stability see Evans and Honkapohja (1995b), but for the
global stability and welfare comparison we need the recursive system (5.12). When
the agents are using the learning rule, agents do not take into account that the other
agent is making an error in his forecast. An agent does not need to know the function
H or the forecast from the other agent. The agent just needs information of the actual
price pt and this assumed to be announced to both agents. It might seem strange that
the agents do not take into account that other agents are using a misspecified model,
and are ignorant of this element, but I have not seen papers where agents a learning
rules like (5.10) and (5.11), and using this information in their forecast. There is a lot
bounded rationality here. We could assume that one type of agent had perfect
foresight and the other used the learning rule, but that would make the arithmetic's
much harder, see Evans, Honkapohja and Sargent (1993). The dynamic system (5.12)
can be written as follows
(pY\,PY,) = G(p:',PY) (5.13)
where G : RX —> Riisa C'-function in ( pr . pR) and given by (5.12). The
conditions for local stability of the steady state (p ,p) under learning are determined
by the size of the eigenvalues for the Jacobian matrix of the function G at (p , p ):
J(P,P) =
rl + af(Hx(p,p)-\) a/H1(p, p)
aSHX (p,p) 1 + as(H2 (p, p)-\)
If the eigenvalues of J are less than 1 in absolute value, then (p ,p) is locally stable
under learning (5.10) and (5.11). The characteristic polynomial k(X) for J(p ,p) is
given by:
k(X) = X2 - (Tr J)X + (Det J)
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where Tr J is the trace ofJ and DetJ is the determinant ofJ
TrJ— 1 + af(Hx(p,p)-l) + 1 + as(H2(p,p) -1)
= (1 -af) +(1 -as)+ afHx(p,p) + asH2(p,p)
DetJ= (1 + af (Hx(p,p)-l))(l + as(H2 (p,p) - \)) - af Hx (p,p) asH2 (p,p)
= (1 -af)( 1 -a,) + (l -af)asH2(p,p) +(1 - as)af Hx(p,p,)
It is easy to see that TrJ> 0 and DetJ> 0, when the partial derivatives Hx and H2 are
positive. Since the eigenvalues ofJ are the roots of the characteristic polynomial, we
have to find the roots of n. The roots of k are as follows:
(TrJ) + J(TrJ)2 -A(DetJ) (Tr J) - yj(Tr J)2 -4(DetJ)
A, = and /T =
2 2
2
Ax and 2^ are real if (Tr J) - 4{Det J) > 0. This can be shown by tedious calculations
and the roots are real. If I Ax I <1 and I ^ I < 1 then the steady state is locally stable.
It is easy to see that 2^< Ax , hence we have to show:
— 1 < Ao < < 1.
This is satisfied if
0 < 1 ~Hx(p,p) - H2(p,p) (5.14)
as shown in the appendix. As a result of the symmetry in the function H at p we
have
H2(p,p) -((1 -p)/p)Hx(p,p),
this shown in the appendix. Then (5.14) is reduced to
H\(P> P) <P
We can summarise the result in proposition 1.
Proposition 5.1. Given assumptions 5.1 and 5.2. If Hx(p,p) < p then the steady
state p is locally stable under learning.
In the homogeneous case, where either p = 1 or p = 0, the condition for local stability
are either Hx(p,p) < 1 (or H2(p,p) < 1). We can show that the steady state is
locally stable in the homogeneous case if and only if it is locally stable in the
heterogeneous case 0 < p< 1. Let us assume that p = 1, then temporary equilibrium
is reduced to p, = F(p'+/l). The steady state p is locally stable under learning if
F'(p) < 1. In order to obtain an equivalence between stability in the homogeneous
case and heterogeneous case, look at the derivative ofpt w.r.t p,+l when p = I:
d(M / pt) _ tJx pe/+\ (dp, / dpe/+{ )-p,
dP:i
dp,
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At p, (5.15a) is
CP)
ppt:e>f1 M= 1 A
(5-15.b)









where A = M/p + %\Y). Hence (5.16b) can be written as function of (5.15b), and
we have the following connection between Hx and F' at the steady state p :
Hx(p,p) = pF'(p)
Hence, if the steady state is locally stable in the homogeneous case, F'(p) < 1, then
it is also stable in the heterogeneous case, Hx(p,p) < p. The opposite result also
holds, if Hx(p,p) < p then pF'(p) < p and F'(p) < 1. Thus local stability in the
heterogeneous case implies local stability in the homogeneous case. It is not
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surprising that there is an equivalence between the economy with homogeneous
agents and heterogeneous agents in this set-up, because if the economy is in a steady
state both types of agents makes the same forecast and we cannot distinguish
between the two types.
In order to illustrate the dynamics and simplify the analysis, let us assume that the





where 0 < a < 1 and s > 0. Given these functions, we can derive an explicit
expression for the function H( p^x, p"x):
(5.17)
In the case where pet+x = p"x H is reduced to
s+cr I-<7
F(p;i)= (5-18)
If the agents have perfect foresight the equilibrium condition is given by (5.18) with
p]J+x = p"x = pt+x otherwise it is given by (5.17) as long as pc^x * p^x. It is easy to
show that the partial derivatives are positive H{(p^x, p"x) > 0 and H2(pe^x, p"x) > 0
and
H2{p ,p) = (l - ju/ju)Hx(p ,p)
Let Hy = d 2H(p'e, pJ'e)/d p''ed pJ,li denote the second-order, partial derivatives of the
function H for ij = 1,2. It can be shown that Hu <0, H22 < 0, Hn > 0, H2l > 0 and
H\ \ H22 - H]2H2\ > 0 such that H is strictly concave in (pe,{x, p]'lx). H has a unique
interior fixpoint:
p =H(p,p) => p =M.
At the steady state where p^x = p'+x = p the partial derivatives are :
1 —<7
M
M(pe,i) + a -m)(PZx)
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H\(p,p)<p®aA.H2(p,p)<(\ - p).
Thus the steady state is locally stable under learning. If there was only one type of
learner such that p = I the condition for local stability F'(p) < 1 together with Z,at
= co ensures global stability under learning, see chapter 2. □
Let us return to the model, and make the following assumption on the function H.
Assumption 5.3. The function H is strictly concave function in pd, .
This assumption on H is not trivial, for example, if cr > 1 the function H defined in
(5.17) does not satisfy assumption 5.3 nor assumption 5.1. The case where cr> 1 can
be used to study cycles. Assumption 5.3 is an attempt to derive some properties on
the function H. If for example p - 1, then H is reduced to F. In addition if cr < 1 such
that assumption 5.3 is satisfied, this results in the sequence {pet{\ }, being decreasing
or increasing during the movement to a steady state, depending on the initial
condition being either above or below the steady state. However when 0 < p < 1 the
sequences might not be monotone as shown in figures 5.1b, 5.1c, 5.2b, 5.2c and
figure 5.3, but for t sufficiently large the sequences become monotone and converge
to the steady state.
If P%,P%i > P then pt = H(ped,pd\) > p, or if p%,p'*, < p then pt =
WpX.pZi) < p, since H is is increasing in both arguments according to
assumption 5.1. The concavity assumption on H can be used to show the following
properties. If > pe'lx > p then
P%>W.P%,PZ,)=P, (5.19)
The strict concavity ofH implies
H{p'i\,pe,ti) ~ H(p ,p) < Hx(p ,p)(p"i'ix - p) + H2(p,p)(p^ - p)
< p(p'd\ - p) + (1 -p)(pe:li - p) < (ped - p) =>
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h{p%„PZ,)< p?«-
We cannot be certain that Pe,l\ > HiPdi ,P%\) ^ well.
Furthermore, if pd < pd, < p then
pz <H(Pd,P::l). (5.20)
Since H is strictly concave in pd,, pd, and H(pd, ,p,+i) = F(Pdi) then
H(p ,p) - H(pd,pd )<H(p,p)-H{pd,pd)
=H(p,p)-F(pdl)<p -Pd =>
at. <H(Pd,pdl),
again it is not certain that pd < H(pd,,pd\ )• ^ A+'i > P > Pd then
P%x >Pt> Pd (5-21)
for y = 1,2 and / *j according to (5.19) and (5.20).
We can now show that the steady state is globally stable under learning given
assumption 5.3, this will follow from (5.19)-(5.21). Proposition 5.2 describes the
case when the forecasts for the fast and slow learner are above steady state. In
proposition 5.3 the forecasts are below the steady state. The other cases can be
covered by these two situations as explained below.
Proposition 5.2. Given assumptions 5.1-5.3. Ifpf = pd > p and pd, > p, pf, >
p for all t, then
(i)pt> p and pd, < pd for all t>\
(ii) {pd}, and {pd)t are convergent sequences with pd, - p and
lim,^ Pd = P •
(Hi) {pt}t is a convergent sequence, with liml_>aa p, = p .
Proof, (i) Since pd, > p, pd > P for all t thenpt = H(pd,,pd\) > H(p,p) = p
for all t.
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S°: At t = 1 pxf = pxs >p0, andas<aj :
Pi = P\f + af(Po ~ P\f) < P\f + "s(Po ~ P\f)
= Pi*+as(P? ~Po)=P?
T°: Assume that pet{x < p*lx then
till = Ped\ + af(Pt - Pi+i) = (1 - af)p'd\\ + afPt < (1 - «/) Pd + afPt
= pz +af(Pt-P::l)<P::l +<*,&-P::l)=P;:2-
where the last inequality is due to pt - p*'*x < 0 from (19) and as<af.
(ii) Since pxf = pxs > p , then p0 = H(pxf, pxJ ) > p according to (i). From the
strict concavity of H : p0 < pxf. From the learning rules we have pe2 < pxf and
P'2 < P\S■ The price at time 1 is less than the price at time 0, px < p0, since the
forecasts p2f and p2s has decreased. Furthermore, from (i) p2s > pe2f, and p2s > p\
from (19).
At time t we have p°'s > p]J and p" >pt_{ such thatp,_x - p" < 0 and
Pd = PT + as(Pt-1 - PT ) < PT,
and {p',s}t is a decreasing sequence that is bounded below by p . Since p" > p]f
from (i) and pe'f > p by assumption, the sequence {p*J }, has to decrease when t is
sufficiently large, although it might not be decreasing initially. Thus p*J > pt and.
ped = pe:s + af(pt-1 - pf) < pf
for t sufficiently large. Now choose an integer Nx sufficiently large such that p]lx and
pe'lx for t > Nx are decreasing. Since both sequences are bounded below by p , the
two sequences converges and lim^ pe^x > p and limt^M p"x > p . Let lim,^ p^x
= p* and limt^M p"x = q*. We have to show that p* = p and q* = p . This is done
by a contradiction. Let us assume thatp* > p and q* > p . Let dx - H(p*,q*) -p* <
0 and d2 = H(p*,q*) - q* < 0. When t > N2 > N{ then
p'i\=p";' +a/(H(p;J,pr)
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p", =p" +a,(H(p;Js «,</„
and for all r > 1 :
p'l <pe,J +YmqA and p£ +Z-=,a^2 •
Ifwe can choose r sufficiently large we have a contradiction to p* > p and q* > p ,
because aj, as are positive and dx , d2 are negative. Hence the expected prices
converge to the steady state p .
(iii) Since is continuous, {pt }f is a convergent sequence with limt_+„pt = p.
■
Remark. We can illustrate proposition 5.2 in figure 5.1a.
Figure 5.1a about here.1
If p\f > pe{s > p then the assumption in proposition 5.2 is not satisfied and (i) is
not satisfied for the first periods, an example of this is shown in figure 5.1b. In figure
5.1b, p\s < pl's, but for t > 4 p™x is decreasing and the both sequences converges.
The increase in pe's from t = 2 to t = 3 is due to high values of p\f and p giving a
high value of px such that px > pe2". We have pe2f > px from (5.19). However, at
some time t p"x > p]'lx because the fast learners have a higher speed of convergence
and from (5.19) we have pe'lx > H(p"/x,p^x). Thus we can use proposition 5.2 and
show convergence.
Figure 5.1b about here.
1
We use the C.E.S-functions with the parameter values p = 0.5, 0.2, cr= 0.41, ry = 0.2, as = 0.05
to generate figure l.a and the following figures, but the initial conditions and money supply varies. In
figure l.a p\'f = p"s =30andM= 15.
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If we look at the case where pxs > p[J > p , the we can find parameter values such
that pe'lx is increasing in the first few periods, this is illustrated in figure 5.1c. In
figure 5.1c we use the parameter values from figure 5.1a but change the initial
conditions and p. However for t sufficiently large we can use proposition 5.2.
Figure 5.1c about here
It is from (ii) in proposition 5.2, we have the terminology of fast and slow learners,
since the fast agents adjust their expectations more rapidly than slow agents such that
for t is sufficient large :
\pl+i - pe,i I < Ia+i - p';l\ I
The fast agents are not learning "more", since they still use the same learning rule.
The case where the initial price expectations below the steady state price is described
in proposition 5.3.
Proposition 5.3. Given assumptions 5.1-5.3. If px = pxs < p and p'fx < p, pefx
< p for all t, then
(i)pt< p and p]{x > pefx for all t >\.
(ii) {pet'fx} t and {pfx}, are convergent sequences with pe,{x — p and
lim,^ pZ = P ■
(Hi) {pJt is a convergent sequence, with limpt = p .
Proof. This is similar to the proof of proposition 5.2. ■
Remark. We can illustrate proposition 5.3 in figure 5.2a. In figure 5.2a {p]{x}, and
{ pfx}, are monotonically increasing such that {pt}t is monotonically increasing.
Figure 5.2a about here.
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If p[J < pe{s < p then p'^ is not increasing initially and (i) is not satisfied as
shown in figure 5.2b. However for t sufficiently large (i) is satisfied and both
sequences converge
Figure 5.2b about here.
If p? < p\s < p , we can find parameter values such that pe^x is not monotonically
increasing see figure 2c for an example, but for t sufficiently large we can use
proposition 3 again and we have convergence.
Figure 5.2c about here.
We use the same parameter values as in figure 5.2b, but change the initial conditions
and the fraction of learners p. In the propositions above we studied the cases where
the initial forecast of the fast and slow learners were either above or below the steady
state. We still need to analyse the cases where :
P\f > P > PT and p'{f <p< pe{s,
Look at the case where the fast learner initially are above and the slow learner is
initially below, pxf > p > p", the other situation is treated symmetrically, then we
cannot tell whether the actual price initially p0 is above or below the steady state, but
from (21) we have
P\ >Po> P\
An example of this situation is shown in figure 5.3, where the fast learners initially
are above the steady state in the first periods, but decrease and fall below the steady
state. In this case we can use proposition 5.3, and the sequences converge to the
steady state. It is not possible that the economy would converge to a cycle or a
sunspot, since assumption 1 ensures that H is increasing in both arguments, and the
strict concavity ofU and strict convexity ofV ensures a unique interior steady state.
Figure 5.3 about here.
It is possible that p]'lx > pt> p't'*x for all t then we would use a combination of
proposition 5.2 and 5.3 to show convergence. Thus the steady state is stable under
learning, and depending on the initial conditions we can use either proposition 5.2 or
5.3.
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Figure 5.3 about here.
It is possible that p"'/x > p, > p'Z for all t then we would use a combination of
proposition 5.2 and 5.3 to show convergence. Thus the steady state is stable under
learning, and depending on the initial conditions we can use either proposition 5.2 or
5.3.
5.4. The welfare comparison.
When we compare the level of welfare between fast and slow learners, we have to
calculate the consumption for each of the agents and insert this into the welfare
function. The welfare function is given by U(c) - V(n) for both fast and slow
learners. The labour supply is given by equation (5.3). If we insert (5.7) into these
equations, we have
j.JW&Zd) mi
v pe,i J V
At time t + 1 the fast learner's actual consumption is given by:
~e<s
Pt +1
pt+xc{+x = M{ =ptnx/ r-f - P> „/n.
P,+1
The slow learner's actual consumption is determined the same way: c/+1 = (p,/pt+l)
n*. Since pt+l , pt, n{ and nst are functions of (pet^ , ) the actual consumption
c{+x and c;+x are functions of (p"+x, p"x) as well. With the actual consumption and
actual labour supply we calculate the welfare. Given these values, we have the ex
post welfare sequences {U(c{+1 )-V(n{ )}Jl0 and {U(c,+X) -V(n, )}™0.
Let us assume that the economy initially is above the steady state and the fast and
slow learner have the same initial forecast : pxf = p[s > p . From proposition 2
p*'lx <p^x for all t > 1, and the fast learners labour supply and actual consumption
are larger than the slow learners labour supply and consumption:
n{ = %(pt/ped\) > %(Pt/pZ) = < for all r > 1
c{+, = (p,/pt+i) n{ > (pt/p,+i)n; = <+1 for all t > 1 ,
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because £ is an increasing function. The expected real interest rate for the slow
learners p,/pfx < 1 for all t, the fast learners expected real interest rate p,/p*fx < 1
when t is sufficiently large, because p]fx > pt for t sufficiently large. Since £, is
increasing, the labour supply in the steady state is higher than the slow learners
labour supply :
n = ffl) > ffpt /pff) = nf for all t > 1.
c > cst+x for all t > 1.
For the fast learner we have n = ffl) > <fpt /pe,{x) — n{ and c > c{+x for t
sufficiently large. We can now compare the welfare between two learners born at
time t.
Proposition 5.4. Given assumptions 5.1-5.3. Let {n",c"+ x}™0 and {n{ ,c{+x}™= 0
denote the slow learners and fast learners labour supply and consumption in a
temporary equilibrium. Ifpf = pxs > p, then
(i) At t = 0 the welfare is equal U(cx ) - V(n50) = U(c{ ) - V(n{ ).
(ii) For t sufficiently large the fast learners are better offthan the slow learners:
U(cf+l) - V(n{) > U(cfx) - V(ff).
Proof, (i) When t = 0, pf = pf hence n{ = and c{ = cx such that the welfare
is equal.
(ii) When t is suffiently large, c > cfx > cfx and since U is strictly concave:
U(c!„)-U(clO>W(cll)(cl,-O > -cUO (5.22)
Note that we use U'(c{+x) in the first inequality. The first-order condition at the
steady state is given by U'(c) = V (n), hence the right-hand side of (5.22) is equal
to:
= V(n)(^-n! -(5.23)
Pl +1 P, + x
since Vis strictly convex and n > n{ > n*, (5.23) is greater than:
1 JJ
>{-»,')-(- v
n, ~n, Pt+1 A+i
> V(n{)-V(nst)
becausept/pt+\ > 1 t sufficiently large. Hence
U(cfj - U(c'M) > V(n{) - =.
u(c{j- > u(-*r»,V ■
Remark. The result in proposition 5.4 is shown in figure 5.4a, note that in figure
5.4a the fast learners are better off for all t > 1 and not just when t is sufficiently
large. A situation where the slow learners are better off in the first periods is shown
in figure 5.4b, but the proposition still holds for t sufficiently large. In figure 5.4b the
initial conditions are pxf > pe{s > p .
Figure 5.4a about here.
Figure 5.4b about here
The intuition behind this result is that forecast made by the fast learner born at time t,
p]{x, is "closer" to the actual the actual price p, compared to the slow agent's forecast
p°'*x, and the fast agent is closer to the actual optimum. Thus although the fast agent
does not have rational expectations, he does produce a better forecast than the slow
agent. If we only had s fast learners, where s is "small" but positive, then fast
learners would still be better off, since this small number of fast learners would still
benefit from making a better forecast. An extension of the model would be to
introduce a perfect foresight agent in the model and let the rest of the agents be
learners. The perfect foresight agent will benefit from the fact that all the other agents
are learners, because the perfect agent know that actual price and is solving the true
optimisation problem. This should not be surprising since the perfect foresight agent
know the path of equilibrium prices, while the learners are making a wrong forecast.
In the second case, where the initial expected prices are lower than the steady state
price, we can show the same result. Let us assume that assumptions 5.1-5.3 are
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satisfied and pe{f = pxs < p . The labour supply of the fast learners are less than the
slow learners labour supply :
n{ = 4(Pt /P°d\) < Z(pt/P%i) = < for all r > 1,
because £ is an increasing function in the expected interest rate (assumption 5.1) and
p]fx > pefx according to proposition 5.3. The consumption of fast learners is less
than slow learners consumption :
c{+[ = (p,/pl+i) n{ < (ptlpt+i)«; = c/+1 for all t > 1.
The steady state are less than the labour supply at time t and consumption at time t+1
n < nst , c < <+I for all t > 1.
n < n{ , c < c{+x for t sufficiently large.
We have the following proposition regarding the welfare of the fast and slow
learners.
Proposition 5.5. Given assumptions 5.1-5.3. Let {n,,c,+l}™=0 and{n{ ,c{+x}™=Q denote
the slow learners and fast learners labour supply and consumption in a temporary
equilibrium. If p[J = pef < p, then at t = 0 : U(c\) - V(n„) - U(c{) -
V(n{) and for t sufficiently large the fast learners are better off than the slow
learners: U(cfx) - V(n,) < U(cfx) - V(n{).
Proof. See appendix. ■
The result here is again due to the fast learners making a "better" forecast than the
slow learners. When pxf ^ pxs but pxf, pxs < p then-proposition 5.5 might not
hold initially, however for t sufficiently large the proposition is still valid. If we look
at the case where the initial conditions are given by pxs > p > pxf, an example of
this is shown figure 5.5, we have a similar result as in figure 5.4b. The slow agents
are better off initially and for some periods ahead, but the fast learners overtake the
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slow learners and remain better off during the movement to the steady state see
figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5 about here.
The reason for the slow being better off than the fast in the short run is that the slow
are "closer" to the actual price. When t is sufficient large the effect from the fast
learners higher speed of learning will make his forecast closer to the actual price, and
the fast learner have a higher welfare compared to the slow learners as before for all t
sufficently large.
5.5. The effect of a change in the money supply.
We assumed that the money supply M was constant. If the government changes the
money supply by printing more money, the steady state price p change. If M is
increased to M then it is easy to see that the steady state price level is increased as
well, from (5.8) we have:
P,
r \




Since the money supply has changed, p does not satisfy the above equation, the new
steady state price is given by p <5(1) = M. Since M > M then p > p and the
increase in the money supply increase the steady state price level, not surprisingly.
There is no real effect the steady state labour supply n = n and the steady state
consumption c = c. The steady state welfare is unchanged and
U(c) - V(n) = U(c) - V(n).
If we assume the economy is in the steady state p and the money supply is M. At
time T the government increase the money supply from M to M. If this is
unanticipated by the agents born at time T the expected prices at time are pe/+x =
Pt+\ ~ P > since Prh > PtIi depend on the expected prices time T - 1, pe/ and pe/,
and the actual price at time T - 1, pT_u according to the learning rules. For example,
the government could change the money supply after the agents have updated the
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expected price according to the learning rule. In this situation there is a delay before
the change in the money supply affects the expected prices. However, the actual price
at time T,pT, increases because the change in M affects the function H(.,.,ju).
Lemma 5.2. Given assumption 5.1, the partial derivative ofHw.r.t. M is positive.
Proof. See appendix. ■
From lemma 5.2, we have that an increase in M increases the price pT. Since pT
increases so does peT{2 and pe/+2 according to the learning rules. We can use
proposition 5.3 to determine the price paths, because the initial condition peT{x =
Pt+\ = P < P ■ The fast learners are better off than the slow learners during the
movement from the old steady state to the new steady state according to proposition
5.5. The increase in the money supply benefits the fast learners. If we made the
opposite experiment such that the government decreased the money supply, we could
use proposition 5.2. Hence fast learners would still be better off than slow learners
during the learning transition when t is sufficiently large. Thus a contractionary or
expansionary monetary policy always make the fast learners better off compared to
the slow learners for t sufficiently large, when the agents have the same initial
forecast.
The forecast at time T - 1, pe/ and pejs, and the actual price at time T - 1 ,pr-\, was
based on the money supply being equal to M. If the government announce the change
in money supply before the agents bom at time T update their price, it would be
natural to allow the agents to change their forecast pe^'+x i = s,f instead of updating
according to learning rule. In this case the two types agents at time T might have
different initial conditions pe/+x * peTs+x. When t > T the agents use the learning rules.
In this situation the slow learners might be better off in the initial periods after the
change, but for t sufficently large the fast learners over take the slow learners.
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5.6. The model with n different types of learners.
If we assume there are n different types of learners instead of two types of learners,
this does not change the stability result and welfare results from the previous
sections. The increase in number of types increase the number of difference
equations in the dynamic system, but the results when m = 2 can be extended to the
case with m > 2 different types. In section 2 we defined pt implict as function of
— e,\ .
Pt+\>'"' Pt + \ '
pt= H{p^,..,pe,:x). (5.24)
The agents learn again on the expected price according to the learning rule:
PY1 = PY + ai (Pt-\ ~ PY) for a111 and i = 1,... ,m. (5.25)
Here ai denotes type i's speed of learning and we assume
ax<a2< ... < am .
The steady state p is determined by the equation p = H(p,...., p). If we substitute
the temporary equilibrium condition (5.24) into the learning rules we have the
following dynamic system consisting ofm non-linear difference equations:
PY\ - PY +al(H(pY,..,pr)~ PY) for all t.
(5.26)
Pi" = per + am (H(pYPY") - PD for all t.
The local stability of the steady state under learning is determined by the size of the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix for (5.26) at the point (p p ):
J(p,....,p) =
g i • gin
^gml gmm '
e,\where gy is the partial derivative of p,'1 + a, (H(pp*'" ) - pe/') w.r.t. p°,J at
(p ,...., p) for all i, j = 1 The partial derivatives gy are given by
gu= 1 +ai(Hi(p p)- 1) when i=j
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gij = ai Hj (P,--,P) when i *j,
where Hx is the partial derivative ofHw.r.t. pf . When pf = p for all i, then
Hj(p p) = (pj/pi)Hi(p ,....,p) for if = 1
The following theorem from Sydsaeter (1981) gives a condition for the eigenvalues
of J to be less than one in absolute value.





Then, all the eigenvalues ofA have moduli less than 1.
Since Hj > 0 for all i = l,...,n the sum of the elements in the rows of J has to be less
than 1 :
gn + + gim < 1 for i = 1,..., m.
Let i= 1, then gu + + glm < 1 implies :
1 + afH\ — 1) + a\ H2 + .... + ci\Hm <1 =i>
Hl+H2 + .... + Hm< 1 H] + —LH\ + .... + ——H\ < 1 ^
P\ P\
pxHx +(1 -px)H{ <pi => Hx<px.
Since H, = (pfPj.)Hj at the steady state p , then
Hj = (jUi/pl.)Hl < Pj for all i,
when Hx< px. The condition for local stability under learning can be summarised in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6. Given assumptions 5.1 and 5.2. If there exists an i e {I ,...,m} such
that Hj < pb then the steady state is locally stable under learning.
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This is similar to proposition 1, if the z'-th agent satisfies the stability condition , then
the rest of the agents satisfies the condition as well. A possible extension of this
result would be to let n go to infinity such that there is an infinite but countable




The Jacobian matrix becomes a co x co-matrix, and we cannot be sure that the
theorem from Sydsaeter (1981) is valid for m = <x>. We could also introduce a
continuum of agents, for example distributed over the unit interval or the unit ball.
This is studied by Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (1995).
Let us return to the global stability question and the welfare comparison, that is, will
the steady state be globally stable under learning and will the welfare results still be
valid when we have m > 2 types of agents. We extend assumption 3 on the function
H in order to cover the case with m types of agents.
Assumption 5.4. The function H is strictly concave in pef for all i = 1
Let us assume that the initial price expectations are above the steady state: pf - ... =
p\ '" > p . and concentrate on the case where pef\ > p for all t and z = 1 In this
case
P,-H(p% p%) > p and
There exists at least one i such that p ,+i > H(pY\,..., pel+mJ
With this property on the function H, then we have the following proposition on the
expected prices and actual price.
Proposition 5.7. Given assumptions 5.1-5.2 and 5.4. If pef = ... = p\m > p and
pY\ > p for all t and z = then
(0 Pe,ii > > Pet'"l for all t>\.
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(ii) {p'+i}Zo a convergent sequence with lim= p, for all i = l,...,m.
(Hi) {p,}Zo *s a convergent sequence with liml_^a) p, — p.
Proof. This is similar to the proof of proposition 5.2. ■
Since pf> ... > pf" for all t, the labour supply and the consumption can be
ordered as follows:
n) < .... < nf and c'+1 < ... < c"f for all t > 1.
When t is suffiently large we have pt /p,f < 1 and the labour supply and
consumption in the steady state are again larger than labour supply and consumption
of the z'-th agent:
h > n\ and c > c'l+l when t sufficiently large and i = 1
Hence we have a similar proposition to proposition 5.4.
Proposition 5.8. Given assumptions 5.1-5.2 and 5.4. Let {n't, c'l+l }f0 denote type i's
supply of labour and consumption in a temporary equilibrium. If pf = ... = pf" >
p for all i,j = 1 ,...,m then
(i) At t — 0 the welfare of the m different agents are equal:
U(c\) — V(n\) = = U(c1')-V(n? ).
(ii) When t is sufficiently large the welfare ofthe m different agents can be ranked :
U(cf ) - V(n) )> > U(c"f ) - V(n"f ) for all t>\.
Proof. Similar to the proof of proposition 5.4. ■
If we assume that the initial expected prices are below the steady state price then we
can prove similar propositions as propositions 5.3 and 5.5 but for m different agents
instead of 2 different agents. However, proposition 5.8 is not valid if the initial
conditions are different as was the case when m = 2. If the initial conditions are
different, then the slow learners might be better off initially and the periods ahead.
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5.7. Conclusion.
We have studied a standard overlapping generations model, but extended it so that it
includes 2 or m types of agents. The condition for local stability of the steady state
depended on the fraction of learners. Given a concavity assumption the steady state
was globally stable. The concavity assumption together with an assumption on the
initial condition on the agents forecast of the price could be used to prove that the
fast learners had a higher welfare than the slow learners for t sufficiently large,
regardless of the initial conditions. This was due to higher speed of convergence such
that the fast agents was close to the actual price. However, it was possible to show by
simulations that the slow learners could be better off for some time during the
learning transition to the steady state if the initial conditions were different.
The two types of learners did not change their speed of learning over time so there
was no possibility for the slow learners to change their speed of learning. The agents
are stuck with their learning rule. An possible extension of this would be to modify
the learning rules so the agents take account of each others expectations. In this
model the fraction of learners were exogenous and another extension would be to
endogenise the fraction of learners. As a last case we extended the model to include
m types of agents. The local stability result and the welfare comparison was the same
as in the case with two types, given the similar assumptions. We could try and
introduce a continuum of agents as in Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (1995). In
this model there were no uncertainty, it is obvious to allow for uncertainty, for
example, a shock to production or preferences. It could also be a monetary shock. In
this situation the fast learners could have a constant speed of learning and the slow
learners could have a decreasing speed of learning. The question is whether the
economy would converge under learning, or if the noisy forecast produced by the fast
learners cause the system to be unstable, but this is left for further investigation.
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Appendix to chapter 5.
Proofoflemma 5.1. For convenience look at the case where m = 2. Ifwe differentiate
equation (5.7) w.r.t. pfx, where p]jx j * i and p are kept constant:
d-
fM^
IP,)_ = d(p4(P, / pE)) + d{(\-p)£(p, / pefj)
dpE +dp, dpE
m dp,
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The condition H2(p,p,p) =
l-M
Hx (p, p, p.) . From the proof of lemma 5.1, the














V(nst)-V(n{) p,< (n; -nf) = (V(n;)-V(n{))/nA
< -n! p,+1
j< V(n\)-V(n])
because p,/p,+\ > 1 for t sufficiently large. Hence
U(c;j- U(c{J< - )
U(c{„)- V(n>)> - ■
l + l
Proofoflemma 2. Let us differentiate equation (5.7) w.r.t. Mwhere p*f, pef and p
all are kept constant:
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Prices
Figure 5.1a. The paths for prices, with q?= p* > p = 15.
Slow learners expected price (dotted line),
fast learners expected price (straight line) and
the actual price (thick straight line).
Prices
Figure 5.1b. The paths for prices,
where p*; = 50 > qf= 20 > p = 15.
Slow learners expected price (dotted line),
fast learners expected price (straight line) and
the actual price (thick straight line).
Prices
Figure 5.1c. The paths for prices, with q* = 100,
pf= 2 5 > p = 15 and p = 0.05.
The Slow learners expected price (dotted line),
the fast learners expected price (straight line) and
the actual price (thick straight line).
(H9
Prices
Figure 5.2a. The paths for prices, where qfc= p* <
Slow learners expected price (dotted line),
fast learners expected price (straight line) and
the actual price (thick straight line).
Prices
Figure 5.2b. The paths for prices,
where pf= 10 < qf= 25 < p = 40.
Slow learners expected price (dotted line),
fast learners expected price (straight line) and
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Figure 5.2c. The paths for prices,
where q^= 2 < p'; = 15 < p = 40 and p = 0.05.
The slow learners expected price
the fast learners expected price
(dotted line),
(straight line) and
the actual price (thick straight line).
ISI
Prices
Figure 5.3. The paths for prices, where q^= 10
< p = 30 < pf= 50.
Slow learners expected price (dotted line),
fast learners expected price (straight line) and
the actual price (thick straight line).
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welfare
Figure 5.4a. The welfare paths, where pf = qc> p.
The slow learners welfare (dotted line),
the fast learners welfare (straight line).
is**
welfare
Figure 5.4b. The welfare paths, where p* > q^"> p.
The slow learners welfare (dotted line),
the fast learners welfare (straight line).
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welfare
Figure 5.5. The welfare paths, where q^> p > pc
The slow learners welfare (dotted line),
The fast learners welfare (straight line).
Chapter 6. The local stability of a 2-cycle under learning.
6.1. Introduction.
There has been a strong interest in the study of cyclical fluctuations in
macroeconomics, since periodic solutions and limit cycles resemble idealised
business cycles, see for example Grandmont (1985) and a recent survey by Guesnerie
and Woodford (1992). In this chapter we will analyse cycles when we have
heterogeneous agents in the non-linear model from chapter 5, but we restrict
ourselves to a 2-cycle to keep the dynamics simple. We will study the existence of 2-
cycles together with the conditions for local stability of a 2-cycle under learning. The
issue of interest is how the existence and the stability conditions of a 2-cycle under
learning are affected by the introduction of heterogeneous agents in the model.
There are different ways of studying the stability of cycles under learning. Evans and
Honkapohja (1995a) formulates a stochastic recursive algorithm for a stochastic non¬
linear model. They use a connection between the recursive algorithm and a
corresponding ordinary differential equation. This connection is based on paper by
Ljung (1977), and the stability of the recursive algorithm can be determined by
studying the stability of the corresponding differential equation. Guesnerie and
Woodford (1991) study a deterministic model with a constant speed of learning.
They use the Poincare-Hopf theorem to study local asymptotic stability under
learning. A paper by Grandmont and Laroque (1986) also concentrate on a non-
stochastic framework, but their learning rule has finite memory and is time-invariant.
In this chapter we will adapt the framework of Evans and -Honkapohja, but we keep
the deterministic framework from chapter 5. The learning rules are modified in a way
which allow the agents to incorporate the possibility of a 2-cycle in their beliefs. We
establish a connection between the dynamic system of difference equations and a
corresponding differential equation in this deterministic setting. This is in many
respects similar to the recursive algorithm formulated by Ljung (1977). However the
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algorithm presented here is simpler, and gives an intuition on how Ljungs algorithm
work.
We find a condition that secures local stability of the 2-cycle with heterogeneous
learning and this does not depend on the speed of learning. This is however a
sufficient condition and not a necessary condition. The result corresponds to the local
stability of a 2-cycle when we have homogeneous agents. Thus if a 2-cycle is locally
stable under learning in the homogeneous case it will also be locally stable ifwe have
heterogeneous agents and vice versa. The intuition for this equivalence is that the two
types of agents make the same forecast when the economy is in a 2-cycle. Hence
there is no difference in their forecast and they are identical, although their speeds of
learning are different.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 6.2 we briefly describe the model and
consider the conditions for existence of a 2-cycle. Section 6.3 describes the recursive
algorithm we use in section 6.4 to find conditions for local stability. In section 6.5 we
look at the case with homogeneous agents and show an equivalence between stability
in the homogeneous case and stability in the heterogeneous case. Section 6.6 contains
the conclusion.
6.2. The model.
We are considering the case where the dynamics are given by the function H(.
Pt =H(Pt+i>qt+idO for all t.
This is the temporary equilibrium condition from chapter 5, where pt is the price at
time t and it depends on the fast learner's expected price at time t + 1, p*+1, and the
slow learner's expected price at time t + 1, q®+1, p denote the fraction of fast learners.
The function H was implicitly derived from the first-order conditions of the
maximisation problems of the two agents in chap. 5:
n,f = 5(Pt1 Pt+i) and nt = S(Pt/q"+i)
and the equilibrium condition on the money market:
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M = jo. Mtf +(1 -p)M* ,
where n[,Mtf is the fast learners labour supply and demand for money, M', nts is the
slow learners money demand and labour supply and M is the money supply, which is
kept constant. We have :
Mf ^Ptnf and M* =ptnts,
for all t. If we combine the first order conditions with the money market equilibrium
condition, we can define the price today implicitly as a function of the expected
prices:
M/pt = jJ-nf + (1 -(a) nts = p£(pt/p^+I) + (1 - |f£(pt/q°+1)
Pt = H(p°+1,q*+1,p) for all t.
Assumption 6.1. H is a C2-function for p®+1 > 0 and q®+1 > 0.
In chapter 5, we made an assumption on the function £ to prove that the partial
derivatives of H with respect to p®+1 and q*+1 was positive for all values of p®+1 >
0, q°+1 > 0 and 0 < p < 1, see assumption 5.1. This assumption, Q > 0, was sufficient
to rule out cycles, hence in order to study cycles we have to drop this assumption.
We will limit the case to a 2-cycle so the results should not be taken literally. The
purpose of studying a 2-cycle is to simplify the set-up and to gain some intuition
about the dynamics. The definition of a rational 2-cycle is as follows.
Definition 6.1. A rational 2-cycle is a price-pair (p,, p2 ) where:
Pi = H(p2 ,p2 ,p ).
P 2 = H(p,,p,,n).
If the economy is in an 2-cycle (p,, p2) then the actual law ofmotion is given by :
P, = H(p, ,p, ,p) t even,
p, = H(p2,p2,p) todd.
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We can write down the equilibrium conditions for this 2-cycle with the use of the
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Let p,/p2 = x so p2/Pi = 1/x. The equilibrium conditions can be written as one
equation :
(6.1) G(x) = x^(x) - £(l/x) = 0.
The steady state p is given by x = 1. The equilibrium condition (6.1) does not
depend on the fraction of fast learners p or slow learners 1 - p. This is not surprising,
since both types of agents solve the same type of maximisation problem here. In
Evans et al. (1993) there is a necessary condition for the existence of a 2-cycle. Ifwe
translate their result to this model, the condition is:
4'(p/p) = ^(l)<0.
Hence ^ has to have a negative derivative at the steady state p for the existence of a
2-cycle.
Grandmont (1985) shows that instability of the steady state is a sufficient condition
for the existence of a 2-cycle for the model with homogeneous agents. In our model,
this is equivalent to :
Hi (p.p,p) < - p and H2(p,p,p) < - (1 - p).
Although Grandmont's results are formulated for a function of one variable, H is
reduced to a function of one variable when p*+I = q°+1 = p. We can then use his
arguments on H to determine the conditions for existence, since the partial
derivatives ofH in the steady state are identical apart from p :
H!(p,p,p) = px(p)and H2(p,p,p) = (l -p)x(p),
where x(p) = F'(p) and F(pt+I) = H(pt+1,pt+I,p) as defined in chapter 5. When the
economy are in steady state the two types of agents have identical forecasts and they
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can be regarded as one type, and the condition for existence of 2-cycle in Grandmont
can be translated to our model as x( p) < - 1 •
Example. U and V are the C.E.S.-functionsfrom chapter 5. Let U(c) = c(I ~CT,/(1 - a)
1+8
and V(n) = n /(1+s) such that H is given by
H(p,q,p) = { (1/M)( p(p"a) +(1 —M-)(q_a ) ) }"p
where a = (1 - cr)/(c7 + s) and p = (cr + s)/(l + s). If we set a = 3, s - 1 and M = 1,
then the steady state is given by p = 1 and there exist a 2-cycle given by p, = 1/2
and p2 - 2.
Let us therefore assume that H satisfies these conditions so that a rational 2-cycle
exists. The purpose of this chapter is to find conditions for local stability of the 2-
cycle under learning. The way to study learning and the stability of cycles or steady
states under learning in a stochastic setting has been to use a stochastic recursive
algorithm formulated in paper by Ljung (1977). See e.g. Marcet and Sargent (1988),
(1989), Woodford (1990) and Evans and Honkapohja (1995a) for applications of
Ljungs algorithm. However the model in this chapter is deterministic and much
simpler than the model in Ljung. Hence Ljungs algorithm might seem to powerful a
tool to use. Instead we analyse a deterministic version of Ljungs algorithm in order to
gain some intuition on Ljungs results and the way these results are proven.
6.3. A deterministic version of a stochastic recursive algorithm.
The original recursive algorithm is formulated as follows:
xt = xt-i +ytQ(t'x,-i >zt)
(6.2)
zt = M(xt_,)-zt_I +N(xt_,)-vt
where xt € Rn are the "estimates", Zj e Rm are the "observations", vt e Rr is a random
vector and yt e R is a deterministic sequence, where yt —» 0. M and N are m x m and
m x r matrix-functions of xt-1 , respectively. In the deterministic case, vt <= Rr is a
deterministic vector. Ljung shows that under certain conditions local convergence of
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xt to a point x under (6.2) depends on the asymptotic stability of the ordinary
differential equation:
(6.3) ^=f(As»ds
where f(x) is defined as:
f(x) = lim E(Q(t,x,z, ))
t—
and \ = M(x)z,_, + N(x)vt, for a fixed x. The reason for using xD instead of x is to
distinguish between the solution to (6.2) and the solution (6.3). The point x could,
for example, be a stationary point for the differential equation, i.e. f(x) = 0. Hence
instead of studying the asymptotic behaviour of the stochastic difference equations
system (6.2), Ljung shows under certain assumptions that we can study the
asymptotic behaviour of the differential equation (6.3), see theorem 1 and 4 in Ljung.
In this chapter we have restricted ourselves to a purely deterministic model with no
random variables. Let us set the matrix functions M and N equal to 0, and there no
random vector vt, furthermore Q does not depend on t, hence (6.2) reduces to
xt= xt_, +ytQ(xt_,).
To simplify the model further we assume that yt = 1/t. Hence we have
(6.2*) xt = xt_, + ^ Q(xt_[).
The system of difference equations in (6.2*) will describe our model with learning




Again we distinguish between a solution to (6.3*) denoted by xD and a solution to
(6.2*) denoted by xt. We assume that Q is a continuous function. If we have the
initial condition xD(s(0)) = x°, then we can write (6.3*) as
xD(s(t))= x0D + P(t) Q(x(s))ds =>
• s(0)
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(6.4) xD(s(t)) — x0D = r Q(x(s))ds
Js(0)
We have to find the connection between the time-index t and notional time s(t). Let
us return to the difference equation at time t:
xt+i -xt= -^-Q(xt) =>
t + 1
t+s y
Xt+S ~ Xt = Z " Q(Xj-l ) =>
j=t?l J
(6.5) xt-xT= £ -Q(xj_i)
j=T+l J
The connection between t and s is given by :
s(t)=Z-
j=i J
We want to approximate the right-hand side of (6.5) to the integral in (6.4). Here we
will use the fact that an integral can be defined as the limit of sums.
The definition of the integral as sum oflimits, see theorem 6.4 in Rudin (1964). Let P
be a partition of the interval [a,b], a = s0 < Sj < ...< sn = b. Let q be given by sM < tj <
Sj. Let f be a bounded function on the interval [a,b], and the function a is a monotone
increasing function in s with Acq = a(Sj) - a(Si_[). Let p(P) = max I S; - Sj_, I.
i = l,...,n
If f is continuous then :
Jj^0Zf(ti)Acci = Jabf(s)d«(s)
This does depend upon the partition P or on the points f as noted by Rudin. It is often
assumed that a(x) = x. □
In order to use the result, we set a = s(T) and b = s(t), where x = s and the partition P
is given by (s(T), s(T+l),...., s(t-l), s(t)} where
s(j)= = Z t forJ =T' ' t-tt i
a(sj) = s(j)
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Actj = a(sj) - a(Sj_j) = s(j) - s(j-l) = 1/j
ju.(P) = max (s(j) — s(j—1)) — 1/T+l.
i=T+l,...,t
Aaj shows how fine the approximation is. The function f in the definition is equal to
Q(x), such that f(s) = Q(x(s)). When T goes to infinity then Aocj as well as p(P) goes
towards 0. Hence if we choose T sufficiently large and set xx = x°(s(T)) then for
every s > 0 there is a 5 > 0 such that
I E -Q(xj-i)" It! Q(x(s))ds I <s
jTfti J Js(T)
for every partition P of [s(T), s(t)] or a partition Pt of [T, t] in time-t notation with
p(P) < 5 = 1/T and every choice of points in [s(j—1), s(j)], or in time-t notation [(j -
1), j], where we choose the lower bound j -1. If we choose T sufficiently large and
set xx = xd(s(T)) as the initial condition, then the path of the difference equation, xt,
will be arbitrarily close to the path of the ordinary differential equation, xD(s(t)), for t
> T.
Let us assume that the differential equation (6.3*) has a stationary point , x, i.e. a
point where Q( x) = 0. Furthermore, we assume that the real parts of the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix for Q at the stationary point are negative. In this case, the
stationary point x is asymptotic stable as shown Brock and Mallearis (1989). Let DA
be the domain of attraction for x, such that any trajectory xD that starts in DA will
converge to x when s goes to infinity :
xD(0) € DA => xD(s) —> x when s —> oo.
This is illustrated in figure 6.1, where we assume that DA contains a neighbourhood
W of x , hence { x } is an invariant set.
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Figure 6.1. The stationary point and the domain of attraction DA.
For a sufficiently large T the trajectories of difference equation will be approximate
closely to the trajectories of differential equation for all t > T. If the sequence for
difference equation { xt }t belongs to the neighbourhood W sufficiently often, then xt
will converge to x. However for small T, xt might not belong to the domain of
attraction, and we must find a method to keep the xt in the domain of attraction DA
until t is sufficiently large. This is also discussed briefly in Evans and Honkapohja
(1995a), where they mention that is in general not possible to establish local
convergence without the projection facility, because xt at an early stage might be
outside the domain of attraction DA. This is due to the their model being stochastic.
In order to keep xt within the domain of attraction we use a projection facility defined
in Ljungs paper . The projection facility is as follows : Let D2 be a nontrivial,
compact set containing x and let D! be an open set, where D2 cz Dj, see figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2. The projection facility.
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The algorithm is then defined as:
(6.6) xt= xt_, +-Q(xt_,)
Where
some value in D2 if X gD
ifXeD
Where D, c: DA and D2 c W, and the initial condition for xt is given by : x0 e D2. If
for some small t, xt leaves the D[ , and perhaps the domain of attraction, then the
projection algorithm will project xt back into D2 which is a subset of W. When t is
sufficiently large, xt will still be inside DA and follow the path of the differential
condition such that xt converge to x. In Evans and Honkapohja (1995a) they
mention that is not necessary to use the projection facility if the shock is small. They
prove this with the help of a Lyapounov function. The intuition is that it is possible to
show that the recursive algorithm only leave the domain of attraction a finite number
of times, with the help of the Lyapounov function. Thus it will infinitely often stay
inside the domain of attraction and we do not need the projection facility.
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6.4. The local stability of the learning rule.
In the previous chapters the speed of learning was constant, this is also referred to as
constant gain parameter, see Evans and Honkapohja (1993b). The agents use a
similar learning rule in this chapter, but take account of the possibility that cycles of
period 2 can occur as well as steady states. Furthermore, we assume that the speed of
learning is no longer constant but decreasing over time. The reason for introducing
the decreasing gain parameter is to be able to extend the model to cover the
stochastic case, i.e. when there is a shock to the model. As noted in chapter 4, it was
necessary to have a decreasing gain parameter when there were a shock in the model.
Let us assume there exist a rational 2-cycle (p,,p2), and the agents believe that the
economy is in a rational 2-cycle with unknown parameter values. Since the two types
of agents act according to the belief that the economy is a 2-cycle, the forecast of the
price at time t + 1, pt+1, should be based on data where (x + 1) mod 2 = 0 for x < t
with the following connection between t and x :
where x iT = pjT+i denotes the fast learner's forecast and yi;T = q2T+i denotes the slow
learner's forecast at time 2x + i for i = 1,2 and x = 0,1,2,.... The actual price is given
by Pi,T = p2(i-i)+i f°r i = 1>2 and x = 0,1,2... We divide the time t-axis into intervals
of length 2 :
t = 2x + i fori =1,2 and x = 0,1,2,3...
The learning rules for the two types of agents are given by
xvr = Xvr_i + ai(Pi,t - xi T_!) for i= 1,2 and x = 1,2,...
Yi.t = Yi.t-i + ar (Pi,x ~ Yi.t-i) for i = 1,2 and x = 1,2,...
r =0 T= 1 r =2 r
t = l t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6
This can be illustrated as follows:
















Hence the fast learners update their forecast of an odd time price based on the
previous odd time forecast and the previous odd time actual price. The forecast of an
even time price is based at the previous even time forecast and actual price. The slow






X2,T X2,T-I + ax(P2,T-X2,T-l)
yi.t yltt-i ax(Pi,T-yi,x-i)
vy2,T7 ly2,x-J l a" (P2.t -y2.r-l)J
The learning rules can be rearranged into 4-tuplets such that we have the algorithm :
(6.7)
d,.d2
where Db D2 denotes the projection facility from section 6.3. The connection
between actual price and expected prices is given by the function H:
Pt =H(p°+1,q°+1)
where p has been omitted for simplicity. Hence we have
Pi.t = P2(x-i) + i = P2t-i = H(P2t,q2t) if i= 1,
such that the forecast at an even time, (pjT , q2x), is used to calculate the actual price
at an odd time, plx = P2t- l
Pi,T = H(x2(T_1),y2(T_1)) -if i - 1.
The actual price at an even time, p2t, is calculated by the forecast at an odd time,
( P2t+1 ' q2r+l ) •
P i,t = P2(t— 1) + i = P2X = H(p2T+1, q2T+1) if i = 2,
or P2,T = H(xliT,yliT)








f (H(x2 T_,,y2 T_,) - x, T_,)A
al (H(x, T, y, T) - x2 T_,)
at ( H(x2>t_, , y21_,) - y, T_j)
a' (H(x, t, y, t) - y 2 T_,)
d,.d2
As can be seen from row 2 and 4, the algorithm (6.8) is not fully recursive. Hence we
substitute xljT and y1>T with x 1>t = x ljT_j + (p1>T - x ljt_, ) and y1>T = y^ + a* (p1>T










ar (H(v|/(x, T_,), y( ylT_,)) - x2>t_, )
ax (H(x2 T_j, y 2 T_,) - y, T_,)
a' (H(v|/(x, t_,), v|/( y, t_,)) - y2,x_i), d„d,
where y(x Ux_y) = x^ + a^ (p1<T - x 1>T_!) and \\t(y 1>t_,) = y u T_i + asT (pljT - y lT_,),
with p] T = H(x Y2,t-i)- Now the algorithm is fully recursive. In the recursive
algorithm from section 6.3, it was necessary to have the same yT in front of all the
rows in the matrix in (6.9), hence the following assumption is made on the speed of
learning, and as mentioned above we furthermore assume the speed of learning is
decreasing. This is captured by assumption 6.2.
Assumption 6.2. a. = yT af and asT = yT ^ for all x > 1, where yT = - for all x.
T
We have a decreasing gain parameter in the algorithm and the algorithm can be
written as:










af ( H(x2iT_, , y21_,) - x, T_i)
af ( H(V|/(X1iT_,),V(yi.t-i)- x2,t-i)
as ( h(x2,x-i ' y2,T-i) - y i.x-i)
as (hO(xi,x-i), y (y i,T-i)) - y 2,t-i ) d,.d2
for x = 1,2,3...or in vector notation:
(6.11) X, = [ X,., + - Q(X„,) 1 fort =1,2,3.
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where XT denote the vector (xLt, x2jX, yi;T, ), and for example the first row and
third row in the Q-matrix is given by:
Qi(Xx_i) = a^Htx^ ,y2,x-i) - xlf t-i ) and
Q3(Xt_i) = as (H(y(x2iI_! ),H/(y2,t-i)) - Yi.x-i )•
We can now use the results from section 6.3 on this algorithm. We furthermore
assume that yT = 1/x for all x.
The local stability of (6.11) is given by the local asymptotic stability of the
associated differential equation according to the results in section 6.3.
(6.12) = Q(XD(r)).
dr
where r > 0 is notional time. The purpose is to study whether XT = (xlT, x2 t , y1>t, y2 l)
converge to X = (p,, p2, p,, p2) when x goes to infinity for initial values Xj close to
X, i.e. X[ e W where W is a neighbourhood around X as defined in section 6.3,
and X is a stationary point for Q.
In order to determine local asymptotic stability of X under (6.12), we have to find
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix for Q(X(r)) at the stationary point X. If all the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian have a negative real part, then the differential equation is
locally stable at the stationary point X, and the algorithm converges to X for nearby
starting points. Let us therefore consider the Jacobian for Q at X. This is a 4x4-
matrix given by:
'
-af afH,(p2,p2) 0 afH2(p2,p2)N
= afHjCpuP,) -af afH2(pl5p,) 0
0 asH,(p2,p2) -as asH2(p2,p2)
UsH^ppp,) 0 asH2(p1,pI) -as J
where H, and H2 are the partial derivatives of H w.r.t. p® and q®, respectively.
From chapter 5, we have the following property of the partial derivatives for H at
(p,,Pi)and(p2,p2):
Hi(p,,p1) = PX(Pi)and H2(p, ,p,) = (1 - p)x(p,)
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H2 (P2>P2) = PX(Pi) ^ H2 (p2, p2) - (1 - p)x(p2),
where x(Pi) = F'(p,) and x(P2) = F(p2 )• We can find the eigenvalues of J( X), but
the expressions are not very nice:
A., - - i(af +as)~ - 7(0 - - l(ii)- (U!L-
2 2 2 V 4-7(0
h = ~ ~(af + as)~ ^M + - J('0--^t==2 2 2 y 4-7C0
X3 - - i(af +3,)+ 1 7(0 - ^ l(ii) +—^~L=r2 2 2 V 4-7(0
A-4 = - ^(af + a,,) + - 7(0 + - J(") +~7=2 2 2 y 4-7(0
with (0 = ((1 - (Oa, + paf)2x(p, )x(P2),
(a) = (af- as)2 + ( (1 - p) as + paf)2 x( p, )x(P2)) and
(Hi) = 8(af- as) x(p, )x(P2){((!- PX + paf)((l - p)^ - paf) }.
If X(P, )x(P2) < 0 then the real part of all the eigenvalues are negative, since the real
part is equal to -l/2(af + ) for all four eigenvalues. When x(Pi )x(P2) ~ 0 then the
eigenvalues are equal to either - af or - aj and all the eigenvalues are negative. If
X(Pi )x(P2) > 0- then it is uncertain whether the eigenvalues have a negative real part
and we have to check the size of the eigenvalues. In the appendix we show that all
four eigenvalues are negative if F'(pj )F'(p,) = x(Pi)x(P2) < I- We can summarise
the result.
Proposition 6.1. Given assumption 6.1 and 6.2, ifx(Pi )z(p2 ) < 1 then the 2-cycle
(Pi > P2) ts locally stable under learning.
Proof. See appendix. ■
We should note that the condition in proposition 6.1 is a sufficient condition and not
necessary condition.
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Example continued. When s = 1, a = 3 and M = 1, then
X(Pi) = a(3(pi)ap_I =- 1
X(p2) = a(3(p2 )ap_1 = - 1
and X(Pi)X(P2) ~ 1 in this special case and if we set p = 0.5, af = 0.9 and ^ =0.5,
then the eigenvalues are given by
X[ = - 1.5, X2 = - 0.7, X3 = - 0.6, X4 = 0,
and the 2-cycle (Pj,p2) = (0.5, 2) can be unstable. However in this case the
condition in proposition 6.1 is not satisfied. If we instead choose M = 0.5 but keep
the other parameter values then (p,, p2) = (1/6, 3/2) is a 2-cycle and
X(p,) = (Mp)aP(p, )■*"'»-0.25
X(p2) = (M|!)aP<P1)a|w--0.25
and x(P] )x(P2) = 1/16. In this case the eigenvalues are
Xj « - 1.03, X2 « - 0.80, X3 « - 0.54, X4 « - 0.42
and the 2-cycle is stable. □
Let us now compare the stability condition in proposition 6.1 with the stability
condition for a rational 2-cycle when we have homogeneous agents.
6.5. The 2-cycle and homogeneous agents.
In order to make the comparison between homogenous and heterogeneous agents, we
consider the case where p = 1. The case where p = 0 is similar. When p = 1 there is
only one first-order condition
p-l: n1 = ^(T1-) ■
Pt+1
The equilibrium condition is reduced to :
(6.13) n=l: M-y-fi.) => pt = F(p(„).
P, P,„
2
The F-function only depends on p°+1 and we assume that F is a C -function in pt+1.
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The definition of a 2-cycle is similar to the previous definition, hence a rational 2-
cycle is a pair (p,, p2) where
Pi = F(p2)and P2 = F(p,).
We can illustrate the function F and the 2-cycle :
Pt
We have to show that a pair (p15p2) is a 2-cycle in the homogeneous case if and
only if it is a 2-cycle in the heterogeneous case defined in section 6.2. Assume the
opposite, then there are two different pairs such that (p,, p,) is a 2-cycle determined
by the H-function and (pj ,p2) is a 2-cycle determined by the F-function. The 2-cycle
(p,, p2) has to satisfy the equilibrium conditions given by :
^-=H«fL) + (l-ll)5(f1-) = 5(fL) and
Pi P2 P2 P2
P2 Pi Pi Pi
while a 2-cycle (p,,p2) for F satisfies :
M^Il) md H.yli)
Pi Pi P2 Pi
Thus a 2-cycle in the heterogeneous case satisfies the equilibrium condition if and
only if it satisfies the condition for a 2-cycle in the homogeneous case.
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Let us, corresponding to section 6.4, assume that the agents act as if the economy
were in a 2-cycle and their forecast is again based on data where (x + 1) mod 2-0
for x < t. Let t = 2x + i for i = 1,2 and x = 1,2,3... and let the agents make their
forecast according to the adaptive learning rule from section 6.4 :
x i,x = x ltT_, + a^ (p1>t - x 1>t_!) x - 1,2,...
X 2,i = X 2,T-1 + ai ( P2,T - X 2,1-1 ) X = 1,2,...
where x i>T = p£t+i is the expected price at time 2x + i for i = 1,2 and x = 1,2,.... The
actual price is given by pi T = P2(T_i)+i for i = 1,2 and x = 1,2... We use the forecast at
an even time to update the price in odd periods such that the connection between the
actual price pi;T and the expected price when i = 1 is given by :
P2i-1=F(P2I) or
P i.i = F(x 2,1-1) x = 1,2...
When i = 2, we use the forecast at an odd time to update a price at an even time:
P2i = F(p=T+1) or
P 2, i = F(x 1>T) x = 1,2,...
This is inserted into the learning rule such that we have the following algorithm:
^ ai(F(x2it_, )-xUt_,) "
ai(F(xl T )-x2 t_,) ,











vx2,T-iy D,.D,. at( F(v|/(xl t_,)) - x2ft_j)
where v|/(x 1>T_1) = x ljT-1 + a^ (pl T - x l T_!) with pl t = F(x 2,x_i) so that the algorithm
is fully recursive, and Dls D2 refers to the projection algorithm . When we had
heterogeneous agents we made two assumptions on the speed of learning a[. These
assumptions are also made here
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Assumption 6.3. = yT af, where yT = 1/x and 0 < af < 1.









F(x2,t-1 ) - X,,T-, '
F(^(XltT-.))-X2,T- 1 J d,,d2
for x = 1,2,3.. . The issue is still the local stability of the rational 2-cycle (PpP,)
under the recursive algorithm. We can use the results from section 6.3 as we did in
the heterogeneous case and local stability is determined by the differential equation :
dXD(r)
dr




with X = (xj, x2). The stability of the rational 2-cycle (p, ,p2) is thus determined by
the eigenvalues for the Jacobian matrix :
J(Pi.P2)
-af afF'(p2)"
UfF'(p,) -af J '
Since J is a 2x2-matrix, the eigenvalues have negative real parts if the trace of J is
negative and the determinant of J is positive. The trace of J(p,,p2) is - 2af and the
determinant is
det(J(pj,p2)) =(af)2( 1 -F'(p,)F'(p2))-
and local stability is ensured if
F(P,)F(P2)<1.
In this case the real parts of the eigenvalues for J(p,,p2) are negative. Hence a
necessary and sufficient condition for stability is F'(p, )F'( P2)<1-
Proposition 6.2. Given assumption 6.3. If F'(pI)F'(p2) < 1, then the 2-cycle (p,
, p2 ) is locally stable under learning.
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We can compare this condition with the stability condition for a 2-cycle, when we
have heterogeneous agents. The dynamics in the heterogeneous case is governed by
the function H, which is a function of p®+1 and qf+1, such that the partial derivatives
at (p*+1 ,q*+1) = (p,, p,) or (p®+1, q®+1) = (p2 ,p2) are given by :
Hi(p1,p,,Ji) = HX(Pi) and H2(p, ,p, ,p) = (1 - p)x(p,)
H,(p2,p2,p) = px(p2) H2(p2,p2,p) = (1 - p)x(p2)
However when (p'+1,qf+J) - (p,,p,) (or (p2,p2)) both agents have the same
forecast p, (or p2), and can be regarded as the same type even though their speed of
learning differ. In fact we will show that
Hi(p,,P! ,p) = pF'(p,) and Hj(p2 ,p2 ,p) = pF'(p2).
H2(Pi,p,,p) = (l - p)F'(Pi) and H2(p2, p2 ,p) = (1 -p)F'(p2).
Ifwe look at the partial derivatives H, and H2 when p. 1, we have from the proof of
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A similar argument applies to Spt/3ql, but with (1 - p) instead of p, and we have
the following connection between the partial derivatives for the function H with
heterogeneous agents and the derivatives for the function F with homogeneous agents
H, (p, ,Pi ,p) = pF'(Pj) and H2(p, ,p, ,p) = (1 - p)F'(p,)
H,(p2,p2,p) = pF'(p2) and H2(p2 ,p2 ,p)= (1 - p)F(p2).
This connection is not surprising, for example, when qI, = p^+l = p,, then H
reduces to a function of one variable, actually H is equal to F in this situation. If the
2-cycle is locally stable under learning in the homogeneous case, then it also locally




We can also do the opposite, such that stability in the heterogeneous case implies
stability in the homogeneous case. We have thus established an connection between
the local stability conditions for a 2-cycle under learning for homogeneous agents
and heterogeneous agents.
6.6. Conclusion.
In this chapter we have studied 2-cycles and the local stability of a 2-cycle under
heterogeneous learning. This was done in a set-up with decreasing speed of learning,
but in a deterministic model. The existence of 2-cycle could be established with the
help of existing results where we have homogeneous agents. We found a set of
conditions for the 2-cycle to locally stable under learning, the idea was to establish a
connection between a difference equation and a differential equation and study the
stability of the associated differential equation. The stability conditions in the
heterogeneous case corresponded to the stability conditions in the homogeneous case.
There are various extensions we could study, first it would be natural to look at a k-
cycle and extend the number of learners to n. We could also look at global
asymptotic stability of the cycle under learning, and investigate whether the domain
of attraction for which trajectories converge to the cycle depend the size of the speed
of learning. Finally we could look at stochastic algorithm, for example, if the
function H depends on a productivity shock but this is left for future research.
If the cycle is unstable, this can give rise to more complex situations as noted in
Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) and in more detail in Bullard (1994). If the 2-cycle
does not exist and the steady state is unstable, then it is possible that the economy
could converge to a strange attractor as shown in Bullard. This attractor arises as a
bifurcation phenomena in Bullards model. It might seem strange that the agents can
detect some periodic motion and not a 2-cycle or the steady state. The agents do not
need to be too smart in order to spot a 2-cycle, but in Bullards case the assumptions
the ensures the existence of a strange attractor exclude the possibility of a cycle.
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Appendix to chapter 6.
Here we will prove that the eigenvalues of J( X) have a negative real part.
Proofofproposition 6.1. Given assumption 6.1, the eigenvalues of J( X ) are :
x2=+
X4--l(af +a,)+lV(i)^J^T
where (1) = ((1 - p)a, + pa^xCp, )x(P2),
(2) = (af- as )2 + ((1 - p) as + paf)2x(p, )x(P2)^
(3) = 8(af-as)x(p,)x(p2){ ((1 - PK + paf)((l - pK - paf) }.
If the real part of the four eigenvalues is negative then the 2-cycle is locally stable.
We divide this into two cases either x(Pi)x(P2) ^ 0 or x(Pi)x(P2) > 0- We have
already shown that the real part of all the eigenvalues are negative if x( p, )x( P2) ^ 0-
Hence we only have to look at the case where x( Pi )x( P?) > 0-
Let us assume that x(Pi )x(P2) > 0- Look first at Xt and X2, if (2) - ((3)/(4 VCO ))
0, then the real part of both X! and X2 are negative. Let us therefore assume :
(2) - C(3)/(4Vot"» > 0.
Then and X2 are real and < X2, and we only need to show that X2 < 0 :
- - - (af + as) - -((1 -p)as + paf){x(pI)x(P2)}'/2
2 2
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+ ^{(af-as)2 + ((l -^)as + ^af)2X(Pi)x(P2)
- 2(af-as)[x(p,)x(P2)]1/2((l ~ PK - P^)) }m
= ~ (af+as)- ^((1 -p)as + paf){x(p,)x(P2)}1/2
+ {%(! +P{x(Pi)x(P2)}1/2 ) + as(l +(1 ~p){x(Pi)x(P2)}1/2) }2
- 2afaj (1 + {x(Pi )x(P2 )}m ) - 2afas(l + {x( P, )x(P2 )}'/2 ) V'2
Since the last two terms in this expression is negative, we have
X2 < -^(af +as)~ ~((1 -P)as + paf){x(p,)x(p2)}1/22 2
+ {8,(1 +p{X(p1)x(P2)}1/2) + as(l +(1 -P){X(P,)X(P2)}1/2)}2}1/2
= -^(af + as)- i((l -p)as + |iaf){x(pI)x(P2)}1/2
+ i{af(l +p{x(Pi)x(P2)}1/2) + as(l +(1 -p){x(Pi)x(P2)}1/2) = 0
Hence X2 < 0 and both eigenvalues have negative real parts.
Let us now look at the two last eigenvalues X3 and X4 . If (3) is positive then X3 < X4
and we just have to look at X4 . However it is possible that they are complex, if (2) +
((3)/(4 7(1) )) is negative. In this case the real part of X3 is less than the real part of X4
and the real part of X4 is given by:
- ~(af+as)+ - 7(1) <0, whenx(p,)x(P2)< 1-
2 2
When (2) + ((3)/(4 TCO )) is positive then X3 < X4 and we have to show that X4 < 0:
X4 = --(af+as)+-7(1)+- 1(2) h—^-7= =>
2 2 2 f 4-7(1)
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(A.l) ^4 = - j(af+as)+^-((1-^i)as + naf){x(p])x(p2)}1/2
+ ~ {(%" as)2 + (0 ~ + M%)2X(Pi )x(P2 )
+ 2(af-as) {X(P,)X(P2)}'/2 ((1 - pK - paj)) }1/2
X4 attains its highest value if (1 - p^ - paf > 0, in this case (3) is positive. Let us
therefore assume that (1 - p.^ - p% > 0. We assumed that x(Pi)x(P2) < L then
right-hand side of (A.l) is less than
<- +aj + j((l -p)as + paf) + I { fo-aj1 + ((1 - p) as + pa^2
+ 2(af-as)( (1 - p^ - paf)) }I/2
= - t ((1 - n)a, + tia,) +-{((1 - n) af + ,1a,)2 }"2 = 0.
2 2
ifx(Pi)x(p2)< 1, then X4 < 0 and all 4 eigenvalues have negative real parts. B
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Chapter 7. Conclusions.
In recent literature of dynamic macroeconomic theory, there has been a great interest
in the convergence of simple adaptive learning rules to rational expectations solution,
but is has been common to assume that agents are homogeneous in their expectation
formation, it thus would be natural to allow for some heterogeneity in the agents
learning rules.
In this thesis, we have analysed heterogeneous beliefs within the framework of a
standard overlapping generations model. This was done to extend some of the local
stability results developed in the previous literature, where the economic agents use
the same learning rule. Furthermore, we analysed the effects on labour supply, prices
and welfare when we change the speed of learning. The issue of interest was whether
agents with fast learning rule could do better compared to agents with slow learning
rule.
Intuitively, agents with a more accurate forecast should have a higher level of welfare
compared to agents with a less accurate forecast. However, this need not be the case
as the results in chapter 2, 3 and 4 show. This was due partly to the assumption that
both groups of agents were boundedly rational, and there was no interaction between
the two groups. In this situation, the fast learners were "closer" to the steady state
value of the variable of interest, and depending on the initial conditions, the fast
agents could be worse off in the long run, even though they made a "better" forecast.
In the simple overlapping generations model introduced in chapter 2, we were able to
shows this learning effect, if both types of agents initially were above the steady
state, the slow learners had a higher welfare in short run, but in the long run the fast
agents were better off. There was a single crossing point in time, the slow agents had
a higher welfare initially, but at some stage the fast became better off than the slow
for the rest of the learning transition. The crossing point depends on the choosen
parameter values. If the two groups initially were below the steady state, it was
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possible to show the opposite result. The fast agents were better off in short run,
while the slow was better off in the long run. The intuitive reason behind these two
results are as follows
• The two economies did not interact, hence the fast (slow) agents was followed by
fast (slow) agents. Since there was a delay in revising the expectations initially,
then both types of agents supplied the same amount of labour initially. The
following generation of fast agents react more rapidly than the slow agent, due to
a higher speed of learning, which meant a reduction in the labour supply, when
they initially were above the steady state, or an increase when they were below the
steady state. Hence the welfare of the old generation of fast learners is lower
compared to the old generation of slow agents, because the consumption of the old
depends on the labour supply of the young, when the labour supply is reduced,
while the opposite applies when the labour supply is increased.
• The level of welfare during the learning transition was below the steady state
welfare, but given that the steady state was locally stable under learning, the
welfare "increase and converge". Since the fast agents was "closer" to the steady
state during the learning transition, because they have a higher speed of learning,
they eventually have a higher welfare. If the level of welfare during the learning
transition was above the steady state welfare, we have the opposite result.
The two situations, where the economy was either above or below the steady state,
could be used in different types of policy experiments. However, government
intervention only reduced the steady state level of welfare, and during the learning
transition the agents were either "undershooting" or "overshooting" the steady state
welfare, depending on the initial conditions.
There was no scope for government intervention in chapter 2. If, there are increasing
returns various forms of government intervention can increase the level of welfare in
a new steady state. Hence the government can use fiscal and/or monetary policy to
steer the economy towards a steady state, or to put it another way, the agents'
learning rule takes them to high-level equilibrium after the government intervention
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has removed the low-level equilibrium. In this case, the fast learners were better of
during the entire learning transition as long as the government intervention was not
too "large". If the government intervention were "large", the slow could be better off
than the fast in the long run, but initially the fast was better off than the slow.
An obvious extension was to incoporate a random shock in this model, for example,
a productivity shock. This could generate fluctuations between a low-level
equilibrium and a high level equilibrium, even if there was no policy changes or
other changes, as long as the agents use a constant speed of learning. In order to
obtain local stability under learning, it was necessary to use a decreasing speed of
learning, otherwise the forecast is still random even in the limit. The reason for
choosing a constant speed was that is was easier to track changes in policy with a
constant learning rule. The welfare comparison for two economies did not
necessarily give the same results as in chapter 2 and 3.
It would be natural to study the case with constant speeds further, if we want to
analyse more complicated changes in government policies, for example, a time-
varying policy, and perhaps allow for the agents to forecast on the policy changes as
well. We should also try and prove the conjectures made in chapter 3 and 4, and try
and find the optimal path of policy, briefly discussed in chapter 3. Since it is possible
that there exist sunspots solutions in the model, we could investigate the connection
between existence and stability of a sunspot solution and the speed of learning. Evans
and Honkapohja (1993a) give an example of an economy that is in a sunspot
equilibrium, and show how government intervention can eliminate the sunspot
solution so the learning rule takes the agent to the steady state after the intervention.
We could investigate how big a the speed of learning combined with government
intervention would be needed to eliminate the sunspot. We compared two adaptive
learning rules, instead we could compare the adaptive learning rule with another
learning rule, in order to show which was fastest.
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In the second part, we extended the overlapping generations model, such that it
includes both fast and slow learners in the model. This changed the conditions for the
steady state to be locally stable under learning, and the stability condition depended
in a simple way on the fraction of fast learners. The welfare comparison between fast
and slow gave the intuitive result that fast learners were better off than slow agents
during the learning transition if the initial condition were the same for both types.
This was due to the fast agent being closer to the actual value of the forecasted
variable at each point in time, hence they were closer to the true optimisation
problem compared to the slow learners. If the initial conditions differed then the slow
learners could be better off initially, but for t sufficiently large the fast learners
overtake as shown by various simulations.
The results in chapter 5 may give some justification for the remark that is easy to
incorporate heterogeneous beliefs into existing models, since both the stability results
and welfare comparison gave the results we expected. However, the results may
depend crucial on the way we incorporate heterogeneous learning in the model, and
this was done in simple way in chapter 5. A natural extension of this would be to
endogenise the fraction of learners, and make it time dependent, another possibilty
was to let the government be able to change fractions. We could also assume that the
fraction was related to the welfare in some way, and that fast and slow are trying
increase their proportion at the expense of the other, such that fraction of slow or fast
goes towards zero. Another extension would be to introduce a random shock to the
model as in chapter 4. We briefly studied the case with n learners, instead of n types,
we could have continuum of agents, where some might have rational expectations or
perfect foresight
Since the standard overlapping generations model may have equilibria other than
steady state, it would be obvious to study the stability of such equilibria under
learning, when we have mixed economy of slow and fast agents. An attempt was
done in the last chapter, where we analysed the local stability of a 2-cycle under
learning in the mixed economy. Although a 2-cycle may not be the most complicated
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equilibrium, it was not as straightforward as expected to find conditions for the 2-
cycle to be locally stable under learning. We found a set of sufficient conditions for
local stability of the 2-cycle. This was done by looking at a corresponding
differential equation instead of difference equation and followed the outline in Ljung
(1977). However, Ljungs results was for a stochastic difference equation, while the
difference equation in chapter 6 was deterministic. Thus we proved Ljungs result for
this simpler algorithm. The stability condition was equivalent to the stability
condition, when there is only one type of agents.
This model could again be extended to include a random variable, but this does not
make it any easier to find stability conditions. We could also look at more
complicated equilibria, such as a k-cycle, sunspot solution or a stationary dynamic
path. However, the dynamics often become quite complicated and we may only be
able to use simulations in order to obtain some results. It is easy to see that the
models become more complex and formal results are to show, when we introduce
some sort of heterogeneity in the agents beliefs, or just vary the speed of learning,
and there still remains a lot to analyse in these models.
It is easy to see that the models become complicated and the formal results is hard to
show, when we introduce some sort of heterogeneity in the agents beliefs, or just
vary the speed of learning, and there still remain a lot to analyse in these models. In
this thesis, we were able to show in some cases, agents who make better forecasts do
not necessarily enjoy a higher welfare compared to agents who are not so quick to
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The computer programs used for the simulations in chapter 2-5.
The computer programs are made in Mathematica for Windows 2.2. A program for
the simulations in chapter 2 is made as follows.
The temporary equilibrium condition :
F[nJ : = B*nA(beta).
The learning rule :
h[n_] : = n + a*(F[n] - n).
In order to generate a sequence of expected labour supply, we choose parameter
values for B, beta, n and an initial condition. The following command give a
sequence of expected labour supply:
NestList[ h, 1,100 ]
This command give the following output
h[l],h[h[l]],h[h[h[l]]], ,h[[ h[l] ]]
Here the initial condition is 1, and we have sequence with 100 values for the
expected labur supply. This can now be used to calculate the welfare sequence since
U(ct+I) - V(nt) could be written as a function of the expected labour supply.
u[n] — v[n] = u[ f [ F[h[n]] ] ] - v[ F[n] ]
The sequence of expected labour supplies can then be mapped in the this expression
and we have a welfare sequence. The good thing about Mathematica is that we can
use symbols and then put in values for the symbols, so it is easy to change the
parameters. Mathematica has a command that can plot the welfare sequence. This
gives the figures in chapter 2. The rest of simulations is extensions of these simple
commands.
In chapter 4 we use a decreasing speed of learning this change the h-function to
h[n_,t_] : = n + (a/t)*(F[n] - n).
p[n_,tj : = t+1.
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In this case we need to update to functions h and p. We define
Iteration[xJ := { h[ x[[l]],x[[2]] ], p[ x[[l]],x[[2]]] }
NestList[ Iteration , {5,1}, 100 ]
This gives us a sequence of expected labour supplies. In this way we define function
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Possible spelling error: new symbol name "beta"
is similar to existing symbol "Beta".
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1 - sigma 1/(1 + epsilon)
(A alpha)
beta = alpha*((1-sigma)/(1+epsilon))
alpha (1 - sigma)
1 + epsilon
F[n]
1 - sigma 1/(1 + epsilon)
(A alpha)
(alpha (1 - sigma))/(l + epsilon)
n
h [n_] : = n + a* (F [n] - n)
u[n_]:= (1/(1-sigma))*(A*((F[h[n]])^alpha))A(1-sigma)
v [n_] : = (1/ (1+epsilon) ) * (F [n] ) (1+epsilon)



















0.8 (1.345 n - n) + n
welfare [n]
0 .118
-1.19034 n + 12.5371
0.0983333 0.0116033
(0.8 (1.346 n - n) + n)
NestList[h, 2, 5]
{2, 1.55275, 1.43496, 1.40272, 1.39378, 1.39129}
Map[welfare, %]
{11.3095, 11.336, 11.3443, 11.3467, 11.3474, 11.3476}
ListPlot[%, PlotJoined -> True]
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